Nathan Robert Howard
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 1607726 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Nathan Robert Howard |
| PRENOMES | Nathan Robert |
| SOBRENOME | Howard |
| ASSINATURA | HOWARD N R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Department of Philosophy Texas A&M University College Station TX USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6083-458X |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 2 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2019 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Gender Unrealism
While intimately familiar, gender eludes theorizing. We argue that well-known challenges to gender’s analysis originate in a subtle ambiguity: questions about gender sometimes express questions about gender categories themselves (e.g., womanhood, manhood, and so on), while at other times expressing questions about what makes someone a member of these categories. Distinguishing these questions accentuates gender’s connections to morality, making a…
Maternal autonomy and prenatal harm
This paper offers an account of why prenatal harms seem particularly objectionable. It identifies structural similarities between key cases of prenatal harm and the recently characterized “all‐or‐nothing” problem from Joe Horton. According to the account defended by the paper, a willingness to parent incurs a duty to protect the fetus from harm. This implication provides independent support for so‐called “voluntarist” or “intentionalist” accounts…
Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View
I propose and defend a novel view called “de se consequentialism,” which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it demonstrates—contra Doug Portmore, Mark Schroeder, Campbell Brown, and Michael Smith, among others—that agent-neutral consequentialism is consistent with agent-centered constraints. Second, it clarifies the nature of agent-centered constraints, thereby meriting attention from even dedicated nonconsequentialists. Scrutiny reveals that …
Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons
I argue that Davidson’s conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts
Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right
A major point of debate about morally good motives concerns an ambiguity in the truism that good and strong-willed people desire to do what is right. This debate is shaped by the assumption that “what’s right” combines in only two ways with “desire,” leading to distinct de dicto and de re readings of the truism. However, a third reading of such expressions is possible, first identified by Janet Fodor, which has gone wholly unappreciated by philos…
One Desire Too Many 1
I defend the widely‐held view that acting with moral worth does not require a desire for rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of…
One Desire Too Many 1
I defend the widely‐held view that acting with moral worth does not require a desire for rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of…
One Desire Too Many 1
I defend the widely‐held view that acting with moral worth does not require a desire for rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of…
Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons
I argue that Davidson’s conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts
Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right
A major point of debate about morally good motives concerns an ambiguity in the truism that good and strong-willed people desire to do what is right. This debate is shaped by the assumption that “what’s right” combines in only two ways with “desire,” leading to distinct de dicto and de re readings of the truism. However, a third reading of such expressions is possible, first identified by Janet Fodor, which has gone wholly unappreciated by philos…
Consequentialism and the Agent’s Point of View
I propose and defend a novel view called “de se consequentialism,” which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it demonstrates—contra Doug Portmore, Mark Schroeder, Campbell Brown, and Michael Smith, among others—that agent-neutral consequentialism is consistent with agent-centered constraints. Second, it clarifies the nature of agent-centered constraints, thereby meriting attention from even dedicated nonconsequentialists. Scrutiny reveals that …
Maternal autonomy and prenatal harm
This paper offers an account of why prenatal harms seem particularly objectionable. It identifies structural similarities between key cases of prenatal harm and the recently characterized “all‐or‐nothing” problem from Joe Horton. According to the account defended by the paper, a willingness to parent incurs a duty to protect the fetus from harm. This implication provides independent support for so‐called “voluntarist” or “intentionalist” accounts…
Gender Unrealism
While intimately familiar, gender eludes theorizing. We argue that well-known challenges to gender’s analysis originate in a subtle ambiguity: questions about gender sometimes express questions about gender categories themselves (e.g., womanhood, manhood, and so on), while at other times expressing questions about what makes someone a member of these categories. Distinguishing these questions accentuates gender’s connections to morality, making a…
Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras) · Sociology (3 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 obras) · Action (physics (1 obra) · Action (physics) (1 obra) · Ambiguity (1 obra)