Gabriella R Montinola
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 2233182 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Gabriella R Montinola |
| PRENOMES | Gabriella R |
| SOBRENOME | Montinola |
| ASSINATURA | MONTINOLA G R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of California, Davis |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3297-7484 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 21 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 812 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1994 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 10 |
Public Preferences for Reallocating Aid in the Presence of Alternative Donors
Research has shown that people support foreign aid more when reminded of its strategic uses or when cued to think about international competition. Additional strategic considerations might affect evaluations of foreign aid. We examine whether citizens in aid-giving countries distinguish across different types of substituting donors, explore whether attitudes regarding aid are underpinned by countries’ relative power positions, and investigate cit…
Foreign pressure and public opinion in target states
Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions
Previous research suggests that ideology, material interests, and moral values drive citizens’ preferences over foreign aid policy. Little attention has been paid to how perceptions of the international environment affect these preferences. We examine the extent to which citizens in a traditional donor country consider donor competition when deciding whether to impose aid sanctions on governments engaged in human rights violations. Employing an i…
Foreign Aid, Government Spending, and Contributions toward Public Goods
Foreign Aid and Climate Change Policy
Climate-related foreign aid is on the rise, with signatories to the Paris Climate agreement pledging $100 billion annually to promote mitigation and adaptation in recipient countries. While this seems like a welcome development, we have little evidence that climate aid actually encourages recipients to adopt climate legislation. In this article, we examine the relationship between climate aid and recipient climate policy. Using multiple measures …
Remittances, Regime Type, and Government Spending Priorities
Helping hand or heavy hand? Foreign aid, regime type and domestic unrest
Does foreign aid affect domestic political unrest? ‘Selectorate’ models of political survival predict that foreign aid should lead autocratic governments, but not democratic ones, to restrict civil liberties. This requires investment in repressive capacity, which should in turn deter unrest. We thus argue that foreign aid should reduce unrest in autocracies but not in democracies. We find strong support for this hypothesis in a sample of 84 count…
Foreign Aid, Time Horizons, and Trade Policy
Although there are theoretical reasons to expect foreign aid to promote trade liberalization, empirical research has found no relationship. Without disputing this general nonresult, we argue that foreign aid can incentivize liberalization under certain conditions. In the absence of aid, the incentive to liberalize trade depends on government time horizons: Far-sighted governments have incentives to do so, whereas short-sighted governments do not.…
The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid
Research shows that foreign aid promotes economic development in democracies but not in autocracies. Although explanations for this phenomenon vary, a common theme is that autocracies are more likely to misuse aid. We provide evidence of such misuse, showing that autocracies are more likely than democracies to divert development aid to the military. Theoretically, we build on “selectorate” models in which autocrats respond to aid by contracting c…
Change and Continuity in a Limited Access Order
The Philippines has exhibited characteristics of both a fragile and basic limited access order since independence in 1946, but the nature of the Philippine state has not been static. The country has experienced two critical junctures since independence, resulting in three distinct historical periods. Democratically elected representatives ruled the country from 1946 to 1972. The democratic experiment ended in 1972 when then incumbent president Fe…
When Does Aid Conditionality Work
Does aid conditionality—the setting of policy goals in exchange for access to aid—promote reform? Many studies on the impact of aid and reform suggest not. However, few explicitly examine whether the impact of aid on reform is mediated by recipient regime type. I argue that conditional aid is effective but its efficacy depends on recipient countries’ level of democracy because the value of aid to governments depends on the degree to which it help…
Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both
Does foreign aid prop up recipient governments? Although many people argue that it does, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. We argue that aid's effects on government survival depend on both the recipient's regime type and the analyst's time horizons. In the long run, continued aid helps autocrats more than democrats because the former can stockpile this aid for use against future negative shocks. However, because large sto…
Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies
The authors investigate the relationship between constitutional design and the rule of law in emerging democracies. The authors provide a formal logic to the Madisonian assertion that increasing the number of veto players strengthens the rule of law. The model shows that as the number of veto players in government increases, their ability to collude on accepting bribes decreases; therefore, their incentive to vote on legislation strengthening the…
Who Recovers First
This article evaluates conditions that facilitate banking crises resolution using data from 67 developing countries from 1980 to 1995. In particular, the author examines explanatory variables under three categories: external macroeconomic constraints, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and domestic political conditions. The principal results of the analyses are twofold. First, IMF credits decrease the probability of resolving bank…
Comparative political corruption
Sources of Corruption
Why is government corruption more pervasive in some societies than in others? In this article we examine public choice explanations that attribute corruption to a lack of competition in either political or economic arenas or both. The principal part of our analysis draws on recently-published data about levels of corruption for a broad cross-section of countries reported for the early 1980s. We supplement this with an additional analysis of a sec…
The Philippines in 1998
Research Article| January 01 1999 The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity amid Crisis Gabriella R. Montinola Gabriella R. Montinola Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1999) 39 (1): 64–71. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645595 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Sear…
Parties and Accountability in the Philippines
Parties and Accountability in the Philippines* Gabriella R. Montinola (bio) On 11 May 1998, in the second set of general elections since Philippine democracy was restored in 1986, 28 million voters went to the polls to choose a president, a vice-president, 12 senators, over 200 members of the House of Representatives, and more than 17,000 local officials. It would not be difficult to portray these elections as something of a circus, and the Phili…
Politicians, Parties, and the Persistence of Weak States
Under what conditions will politicians strengthen state capabilities through bureaucratic reform? This article presents a principal-agent model of state capacity that shows that unless competition to influence policy is largely confined to a single dimension, politicians have no incentive or 'political will' to adopt bureaucratic reform. The validity of this model is tested using the experience of the Philippines in the period 1946-72. It is foun…
Federalism, Chinese Style
China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. Th…
The foundations of political corruption
1994). The foundations of political corruption: Insights from the Philippine case. Asian Journal of Political Science: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 86-113
Federalism, Chinese Style
China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. Th…
Sources of Corruption
Why is government corruption more pervasive in some societies than in others? In this article we examine public choice explanations that attribute corruption to a lack of competition in either political or economic arenas or both. The principal part of our analysis draws on recently-published data about levels of corruption for a broad cross-section of countries reported for the early 1980s. We supplement this with an additional analysis of a sec…
Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both
Does foreign aid prop up recipient governments? Although many people argue that it does, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. We argue that aid's effects on government survival depend on both the recipient's regime type and the analyst's time horizons. In the long run, continued aid helps autocrats more than democrats because the former can stockpile this aid for use against future negative shocks. However, because large sto…
Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies
The authors investigate the relationship between constitutional design and the rule of law in emerging democracies. The authors provide a formal logic to the Madisonian assertion that increasing the number of veto players strengthens the rule of law. The model shows that as the number of veto players in government increases, their ability to collude on accepting bribes decreases; therefore, their incentive to vote on legislation strengthening the…
Parties and Accountability in the Philippines
Parties and Accountability in the Philippines* Gabriella R. Montinola (bio) On 11 May 1998, in the second set of general elections since Philippine democracy was restored in 1986, 28 million voters went to the polls to choose a president, a vice-president, 12 senators, over 200 members of the House of Representatives, and more than 17,000 local officials. It would not be difficult to portray these elections as something of a circus, and the Phili…
Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions
Previous research suggests that ideology, material interests, and moral values drive citizens’ preferences over foreign aid policy. Little attention has been paid to how perceptions of the international environment affect these preferences. We examine the extent to which citizens in a traditional donor country consider donor competition when deciding whether to impose aid sanctions on governments engaged in human rights violations. Employing an i…
The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid
Research shows that foreign aid promotes economic development in democracies but not in autocracies. Although explanations for this phenomenon vary, a common theme is that autocracies are more likely to misuse aid. We provide evidence of such misuse, showing that autocracies are more likely than democracies to divert development aid to the military. Theoretically, we build on “selectorate” models in which autocrats respond to aid by contracting c…
Remittances, Regime Type, and Government Spending Priorities
Comparative political corruption
When Does Aid Conditionality Work
Does aid conditionality—the setting of policy goals in exchange for access to aid—promote reform? Many studies on the impact of aid and reform suggest not. However, few explicitly examine whether the impact of aid on reform is mediated by recipient regime type. I argue that conditional aid is effective but its efficacy depends on recipient countries’ level of democracy because the value of aid to governments depends on the degree to which it help…
Who Recovers First
This article evaluates conditions that facilitate banking crises resolution using data from 67 developing countries from 1980 to 1995. In particular, the author examines explanatory variables under three categories: external macroeconomic constraints, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and domestic political conditions. The principal results of the analyses are twofold. First, IMF credits decrease the probability of resolving bank…
Foreign pressure and public opinion in target states
Politicians, Parties, and the Persistence of Weak States
Under what conditions will politicians strengthen state capabilities through bureaucratic reform? This article presents a principal-agent model of state capacity that shows that unless competition to influence policy is largely confined to a single dimension, politicians have no incentive or 'political will' to adopt bureaucratic reform. The validity of this model is tested using the experience of the Philippines in the period 1946-72. It is foun…
Helping hand or heavy hand? Foreign aid, regime type and domestic unrest
Does foreign aid affect domestic political unrest? ‘Selectorate’ models of political survival predict that foreign aid should lead autocratic governments, but not democratic ones, to restrict civil liberties. This requires investment in repressive capacity, which should in turn deter unrest. We thus argue that foreign aid should reduce unrest in autocracies but not in democracies. We find strong support for this hypothesis in a sample of 84 count…
Foreign Aid, Time Horizons, and Trade Policy
Although there are theoretical reasons to expect foreign aid to promote trade liberalization, empirical research has found no relationship. Without disputing this general nonresult, we argue that foreign aid can incentivize liberalization under certain conditions. In the absence of aid, the incentive to liberalize trade depends on government time horizons: Far-sighted governments have incentives to do so, whereas short-sighted governments do not.…
Foreign Aid, Government Spending, and Contributions toward Public Goods
Foreign Aid and Climate Change Policy
Climate-related foreign aid is on the rise, with signatories to the Paris Climate agreement pledging $100 billion annually to promote mitigation and adaptation in recipient countries. While this seems like a welcome development, we have little evidence that climate aid actually encourages recipients to adopt climate legislation. In this article, we examine the relationship between climate aid and recipient climate policy. Using multiple measures …
The Philippines in 1998
Research Article| January 01 1999 The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity amid Crisis Gabriella R. Montinola Gabriella R. Montinola Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1999) 39 (1): 64–71. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645595 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Sear…
The foundations of political corruption
1994). The foundations of political corruption: Insights from the Philippine case. Asian Journal of Political Science: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 86-113
The foundations of political corruption
1994). The foundations of political corruption: Insights from the Philippine case. Asian Journal of Political Science: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 86-113
Federalism, Chinese Style
China's remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call “federalism, Chinese style.” This form of decentralization has three consequences. First, it fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital. Th…
The Philippines in 1998
Research Article| January 01 1999 The Philippines in 1998: Opportunity amid Crisis Gabriella R. Montinola Gabriella R. Montinola Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (1999) 39 (1): 64–71. https://doi.org/10.2307/2645595 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Sear…
Parties and Accountability in the Philippines
Parties and Accountability in the Philippines* Gabriella R. Montinola (bio) On 11 May 1998, in the second set of general elections since Philippine democracy was restored in 1986, 28 million voters went to the polls to choose a president, a vice-president, 12 senators, over 200 members of the House of Representatives, and more than 17,000 local officials. It would not be difficult to portray these elections as something of a circus, and the Phili…
Politicians, Parties, and the Persistence of Weak States
Under what conditions will politicians strengthen state capabilities through bureaucratic reform? This article presents a principal-agent model of state capacity that shows that unless competition to influence policy is largely confined to a single dimension, politicians have no incentive or 'political will' to adopt bureaucratic reform. The validity of this model is tested using the experience of the Philippines in the period 1946-72. It is foun…
Comparative political corruption
Sources of Corruption
Why is government corruption more pervasive in some societies than in others? In this article we examine public choice explanations that attribute corruption to a lack of competition in either political or economic arenas or both. The principal part of our analysis draws on recently-published data about levels of corruption for a broad cross-section of countries reported for the early 1980s. We supplement this with an additional analysis of a sec…
Who Recovers First
This article evaluates conditions that facilitate banking crises resolution using data from 67 developing countries from 1980 to 1995. In particular, the author examines explanatory variables under three categories: external macroeconomic constraints, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and domestic political conditions. The principal results of the analyses are twofold. First, IMF credits decrease the probability of resolving bank…
Veto Players and the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies
The authors investigate the relationship between constitutional design and the rule of law in emerging democracies. The authors provide a formal logic to the Madisonian assertion that increasing the number of veto players strengthens the rule of law. The model shows that as the number of veto players in government increases, their ability to collude on accepting bribes decreases; therefore, their incentive to vote on legislation strengthening the…
Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both
Does foreign aid prop up recipient governments? Although many people argue that it does, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. We argue that aid's effects on government survival depend on both the recipient's regime type and the analyst's time horizons. In the long run, continued aid helps autocrats more than democrats because the former can stockpile this aid for use against future negative shocks. However, because large sto…
When Does Aid Conditionality Work
Does aid conditionality—the setting of policy goals in exchange for access to aid—promote reform? Many studies on the impact of aid and reform suggest not. However, few explicitly examine whether the impact of aid on reform is mediated by recipient regime type. I argue that conditional aid is effective but its efficacy depends on recipient countries’ level of democracy because the value of aid to governments depends on the degree to which it help…
Change and Continuity in a Limited Access Order
The Philippines has exhibited characteristics of both a fragile and basic limited access order since independence in 1946, but the nature of the Philippine state has not been static. The country has experienced two critical junctures since independence, resulting in three distinct historical periods. Democratically elected representatives ruled the country from 1946 to 1972. The democratic experiment ended in 1972 when then incumbent president Fe…
The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid
Research shows that foreign aid promotes economic development in democracies but not in autocracies. Although explanations for this phenomenon vary, a common theme is that autocracies are more likely to misuse aid. We provide evidence of such misuse, showing that autocracies are more likely than democracies to divert development aid to the military. Theoretically, we build on “selectorate” models in which autocrats respond to aid by contracting c…
Helping hand or heavy hand? Foreign aid, regime type and domestic unrest
Does foreign aid affect domestic political unrest? ‘Selectorate’ models of political survival predict that foreign aid should lead autocratic governments, but not democratic ones, to restrict civil liberties. This requires investment in repressive capacity, which should in turn deter unrest. We thus argue that foreign aid should reduce unrest in autocracies but not in democracies. We find strong support for this hypothesis in a sample of 84 count…
Foreign Aid, Time Horizons, and Trade Policy
Although there are theoretical reasons to expect foreign aid to promote trade liberalization, empirical research has found no relationship. Without disputing this general nonresult, we argue that foreign aid can incentivize liberalization under certain conditions. In the absence of aid, the incentive to liberalize trade depends on government time horizons: Far-sighted governments have incentives to do so, whereas short-sighted governments do not.…
Remittances, Regime Type, and Government Spending Priorities
Foreign Aid and Climate Change Policy
Climate-related foreign aid is on the rise, with signatories to the Paris Climate agreement pledging $100 billion annually to promote mitigation and adaptation in recipient countries. While this seems like a welcome development, we have little evidence that climate aid actually encourages recipients to adopt climate legislation. In this article, we examine the relationship between climate aid and recipient climate policy. Using multiple measures …
Foreign Aid, Government Spending, and Contributions toward Public Goods
Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions
Previous research suggests that ideology, material interests, and moral values drive citizens’ preferences over foreign aid policy. Little attention has been paid to how perceptions of the international environment affect these preferences. We examine the extent to which citizens in a traditional donor country consider donor competition when deciding whether to impose aid sanctions on governments engaged in human rights violations. Employing an i…
Foreign pressure and public opinion in target states
Public Preferences for Reallocating Aid in the Presence of Alternative Donors
Research has shown that people support foreign aid more when reminded of its strategic uses or when cued to think about international competition. Additional strategic considerations might affect evaluations of foreign aid. We examine whether citizens in aid-giving countries distinguish across different types of substituting donors, explore whether attitudes regarding aid are underpinned by countries’ relative power positions, and investigate cit…
Economics (19 obras) · Political science (19 obras) · Politics (17 obras) · Law (12 obras) · International Development and Aid (11 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Political economy (9 obras) · Democracy (8 obras) · Development economics (8 obras) · Government (linguistics (8 obras)