Andreas Broscheid
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1493455 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Andreas Broscheid |
| PRENOMES | Andreas |
| SOBRENOME | Broscheid |
| ASSINATURA | BROSCHEID A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7497-7170 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 173 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2003 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2011 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Comparing Circuits
This article investigates possible ideological differences between circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It looks at the distribution of three-judge panel ideologies on the circuits and at differences in decisionmaking patterns, testing several theoretical approaches to circuit differences: the attitudinalist approach, arguing that different judicial ideologies account for intercircuit differences; historical-institutionalist approaches that ar…
Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU
This paper presents a quantitative look at lobbying activity and the emergence of institutional fora in the European Union (EU). Specifically, the paper explores why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains, and why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation for some policy issues but not others. Building on a strategic lobbying model, the paper shows empirically that Commission activity influences inte…
Public Members on Medical Licensing Boards and the Choice of Entry Barriers
Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission
We propose an informational model of lobbying to understand macro-characteristics of lobbying systems. We are particularly interested in the number of lobbyists in a system, and the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists. Empirically, we seek to explain the post-Maastricht lobbying boom in the European Union and the concomitant establishment of European Commission forums for interest representation. Using a simple model of information…
Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission
We propose an informational model of lobbying to understand macro-characteristics of lobbying systems. We are particularly interested in the number of lobbyists in a system, and the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists. Empirically, we seek to explain the post-Maastricht lobbying boom in the European Union and the concomitant establishment of European Commission forums for interest representation. Using a simple model of information…
Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU
This paper presents a quantitative look at lobbying activity and the emergence of institutional fora in the European Union (EU). Specifically, the paper explores why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains, and why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation for some policy issues but not others. Building on a strategic lobbying model, the paper shows empirically that Commission activity influences inte…
Comparing Circuits
This article investigates possible ideological differences between circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It looks at the distribution of three-judge panel ideologies on the circuits and at differences in decisionmaking patterns, testing several theoretical approaches to circuit differences: the attitudinalist approach, arguing that different judicial ideologies account for intercircuit differences; historical-institutionalist approaches that ar…
Public Members on Medical Licensing Boards and the Choice of Entry Barriers
Public Members on Medical Licensing Boards and the Choice of Entry Barriers
Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission
We propose an informational model of lobbying to understand macro-characteristics of lobbying systems. We are particularly interested in the number of lobbyists in a system, and the distinction between insider and outsider lobbyists. Empirically, we seek to explain the post-Maastricht lobbying boom in the European Union and the concomitant establishment of European Commission forums for interest representation. Using a simple model of information…
Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU
This paper presents a quantitative look at lobbying activity and the emergence of institutional fora in the European Union (EU). Specifically, the paper explores why the number of interest representatives differs across policy domains, and why we find institutionalized fora for interest representation for some policy issues but not others. Building on a strategic lobbying model, the paper shows empirically that Commission activity influences inte…
Comparing Circuits
This article investigates possible ideological differences between circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. It looks at the distribution of three-judge panel ideologies on the circuits and at differences in decisionmaking patterns, testing several theoretical approaches to circuit differences: the attitudinalist approach, arguing that different judicial ideologies account for intercircuit differences; historical-institutionalist approaches that ar…
Economics (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Political science (4 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Law and economics (3 obras) · Politics (3 obras) · Argument (complex analysis (2 obras) · Commission (2 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 obras) · European commission (2 obras)