Edward Ingram
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 220832 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Edward Ingram |
| PRENOMES | Edward |
| SOBRENOME | Ingram |
| ASSINATURA | INGRAM E |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Simon Fraser University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 29 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 22 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 28 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1973 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2018 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
The British Empire as a World Power
Elegantly written, at times witty, at times acerbic, these erudite ten essays by Edward Ingram, editor of The International History Review, both stimulate and challenge - English Historical Review With this splendid book, Ingram consolidates his reputation as the leading historian of the British Empire in the international system. - The International History Review
National and International Politics in the Middle East
The Wonderland of the Political Scientist
The Wonderland of the Political Scientist
July 01 1997 The Wonderland of the Political Scientist Edward Ingram Edward Ingram Edward Ingram is Professor of Imperial History at Simon Fraser University and Editor of The International History Review. His most recent work is a collection of essays on Empire-building and Empire-builders (London: CASS, 1995). Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Edward Ingram Edward Ingram is Professo…
Raglan
The Geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt – III
The argument about war aims and strategy in the war of the Second Coalition between supporters of imperial expansion and supporters of a Continental commitment, which caused the cabinet crisis of September 1800 and led to the collapse of William Pitt the Younger's administration, was echoed in the British government of India. The behaviour of the British army sailing around the Mediterranean was copied by a second British army hovering on the sho…
The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt – IV
When the British ambassador, Lord Whitworth, was recalled from Paris on 13 May 1803 and the British government declared war on France, they fought for the reason they had fought in 1798, to head off a French invasion of Egypt. Although Napoleon Bonaparte was not planning a second invasion of Egypt, he had convinced the British that he was, and had convinced the Russians that he was planning to partition the Ottoman Empire. Thus, even if the terms…
Shorter Notices
Journal Article Shorter Notices Get access EDWARD INGRAM EDWARD INGRAM Simon Fraser UniversityBritish Columbia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume CIX, Issue 431, April 1994, Pages 506–507, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/CIX.431.506 Published: 01 April 1994
The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt — I
(1994). The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt — I: the cabinet crisis of September 1800. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 435-460
The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt – II
The departure from Malta on 20 December 1800 of the British commanderin-chief in the Mediterranean, Sir Ralph Abercromby, at the head of 15,000 troops sent to challenge the French army of occupation in Egypt, was the outcome of a cabinet crisis lasting six weeks between supporters and opponents of the British alliance with Austria. Its supporters saw the alliance as the only way to reduce the power of France on the Continent; its critics as a sna…
Britain’s Persian Connection 1798-1828
In 1801 and again in 1809 the British made a treaty with the Qajar regime of Persia. The two treaties and the attempts to define and to protect Great Britain's interests in the Middle East were known at the time as the Persian Connection. Edward Ingram's scholarly and extensively researched study shows how the British expected the Persian Connection to help them win the Napoleonic Wars and to enable them to enjoy the fruits of empire in India. Pr…
Where and for what shall we fight
PIERS MACKESY. War without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799–1802. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Pp. xiv, 248. £25
Pitt the Younger
"Pitt the Younger: The Reluctant Transition, by John Ehrman." Canadian Journal of History, 19(3), pp. 440–441
Illusions of Victory
Commitment to Empire
Approaches to the great game in Asia
The behaviour of Englishmen in the Middle East in the nineteenth century resembled a formation dance more complicated than the Circassian Circle. As Lord Curzon would explain it, the British walked round and round, regularly returning to their starting point having done nothing on the way.' The best example of this was given by Curzon himself. At the end of the First World War, he and Lord Hardinge, another former viceroy of India, who had gone b…
Commitment to Empire
Family and faction in the great game in Asia
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Persian Mission reflected as a mirror the changing strategies devised by the British to safeguard British India from the unrest and crippling expense expected to follow from the unchecked expansion eastwards of Russia. Control of the mission was regularly seized by the foreign office and, whenever friendly relations with Russia seemed necessary to maintain the European balance of power, was as regularly slou…
Great Britain's Great Game
(1980). Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction. The International History Review: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 160-171
From trade to empire in the near east — III
A hazard of social life in the second British Empire was the predominance of Presbyterian Scots. Dour, energetic, and thrifty, encouraged and helped by Henry Dundas, president of the board of control, and his collaborator at East India House, David Scott, at the end of the eighteenth century they swarmed over India, each hoping to return to set up in society. To this day throughout white dominions one meets their scattered descendants, those who,…
From trade to empire in the near East — II
From trade to empire in the near East – I
During the nineteenth century, to be admired by the British, foreigners needed to be warlike or dead. The dead were preferred, particularly classical Greeks, but the Arabs were their closest competitor. The attraction of Arabia was emptiness. Nothing was there, or nothing the British recognised: they remembered Alexander and Antony. According to the viceroy of India, as late as 1871 British policy in Arabia 'originated in a geographical error'.2 …
Lord Mulgrave's Proposals for the Reconstruction of Europe in 1804
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The rules of the game
A preview of the great game in Asia – IV
Having to consult eighteen separate departments of government, scattered not only around London but also in Cairo, Khartoum, Aden, Baghdad, and India, made it very difficult, complained the assistant secretary to the committee of imperial defence, Sir Mark Sykes in 1916, to decide which of Britain's interests in the near east were the most vital, and how they could be best secured.2 Sykes might have added that this difficulty was nothing new. The…
Great Britain's Great Game
(1980). Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction. The International History Review: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 160-171
An Aspiring Buffer State
Weak states can control strong states, provided the weak can persuade the strong to admit, that they are vitally interested in their integrity and independence. In the late nineteentli century everybody understood the influence of the Ottoman Empire upon British policy, and the influence of Austria-Hungary upon Imperial German policy in the near east. In the heyday of the Great Powers of Europe it was not expected tliat orientals should aspire to…
Illusions of Victory
The Wonderland of the Political Scientist
July 01 1997 The Wonderland of the Political Scientist Edward Ingram Edward Ingram Edward Ingram is Professor of Imperial History at Simon Fraser University and Editor of The International History Review. His most recent work is a collection of essays on Empire-building and Empire-builders (London: CASS, 1995). Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Edward Ingram Edward Ingram is Professo…
A preview of the great game in Asia—I
During the Six Days' War between the Arabs and the Israelis in the summer of 1967, the Israelis broke the Arab blockade of the gulf of Aqaba by driving the Egyptians from their fortress at Sharm el-Sheikh, commanding the straits of Tiran. It was interesting to wonder, idly, whether the Arabs might try to reimpose the blockade by occupying one of the least known outposts of the British Empire, that the British were then talking of renouncing. This…
From trade to empire in the near East – I
During the nineteenth century, to be admired by the British, foreigners needed to be warlike or dead. The dead were preferred, particularly classical Greeks, but the Arabs were their closest competitor. The attraction of Arabia was emptiness. Nothing was there, or nothing the British recognised: they remembered Alexander and Antony. According to the viceroy of India, as late as 1871 British policy in Arabia 'originated in a geographical error'.2 …
The rules of the game
A preview of the great game in Asia – IV
Having to consult eighteen separate departments of government, scattered not only around London but also in Cairo, Khartoum, Aden, Baghdad, and India, made it very difficult, complained the assistant secretary to the committee of imperial defence, Sir Mark Sykes in 1916, to decide which of Britain's interests in the near east were the most vital, and how they could be best secured.2 Sykes might have added that this difficulty was nothing new. The…
A preview of the great game in Asia‐III
I would gladly hope that he has not been imposed upon, nor that he has not ventured to act so improperly. I love a brave Man, and of consequence I am interested in Sir Sidney Smith. There arefew who possess both the qualifications necessary in a general, and those necessary to make treaties, etc. He forgot that he was negotiating with the wise men of France as well as with a sensible, clever,general. But what are we to do, should it be true that …
A preview of the great game in Asia‐II
Had the British Museum reconstructed one hundred and fifty years ago the galleries that house their collection of classical antiquities, the opening would have been commemorated by Byron and by Keats. The recent reconstruction passed almost unrecorded. Poetry and the classics are the taste of a minority. Throughout the nineteenth century educated Englishmen knew more of Greece and Rome than of most of Europe. Of the near east they knew only tales…
A preview of the great game in Asia‐III
I would gladly hope that he has not been imposed upon, nor that he has not ventured to act so improperly. I love a brave Man, and of consequence I am interested in Sir Sidney Smith. There arefew who possess both the qualifications necessary in a general, and those necessary to make treaties, etc. He forgot that he was negotiating with the wise men of France as well as with a sensible, clever,general. But what are we to do, should it be true that …
A preview of the great game in Asia—I
During the Six Days' War between the Arabs and the Israelis in the summer of 1967, the Israelis broke the Arab blockade of the gulf of Aqaba by driving the Egyptians from their fortress at Sharm el-Sheikh, commanding the straits of Tiran. It was interesting to wonder, idly, whether the Arabs might try to reimpose the blockade by occupying one of the least known outposts of the British Empire, that the British were then talking of renouncing. This…
An Aspiring Buffer State
Weak states can control strong states, provided the weak can persuade the strong to admit, that they are vitally interested in their integrity and independence. In the late nineteentli century everybody understood the influence of the Ottoman Empire upon British policy, and the influence of Austria-Hungary upon Imperial German policy in the near east. In the heyday of the Great Powers of Europe it was not expected tliat orientals should aspire to…
A preview of the great game in Asia – IV
Having to consult eighteen separate departments of government, scattered not only around London but also in Cairo, Khartoum, Aden, Baghdad, and India, made it very difficult, complained the assistant secretary to the committee of imperial defence, Sir Mark Sykes in 1916, to decide which of Britain's interests in the near east were the most vital, and how they could be best secured.2 Sykes might have added that this difficulty was nothing new. The…
The rules of the game
Lord Mulgrave's Proposals for the Reconstruction of Europe in 1804
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
From trade to empire in the near east — III
A hazard of social life in the second British Empire was the predominance of Presbyterian Scots. Dour, energetic, and thrifty, encouraged and helped by Henry Dundas, president of the board of control, and his collaborator at East India House, David Scott, at the end of the eighteenth century they swarmed over India, each hoping to return to set up in society. To this day throughout white dominions one meets their scattered descendants, those who,…
From trade to empire in the near East — II
From trade to empire in the near East – I
During the nineteenth century, to be admired by the British, foreigners needed to be warlike or dead. The dead were preferred, particularly classical Greeks, but the Arabs were their closest competitor. The attraction of Arabia was emptiness. Nothing was there, or nothing the British recognised: they remembered Alexander and Antony. According to the viceroy of India, as late as 1871 British policy in Arabia 'originated in a geographical error'.2 …
Great Britain's Great Game
(1980). Great Britain's Great Game: An Introduction. The International History Review: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 160-171
Family and faction in the great game in Asia
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Persian Mission reflected as a mirror the changing strategies devised by the British to safeguard British India from the unrest and crippling expense expected to follow from the unchecked expansion eastwards of Russia. Control of the mission was regularly seized by the foreign office and, whenever friendly relations with Russia seemed necessary to maintain the European balance of power, was as regularly slou…
Approaches to the great game in Asia
The behaviour of Englishmen in the Middle East in the nineteenth century resembled a formation dance more complicated than the Circassian Circle. As Lord Curzon would explain it, the British walked round and round, regularly returning to their starting point having done nothing on the way.' The best example of this was given by Curzon himself. At the end of the First World War, he and Lord Hardinge, another former viceroy of India, who had gone b…
Commitment to Empire
Commitment to Empire
Pitt the Younger
"Pitt the Younger: The Reluctant Transition, by John Ehrman." Canadian Journal of History, 19(3), pp. 440–441
Illusions of Victory
Where and for what shall we fight
PIERS MACKESY. War without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799–1802. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Pp. xiv, 248. £25
Britain’s Persian Connection 1798-1828
In 1801 and again in 1809 the British made a treaty with the Qajar regime of Persia. The two treaties and the attempts to define and to protect Great Britain's interests in the Middle East were known at the time as the Persian Connection. Edward Ingram's scholarly and extensively researched study shows how the British expected the Persian Connection to help them win the Napoleonic Wars and to enable them to enjoy the fruits of empire in India. Pr…
Shorter Notices
Journal Article Shorter Notices Get access EDWARD INGRAM EDWARD INGRAM Simon Fraser UniversityBritish Columbia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume CIX, Issue 431, April 1994, Pages 506–507, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/CIX.431.506 Published: 01 April 1994
The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt — I
(1994). The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt — I: the cabinet crisis of September 1800. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 435-460
The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt – II
The departure from Malta on 20 December 1800 of the British commanderin-chief in the Mediterranean, Sir Ralph Abercromby, at the head of 15,000 troops sent to challenge the French army of occupation in Egypt, was the outcome of a cabinet crisis lasting six weeks between supporters and opponents of the British alliance with Austria. Its supporters saw the alliance as the only way to reduce the power of France on the Continent; its critics as a sna…
Raglan
The Geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt – III
The argument about war aims and strategy in the war of the Second Coalition between supporters of imperial expansion and supporters of a Continental commitment, which caused the cabinet crisis of September 1800 and led to the collapse of William Pitt the Younger's administration, was echoed in the British government of India. The behaviour of the British army sailing around the Mediterranean was copied by a second British army hovering on the sho…
The geopolitics of the first British expedition to Egypt – IV
When the British ambassador, Lord Whitworth, was recalled from Paris on 13 May 1803 and the British government declared war on France, they fought for the reason they had fought in 1798, to head off a French invasion of Egypt. Although Napoleon Bonaparte was not planning a second invasion of Egypt, he had convinced the British that he was, and had convinced the Russians that he was planning to partition the Ottoman Empire. Thus, even if the terms…
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