Stephanie Denison
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1464745 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Stephanie Denison |
| PRENOMES | Stephanie |
| SOBRENOME | Denison |
| ASSINATURA | DENISON S |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Waterloo |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6658-4139 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 25 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Children’s exploration distinguishes necessary and merely possible outcomes.
Preschoolers often fail tasks that require that they select between a necessary and a merely possible outcome. Prior work has interpreted these failures as evidence that children hold a minimal representation of possibility or as reflecting performance factors. However, all previous paradigms have operationalized children's modal understanding as a discrete choice or outcome, making it difficult to distinguish between these accounts. We introduce…
The Counterfactual Detective
We reveal a way that people use counterfactual thinking: They use it to infer motives and solve mysteries about what happened in the unseen past. In three preregistered experiments, participants (total N = 1,242) were asked to determine which of two competitors in a contest had sabotaged a third competitor. Participants often succeeded in identifying the culprit when counterfactual reasoning could be used to judge whether each suspect profited fr…
Older but not younger preschoolers use efficiency to evaluate how well goals are completed.
618; 48% female and 52% male; tested in a predominantly White region) scenarios where pairs of agents approached objects using paths that varied in length and efficiency, and then asked children which agent did a better job. In Experiments 1A and 1B, children aged 3 and 4 evaluated the agents using path length, but not efficiency. In Experiments 2A, 2B, and 3, children used path length to assess which agent did a better job from around age 4. But…
An Introduction to Rational Constructivism in Cognitive Development
Rational constructivism is a contemporary theory of cognitive development. It proposes that children generate, tweak, and radically revise theories, beliefs, and representations by integrating evidence with existing knowledge via probabilistic inferential learning mechanisms. We begin with a general overview of the theory of rational constructivism, covering its theoretical commitments and predictions. We then describe how it accounts for the emp…
Not just social networks
Six-Year-Olds, but Not Younger Children, Consider the Probability of Being Right by Chance When Inferring Others' Knowledge
When determining what others know, we intuitively consider not only whether they succeed but also their probability of success in the absence of knowledge (e.g., random guessing). Across three experiments (n = 240 North American 4–6-year-olds, data collected between 2020–2023) we find that 4-year-olds understand that tasks with a lower probability of chance success are harder. However, it is not until age 6 that children use this understanding to…
How young children come to recommend resource choices that reduce waste
Whereas adults are often motivated to minimize material waste, young children are notoriously wasteful of material resources. Wastefulness in children could arise because they do not see the value in minimizing material waste. We explored this possibility in four experiments on children aged 3–7 (total N = 514). Children saw vignettes where an agent chose between two resources: a smaller resource that resulted in minimal waste or a larger one tha…
Children use proximity and ability to infer distinct kinds of counterfactual closeness
Counterfactual outcomes (i.e., events that did not happen) vary in their closeness to reality. Whereas some are viewed as distant possibilities, others are seen as close, barely unrealized outcomes. Here, we investigate whether young children distinguish between two kinds of counterfactual closeness: one based on proximity and the other on ability. In two experiments, 4-7-year-olds (total N = 304) saw stories where two agents lost a race against …
Up and down
People often think about how things could have been better or worse. People make these upward and downward comparisons in different situations and with differing emotional consequences. We investigated whether the direction of counterfactual comparisons affects people's judgements of counterfactual closeness. In four preregistered experiments (N = 2,142), participants saw vignettes where agents lost or won a luck-based game. In Experiments 1, 2, …
Close counterfactuals and almost doing the impossible
Doing things efficiently
We examined why people prefer simple explanations. • We suggest the preference arises because people value completing goals efficiently. • Participants evaluated the appeal of explanations and causal processes. • Participants generally preferred simple methods as both explanations and processes. • Statistical information diminished and reversed this preference in parallel for both judgments. People often find simple explanations more satisfying t…
Emotions before actions
Adults expect people to be biased by sunk costs, but young children do not. We tested between two accounts for why children overlook the sunk cost bias. On one account, children do not see sunk costs as causal. The other account posits that children see sunk costs as causal, but unlike adults, think future actions cannot make up for sunk costs. These accounts make opposing predictions about whether children should see sunk costs as affecting emot…
Calculated Feelings
Developing the ability to accurately infer others’ emotions is crucial for children’s cognitive development. Here, we offer a new theoretical perspective on how children develop this ability. We first review recent work showing that with age, children increasingly use probability to infer emotions. We discuss how these findings do not fit with prominent accounts of how children understand emotions, namely the script account and the theory of mind…
Probability and intentional action
Local or foreign? Flexibility in children’s preference for similar others
Children have a robust social preference for people similar to them, like those who share their language, accent, and race. In the present research, we show that this preference can diminish when children consider who they want to learn about. Across three experiments, 4- to 6-year-olds (total N = 160; 74 female, 86 male, from the Waterloo region in Canada, a predominantly White and middle-class region) and adults ( N = 103) saw pairs of characte…
Novelty preferences depend on goals
So, what is it? Examining parent-child interactions while talking about artifacts in a museum
The odds tell children what people favor
In pursuing goals, people seek favorable odds. We investigated whether young children use this fact to infer goals from people's actions across two experiments on Canadian 3- to 7-year-old children ( N = 316; 167 girls, 149 boys). Participants' demographic information was not formally collected, but the region is predominantly middle-class and White. In Experiment 1, 3-year-old children saw a story where one agent went to a gumball machine with m…
Toddlers and Preschoolers Understand That Some Preferences Are More Subjective Than Others
Four experiments examined Canadian 2- to 3-year-old children’s (N = 224; 104 girls, 120 boys) thoughts about shared preferences. Children saw sets of items, and identified theirs and another person’s preferences. Children expected that food preferences would be more likely to be shared than color preferences, regardless of whether the items were similar or different in appeal (Experiments 1–3). A final study replicated these findings while also e…
Oh … so close! Children’s close counterfactual reasoning and emotion inferences
How we feel about an outcome often depends on how close an alternative outcome was to occurring. In four experiments, we investigated whether predominantly White, middle-class, Canadian children ( N = 425, Experiments 1-3) and American adults ( N = 227, Experiment 4) consider close counterfactual alternatives when inferring other people's emotions. In Experiment 1, 6-year-olds (but not 4- and 5-year-olds) inferred that an agent would feel sadder …
Infants’ reasoning about samples generated by intentional versus non‐intentional agents
The current experiments investigate how infants use goal‐directed action to reason about intentionally sampled outcomes in a probabilistic inference paradigm. Older infants and young children are flexible in their expectations of sampling: They expect random samples to reflect population statistics and non‐random samples to reflect an agent's preferences or goals (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & Denison, 2009). However, more recent work shows …
Who knows what? Preschoolers appreciate the link between ownership and knowledge
We investigated 4- and 5-year-olds' ( N = 194) appreciation of the link between knowledge and ownership. Namely, we asked whether preschoolers appreciate the ways in which owners are typically knowledgeable about artifacts. Experiment 1 revealed that 4- and 5-year-olds view owners as better sources of knowledge about artifacts than those who simply like artifacts. Experiment 2 built on these findings by showing that 5-year-olds appreciate that ow…
Beyond belief
Improbable events are surprising. However, it is unknown whether children consider probability when attributing surprise to other people. We conducted four experiments that investigate this issue. In the first three experiments, children saw stories in which two characters received a red gumball from two gumball machines with different distributions, and children then judged which character was more surprised. Experiment 1 (N = 120) shows develop…
Probability versus representativeness in infancy
A rich tradition in developmental psychology explores physical reasoning in infancy. However, no research to date has investigated whether infants can reason about physical objects that behave probabilistically, rather than deterministically. Physical events are often quite variable, in that similar-looking objects can be placed in similar contexts with different outcomes. Can infants rapidly acquire probabilistic physical knowledge, such as some…
The emergence of probabilistic reasoning in very young infants
How do people make rich inferences from such sparse data? Recent research has explored this inferential ability by investigating probabilistic reasoning in infancy. For example, 8- and 11-month-old infants can make inferences from samples to populations and vice versa (Denison & Xu, 2010a; Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008a). The current experiment investigates the developmental origins of this probabilistic inference mechanism with 4.5- and …
The emergence of probabilistic reasoning in very young infants
How do people make rich inferences from such sparse data? Recent research has explored this inferential ability by investigating probabilistic reasoning in infancy. For example, 8- and 11-month-old infants can make inferences from samples to populations and vice versa (Denison & Xu, 2010a; Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008a). The current experiment investigates the developmental origins of this probabilistic inference mechanism with 4.5- and …
So, what is it? Examining parent-child interactions while talking about artifacts in a museum
Probability versus representativeness in infancy
A rich tradition in developmental psychology explores physical reasoning in infancy. However, no research to date has investigated whether infants can reason about physical objects that behave probabilistically, rather than deterministically. Physical events are often quite variable, in that similar-looking objects can be placed in similar contexts with different outcomes. Can infants rapidly acquire probabilistic physical knowledge, such as some…
The emergence of probabilistic reasoning in very young infants
How do people make rich inferences from such sparse data? Recent research has explored this inferential ability by investigating probabilistic reasoning in infancy. For example, 8- and 11-month-old infants can make inferences from samples to populations and vice versa (Denison & Xu, 2010a; Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008a). The current experiment investigates the developmental origins of this probabilistic inference mechanism with 4.5- and …
Probability versus representativeness in infancy
A rich tradition in developmental psychology explores physical reasoning in infancy. However, no research to date has investigated whether infants can reason about physical objects that behave probabilistically, rather than deterministically. Physical events are often quite variable, in that similar-looking objects can be placed in similar contexts with different outcomes. Can infants rapidly acquire probabilistic physical knowledge, such as some…
Beyond belief
Improbable events are surprising. However, it is unknown whether children consider probability when attributing surprise to other people. We conducted four experiments that investigate this issue. In the first three experiments, children saw stories in which two characters received a red gumball from two gumball machines with different distributions, and children then judged which character was more surprised. Experiment 1 (N = 120) shows develop…
Infants’ reasoning about samples generated by intentional versus non‐intentional agents
The current experiments investigate how infants use goal‐directed action to reason about intentionally sampled outcomes in a probabilistic inference paradigm. Older infants and young children are flexible in their expectations of sampling: They expect random samples to reflect population statistics and non‐random samples to reflect an agent's preferences or goals (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & Denison, 2009). However, more recent work shows …
Who knows what? Preschoolers appreciate the link between ownership and knowledge
We investigated 4- and 5-year-olds' ( N = 194) appreciation of the link between knowledge and ownership. Namely, we asked whether preschoolers appreciate the ways in which owners are typically knowledgeable about artifacts. Experiment 1 revealed that 4- and 5-year-olds view owners as better sources of knowledge about artifacts than those who simply like artifacts. Experiment 2 built on these findings by showing that 5-year-olds appreciate that ow…
Toddlers and Preschoolers Understand That Some Preferences Are More Subjective Than Others
Four experiments examined Canadian 2- to 3-year-old children’s (N = 224; 104 girls, 120 boys) thoughts about shared preferences. Children saw sets of items, and identified theirs and another person’s preferences. Children expected that food preferences would be more likely to be shared than color preferences, regardless of whether the items were similar or different in appeal (Experiments 1–3). A final study replicated these findings while also e…
Oh … so close! Children’s close counterfactual reasoning and emotion inferences
How we feel about an outcome often depends on how close an alternative outcome was to occurring. In four experiments, we investigated whether predominantly White, middle-class, Canadian children ( N = 425, Experiments 1-3) and American adults ( N = 227, Experiment 4) consider close counterfactual alternatives when inferring other people's emotions. In Experiment 1, 6-year-olds (but not 4- and 5-year-olds) inferred that an agent would feel sadder …
Novelty preferences depend on goals
So, what is it? Examining parent-child interactions while talking about artifacts in a museum
The odds tell children what people favor
In pursuing goals, people seek favorable odds. We investigated whether young children use this fact to infer goals from people's actions across two experiments on Canadian 3- to 7-year-old children ( N = 316; 167 girls, 149 boys). Participants' demographic information was not formally collected, but the region is predominantly middle-class and White. In Experiment 1, 3-year-old children saw a story where one agent went to a gumball machine with m…
Calculated Feelings
Developing the ability to accurately infer others’ emotions is crucial for children’s cognitive development. Here, we offer a new theoretical perspective on how children develop this ability. We first review recent work showing that with age, children increasingly use probability to infer emotions. We discuss how these findings do not fit with prominent accounts of how children understand emotions, namely the script account and the theory of mind…
Probability and intentional action
Local or foreign? Flexibility in children’s preference for similar others
Children have a robust social preference for people similar to them, like those who share their language, accent, and race. In the present research, we show that this preference can diminish when children consider who they want to learn about. Across three experiments, 4- to 6-year-olds (total N = 160; 74 female, 86 male, from the Waterloo region in Canada, a predominantly White and middle-class region) and adults ( N = 103) saw pairs of characte…
Close counterfactuals and almost doing the impossible
Doing things efficiently
We examined why people prefer simple explanations. • We suggest the preference arises because people value completing goals efficiently. • Participants evaluated the appeal of explanations and causal processes. • Participants generally preferred simple methods as both explanations and processes. • Statistical information diminished and reversed this preference in parallel for both judgments. People often find simple explanations more satisfying t…
Emotions before actions
Adults expect people to be biased by sunk costs, but young children do not. We tested between two accounts for why children overlook the sunk cost bias. On one account, children do not see sunk costs as causal. The other account posits that children see sunk costs as causal, but unlike adults, think future actions cannot make up for sunk costs. These accounts make opposing predictions about whether children should see sunk costs as affecting emot…
Not just social networks
Six-Year-Olds, but Not Younger Children, Consider the Probability of Being Right by Chance When Inferring Others' Knowledge
When determining what others know, we intuitively consider not only whether they succeed but also their probability of success in the absence of knowledge (e.g., random guessing). Across three experiments (n = 240 North American 4–6-year-olds, data collected between 2020–2023) we find that 4-year-olds understand that tasks with a lower probability of chance success are harder. However, it is not until age 6 that children use this understanding to…
How young children come to recommend resource choices that reduce waste
Whereas adults are often motivated to minimize material waste, young children are notoriously wasteful of material resources. Wastefulness in children could arise because they do not see the value in minimizing material waste. We explored this possibility in four experiments on children aged 3–7 (total N = 514). Children saw vignettes where an agent chose between two resources: a smaller resource that resulted in minimal waste or a larger one tha…
Children use proximity and ability to infer distinct kinds of counterfactual closeness
Counterfactual outcomes (i.e., events that did not happen) vary in their closeness to reality. Whereas some are viewed as distant possibilities, others are seen as close, barely unrealized outcomes. Here, we investigate whether young children distinguish between two kinds of counterfactual closeness: one based on proximity and the other on ability. In two experiments, 4-7-year-olds (total N = 304) saw stories where two agents lost a race against …
Up and down
People often think about how things could have been better or worse. People make these upward and downward comparisons in different situations and with differing emotional consequences. We investigated whether the direction of counterfactual comparisons affects people's judgements of counterfactual closeness. In four preregistered experiments (N = 2,142), participants saw vignettes where agents lost or won a luck-based game. In Experiments 1, 2, …
Children’s exploration distinguishes necessary and merely possible outcomes.
Preschoolers often fail tasks that require that they select between a necessary and a merely possible outcome. Prior work has interpreted these failures as evidence that children hold a minimal representation of possibility or as reflecting performance factors. However, all previous paradigms have operationalized children's modal understanding as a discrete choice or outcome, making it difficult to distinguish between these accounts. We introduce…
The Counterfactual Detective
We reveal a way that people use counterfactual thinking: They use it to infer motives and solve mysteries about what happened in the unseen past. In three preregistered experiments, participants (total N = 1,242) were asked to determine which of two competitors in a contest had sabotaged a third competitor. Participants often succeeded in identifying the culprit when counterfactual reasoning could be used to judge whether each suspect profited fr…
Older but not younger preschoolers use efficiency to evaluate how well goals are completed.
618; 48% female and 52% male; tested in a predominantly White region) scenarios where pairs of agents approached objects using paths that varied in length and efficiency, and then asked children which agent did a better job. In Experiments 1A and 1B, children aged 3 and 4 evaluated the agents using path length, but not efficiency. In Experiments 2A, 2B, and 3, children used path length to assess which agent did a better job from around age 4. But…
An Introduction to Rational Constructivism in Cognitive Development
Rational constructivism is a contemporary theory of cognitive development. It proposes that children generate, tweak, and radically revise theories, beliefs, and representations by integrating evidence with existing knowledge via probabilistic inferential learning mechanisms. We begin with a general overview of the theory of rational constructivism, covering its theoretical commitments and predictions. We then describe how it accounts for the emp…
Psychology (21 obras) · Social Psychology (16 obras) · Developmental psychology (15 obras) · Child and Animal Learning Development (14 obras) · Cognitive psychology (14 obras) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (9 obras) · Mathematics (9 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (9 obras) · Cognition (8 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras)