Scott F Aikin
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1294675 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Scott F Aikin |
| PRENOMES | Scott F |
| SOBRENOME | Aikin |
| ASSINATURA | AIKIN S F |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Vanderbilt University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5358-7234 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 33 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 31 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 2 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2007 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Hubert Marraud
Empirical evidence for the non-persuasiveness of the straw man on its target
This paper addresses the degree to which straw man arguments are perceived as persuasive by their targets. A review of the literature shows that there is a consensus on the topic, stipulating that using a straw man argument is unlikely to change a person’s views. However, the experimental evidence we have so far on the straw man fallacy only covers third-person scenarios, i.e., when participants act as an audience observing an argumentative excha…
What about Whataboutism
In some recent literature, ‘whataboutism’ is analysed as a sometimes-reasonable argument or claim about inconsistency on an issue of dispute, akin to the ad hominem tu quoque. We argue that this doesn’t capture the peculiarly meta-argumentative failure (or success) of ‘what-about’ appeals. Whataboutist moves are appeals to evidence about whether one has assessed the total evidence or has made the right contrasting consideration and so need not be…
Three Puzzles with Ad Hominem Arguments
The ad hominem appears to be the simplest fallacy form—one criticizes speakers instead of their statements or arguments. It is regularly taken to be a fallacy of irrelevance, in that who is speaking does not bear on the truth of what is said. But three puzzles attend this analysis. (1) Given that the fallacy is simple and seemingly obvious, how could it be effective in practice? (2) Are there not cases when who is speaking is relevant? How do we …
Selective Dispute Avoidance, Deep Disagreements, and Pragmatic Meta-Arguments for Engagement
The phenomenon of selective dispute avoidance is that there are issues we debate and issues we recoil from debating, despite the fact that they are very similar in values at stake. What accounts for this variance? That some disagreements are deep and engagements on some deep issues yields meta-argumentatively bad results is a plausible explanation. However, practical second-order rebutting reasons to these considerations are proposed, essentially…
Epictetus’s Encheiridion
For anyone approaching the Encheiridion of Epictetus for the first time, this book provides a comprehensive guide to understanding a complex philosophical text. Including a full translation and clear explanatory commentaries, Epictetus’s ‘Encheiridion’ introduces readers to a hugely influential work of Stoic philosophy. Scott Aikin and William O. Stephens unravel the core themes of Stoic ethics found within this ancient handbook. Focusing on the …
Free Speech Fallacies as Meta-Argumentative Errors
On Halting Meta-argument with Para-Argument
The academic at the crossroads
Bothsiderism
Fallacies of Meta-argumentation
This article argues that the theoretical concept of meta-argumentative fallacy is useful. The authors argue for this along two lines. The first is that with the concept, the authors may clarify the concept of meta-argumentation. That is, by theorizing where meta-argument goes wrong, the authors may capture the norms of this level of argumentation. The second is that the concept of meta-argumentative fallacies provides an explanatory model for a v…
Argumentation and the problem of agreement
Deep Disagreement and the Problem of the Criterion
What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement get Right (and Wrong)
In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement
Thinking About Logic
"Thinking about Logic is an accessible and thought-provoking collection of classic articles in the philosophy of logic. An ideal companion to any formal logic course or textbook, this volume illuminates how logic relates to perennial philosophical issues about knowledge, meaning, rationality, and reality. The editors have selected each essay for its brevity, clarity, and impact and have included insightful introductions and discussion questions. …
On the Limits of the Term “Pragmatism”
Cheryl Misak argues that the link between belief and action is a pragmatist hallmark, and so extends the reach of the term 'pragmatist' to a surprisingly wide and varied group of philosophers. In this essay, I first show that this hallmark extends the term 'pragmatist' to William Kingdon Clifford and his case for evidentialism. This, I argue, is a salutary extension. One difficulty with the version of the pragmatist criterion of belief Misak posi…
Pragmatism, Common Sense, and Metaphilosophy
The pragmatist use of common sense philosophy has not only been a source for first-order philosophical work but also for metaphilosophical orientation. The primary motive for both of these lines of thought has been that of anti-skepticism. This essay shows, using William James and G.E. Moore as primary examples, that skeptical challenges may be posed from within the common sense and pragmatist common sense programs. From this result, a case for s…
Why We Argue (and How We Should)
Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Nature of Philosophy
For the past fifteen years, Aikin and Talisse have been working collaboratively on a new vision of American pragmatism, one which sees pragmatism as a living and developing philosophical idiom that originates in the work of the "classical" pragmatisms of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, uninterruptedly develops through the later 20th Century pragmatists (C. I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, Nelson Goodman, W. V. O. Quine), and continues th…
Does divine hiding undermine Positive Evidential Atheism
Positive Evidential Atheism is the two-part view that our available evidence sufficiently supports the belief that God does not exist and that God's non-existence is a morally good thing. Paul Moser's recent work (2012, 2013, 2014, and forthcoming) provides a case that Positive Evidential Atheism is undermined by ‘intentional divine elusiveness’. This essay defends Positive Evidential Atheism from Moser's objection along two lines: (1) Moser's un…
Pragmatism and Pluralism Revisited
In 2005, we published a jointly authored article arguing that pragmatists must reject pluralism. As certain pragmatists describe themselves as pluralists, the essay received its share of criticism; however, no response has succeeded in defeating the essay’s argument. Nonetheless, contemporary classical pragmatists persist in embracing the term. Something’s amiss. In this article, we defend a conclusion that differs importantly from that of the 20…
Stoicism, Feminism and Autonomy
The ancient Stoics had an uneven track record with regard to women’s standing. On the one hand, they recognized women as fully capable of rationality and virtue. On the other hand, they continued to hold that women’s roles were in the home. These views are consistent, given Stoic value theory, but are unacceptable on liberal feminist grounds. Stoic value theory, given different emphasis on the ethical role of choice, is shown to be capable of sat…
Why We Argue (And How We Should)
Why We Argue (And How We Should): A Guide to Political Disagreement presents an accessible and engaging introduction to the theory of argument, with special emphasis on the way argument works in public political debate. The authors develop a view according to which proper argument is necessary for one’s individual cognitive health; this insight is then expanded to the collective health of one’s society. Proper argumentation, then, is seen to play…
Poe's Law, group polarization, and argumentative failure in religious and political discourse
Poe's Law is roughly that online parodies of religious views are indistinguishable from sincere expressions of religious views. Poe's Law may be expressed in a variety of forms, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, polarized attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poe's Law have relevance in wider circles tha…
The Pragmatism Reader
not that, as the stereotype goes, Continental thinkers and scholars have no respect for scientific modes of thought and experience; it is rather that they are skeptical that this mode is the only mode of world-disclosure. Insofar as Neo-Kantianism aims to vindicate the idea that thought and experience as they pertain to the physical sciences are privileged vis-a-vis other modes, it is completely out of step with the pluralism of the Continental t…
Poe's Law, group polarization, and argumentative failure in religious and political discourse
Poe's Law is roughly that online parodies of religious views are indistinguishable from sincere expressions of religious views. Poe's Law may be expressed in a variety of forms, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, polarized attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poe's Law have relevance in wider circles tha…
Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism
Pragmatism and Pluralism Revisited
In 2005, we published a jointly authored article arguing that pragmatists must reject pluralism. As certain pragmatists describe themselves as pluralists, the essay received its share of criticism; however, no response has succeeded in defeating the essay’s argument. Nonetheless, contemporary classical pragmatists persist in embracing the term. Something’s amiss. In this article, we defend a conclusion that differs importantly from that of the 20…
Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given
Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subject's beliefs are justified on the basis of that subject's awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of…
Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology
Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology
The Truth about Hypocrisy
Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of Hypocrisy
Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent’s proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from imp…
Holding One’s Own
The Dogma of Environmental Revelation
Environmental revelationism is the view that there are preferred means of knowing the value and structure of nature, and these means are characterized by experiences of awe or ceremonial feelings of reverence. This paper outlines the dogmatic consequences of this view
Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic infinitism
Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given
Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subject's beliefs are justified on the basis of that subject's awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of…
The Pragmatism Reader
not that, as the stereotype goes, Continental thinkers and scholars have no respect for scientific modes of thought and experience; it is rather that they are skeptical that this mode is the only mode of world-disclosure. Insofar as Neo-Kantianism aims to vindicate the idea that thought and experience as they pertain to the physical sciences are privileged vis-a-vis other modes, it is completely out of step with the pluralism of the Continental t…
Pragmatism Reader
Poe's Law, group polarization, and argumentative failure in religious and political discourse
Poe's Law is roughly that online parodies of religious views are indistinguishable from sincere expressions of religious views. Poe's Law may be expressed in a variety of forms, each highlighting either a facet of indirect discourse generally, polarized attitudes of online audiences, or the quality of online religious material. As a consequence of the polarization of online discussions, invocations of Poe's Law have relevance in wider circles tha…
Why We Argue (And How We Should)
Why We Argue (And How We Should): A Guide to Political Disagreement presents an accessible and engaging introduction to the theory of argument, with special emphasis on the way argument works in public political debate. The authors develop a view according to which proper argument is necessary for one’s individual cognitive health; this insight is then expanded to the collective health of one’s society. Proper argumentation, then, is seen to play…
Stoicism, Feminism and Autonomy
The ancient Stoics had an uneven track record with regard to women’s standing. On the one hand, they recognized women as fully capable of rationality and virtue. On the other hand, they continued to hold that women’s roles were in the home. These views are consistent, given Stoic value theory, but are unacceptable on liberal feminist grounds. Stoic value theory, given different emphasis on the ethical role of choice, is shown to be capable of sat…
Does divine hiding undermine Positive Evidential Atheism
Positive Evidential Atheism is the two-part view that our available evidence sufficiently supports the belief that God does not exist and that God's non-existence is a morally good thing. Paul Moser's recent work (2012, 2013, 2014, and forthcoming) provides a case that Positive Evidential Atheism is undermined by ‘intentional divine elusiveness’. This essay defends Positive Evidential Atheism from Moser's objection along two lines: (1) Moser's un…
Pragmatism and Pluralism Revisited
In 2005, we published a jointly authored article arguing that pragmatists must reject pluralism. As certain pragmatists describe themselves as pluralists, the essay received its share of criticism; however, no response has succeeded in defeating the essay’s argument. Nonetheless, contemporary classical pragmatists persist in embracing the term. Something’s amiss. In this article, we defend a conclusion that differs importantly from that of the 20…
Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Nature of Philosophy
For the past fifteen years, Aikin and Talisse have been working collaboratively on a new vision of American pragmatism, one which sees pragmatism as a living and developing philosophical idiom that originates in the work of the "classical" pragmatisms of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, uninterruptedly develops through the later 20th Century pragmatists (C. I. Lewis, Wilfrid Sellars, Nelson Goodman, W. V. O. Quine), and continues th…
Thinking About Logic
"Thinking about Logic is an accessible and thought-provoking collection of classic articles in the philosophy of logic. An ideal companion to any formal logic course or textbook, this volume illuminates how logic relates to perennial philosophical issues about knowledge, meaning, rationality, and reality. The editors have selected each essay for its brevity, clarity, and impact and have included insightful introductions and discussion questions. …
On the Limits of the Term “Pragmatism”
Cheryl Misak argues that the link between belief and action is a pragmatist hallmark, and so extends the reach of the term 'pragmatist' to a surprisingly wide and varied group of philosophers. In this essay, I first show that this hallmark extends the term 'pragmatist' to William Kingdon Clifford and his case for evidentialism. This, I argue, is a salutary extension. One difficulty with the version of the pragmatist criterion of belief Misak posi…
Pragmatism, Common Sense, and Metaphilosophy
The pragmatist use of common sense philosophy has not only been a source for first-order philosophical work but also for metaphilosophical orientation. The primary motive for both of these lines of thought has been that of anti-skepticism. This essay shows, using William James and G.E. Moore as primary examples, that skeptical challenges may be posed from within the common sense and pragmatist common sense programs. From this result, a case for s…
Why We Argue (and How We Should)
What Optimistic Responses to Deep Disagreement get Right (and Wrong)
In this paper, I argue for three theses. First, that the problem of Deep Disagreement is usefully understood as an instance of the skeptical Problem of the Criterion. Second, there are structural similarities between proposed optimistic answers to deep disagreement and the problem of the criterion. Third, in light of these similarities, there are both good and bad consequences for proposed solutions to the problem of deep disagreement
Deep Disagreement and the Problem of the Criterion
Bothsiderism
Fallacies of Meta-argumentation
This article argues that the theoretical concept of meta-argumentative fallacy is useful. The authors argue for this along two lines. The first is that with the concept, the authors may clarify the concept of meta-argumentation. That is, by theorizing where meta-argument goes wrong, the authors may capture the norms of this level of argumentation. The second is that the concept of meta-argumentative fallacies provides an explanatory model for a v…
Argumentation and the problem of agreement
Epictetus’s Encheiridion
For anyone approaching the Encheiridion of Epictetus for the first time, this book provides a comprehensive guide to understanding a complex philosophical text. Including a full translation and clear explanatory commentaries, Epictetus’s ‘Encheiridion’ introduces readers to a hugely influential work of Stoic philosophy. Scott Aikin and William O. Stephens unravel the core themes of Stoic ethics found within this ancient handbook. Focusing on the …
Philosophy (25 obras) · Epistemology (23 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (12 obras) · Sociology (12 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · Psychology (8 obras) · Argumentative (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (7 obras)