Aviva Aron-Dine
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1471173 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Aviva Aron-Dine |
| PRENOMES | Aviva |
| SOBRENOME | Aron-Dine |
| ASSINATURA | ARON-DINE A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Office of Management |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 2 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2015 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We fi…
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later
Between 1974 and 1981, the RAND health insurance experiment provided health insurance to more than 5,800 individuals from about 2,000 households in six different locations across the United States, a sample designed to be representative of families with adults under the age of 62. More than three decades later, the RAND results are still widely held to be the "gold standard" of evidence for predicting the likely impact of health insurance reforms…
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later
Between 1974 and 1981, the RAND health insurance experiment provided health insurance to more than 5,800 individuals from about 2,000 households in six different locations across the United States, a sample designed to be representative of families with adults under the age of 62. More than three decades later, the RAND results are still widely held to be the "gold standard" of evidence for predicting the likely impact of health insurance reforms…
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later
Between 1974 and 1981, the RAND health insurance experiment provided health insurance to more than 5,800 individuals from about 2,000 households in six different locations across the United States, a sample designed to be representative of families with adults under the age of 62. More than three decades later, the RAND results are still widely held to be the "gold standard" of evidence for predicting the likely impact of health insurance reforms…
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We fi…
Actuarial science (2 obras) · Economic growth (2 obras) · Economics (2 obras) · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics (2 obras) · Health care (2 obras) · Health insurance (2 obras) · Healthcare Policy and Management (2 obras) · Incentive (2 obras) · Microeconomics (2 obras) · Moral hazard (2 obras)