J Luis Guasch
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1456984 |
|---|---|
| NOME | J Luis Guasch |
| PRENOMES | J Luis |
| SOBRENOME | Guasch |
| ASSINATURA | GUASCH J L |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of California San Diego |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 48 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1984 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2008 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Corruption and concession renegotiations
Renegotiation of Infrastructure Concessions
Numerous renegotiations have plagued Latin American infrastructure concession contracts in the 1990s, to the point that private sector involvement is being questioned in some countries. This issue has been analyzed in a series of papers by Guasch et al. (2003, 2006a, 2006b). After putting these contributions in the context of the theoretical and empirical literature on contract renegotiation, this note surveys the existing evidence on the determi…
Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
In this chapter, the authors present an analysis of the motivation, formation, and design of credit cooperatives and show how their degree of success is likely to depend crucially on the particular incentive schemes, extent of control over resources, quality monitoring, and enforcement of punishment rules.
Agriculture and the Transition to the Market
Agricultural sectors in Eastern and Central Europe are large, and a substantial number of people are directly affected by changes in producer prices, farm employment, and land ownership. Retail food markets are among the most distorted in the pre-transition economies, and the needed adjustments are correspondingly large. The decollectivization of agriculture and return of land to former owners are among the most dramatic and emotive elements of t…
Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies
Tournament contracts are characterized that simultaneously elicit first-best efficient effort levels and self -selection of risk-neutral heterogeneous workers into ability-specific contracts. Comparisons across self-selected ability types are shown to be sometimes necessary to attain efficiency. Rationales are explored for not commonly observing such contracts in hierarchical organizations. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press
A theoretical and empirical analysis of the length of residency discount in the rental housing market
Rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries
An analysis of vacancy patterns in the rental housing market
Capital requirements, screening and interlinked sharecropping and credit contracts
Rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries
Capital requirements, screening and interlinked sharecropping and credit contracts
Corruption and concession renegotiations
Agriculture and the Transition to the Market
Agricultural sectors in Eastern and Central Europe are large, and a substantial number of people are directly affected by changes in producer prices, farm employment, and land ownership. Retail food markets are among the most distorted in the pre-transition economies, and the needed adjustments are correspondingly large. The decollectivization of agriculture and return of land to former owners are among the most dramatic and emotive elements of t…
A theoretical and empirical analysis of the length of residency discount in the rental housing market
Renegotiation of Infrastructure Concessions
Numerous renegotiations have plagued Latin American infrastructure concession contracts in the 1990s, to the point that private sector involvement is being questioned in some countries. This issue has been analyzed in a series of papers by Guasch et al. (2003, 2006a, 2006b). After putting these contributions in the context of the theoretical and empirical literature on contract renegotiation, this note surveys the existing evidence on the determi…
Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies
Tournament contracts are characterized that simultaneously elicit first-best efficient effort levels and self -selection of risk-neutral heterogeneous workers into ability-specific contracts. Comparisons across self-selected ability types are shown to be sometimes necessary to attain efficiency. Rationales are explored for not commonly observing such contracts in hierarchical organizations. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press
An analysis of vacancy patterns in the rental housing market
Capital requirements, screening and interlinked sharecropping and credit contracts
An analysis of vacancy patterns in the rental housing market
Rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries
A theoretical and empirical analysis of the length of residency discount in the rental housing market
Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies
Tournament contracts are characterized that simultaneously elicit first-best efficient effort levels and self -selection of risk-neutral heterogeneous workers into ability-specific contracts. Comparisons across self-selected ability types are shown to be sometimes necessary to attain efficiency. Rationales are explored for not commonly observing such contracts in hierarchical organizations. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press
Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
In this chapter, the authors present an analysis of the motivation, formation, and design of credit cooperatives and show how their degree of success is likely to depend crucially on the particular incentive schemes, extent of control over resources, quality monitoring, and enforcement of punishment rules.
Agriculture and the Transition to the Market
Agricultural sectors in Eastern and Central Europe are large, and a substantial number of people are directly affected by changes in producer prices, farm employment, and land ownership. Retail food markets are among the most distorted in the pre-transition economies, and the needed adjustments are correspondingly large. The decollectivization of agriculture and return of land to former owners are among the most dramatic and emotive elements of t…
Renegotiation of Infrastructure Concessions
Numerous renegotiations have plagued Latin American infrastructure concession contracts in the 1990s, to the point that private sector involvement is being questioned in some countries. This issue has been analyzed in a series of papers by Guasch et al. (2003, 2006a, 2006b). After putting these contributions in the context of the theoretical and empirical literature on contract renegotiation, this note surveys the existing evidence on the determi…
Corruption and concession renegotiations
Economics (9 obras) · Business (7 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Empirical evidence (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Public economics (3 obras) · Agriculture (2 obras) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (2 obras)