Gordon Tullock
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 232050 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Gordon Tullock |
| PRENOMES | Gordon |
| SOBRENOME | Tullock |
| ASSINATURA | TULLOCK G |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Virginia Tech |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 116 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 1215 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 114 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 2 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1954 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ÍNDICE H | 14 |
My path to The Calculus of Consent
Autocracy
Autocracy
The legacy of Bismarck
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
The vote motive
Reflections on Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter
Open Secrets of American Foreign Policy
"This book provides an analysis of the political, economic and military history of American foreign policy, with the aim of divulging important details that most people have either never learned or forgotten - hence the phrase "open secrets". Covering events such as the attack on Pearl Harbor and the American Revolution, as well as American involvement in the Korean War and the collapse of Nationalist China, this book debunks a number of myths he…
Counterpoint
To be considered for publication in the Counterpoint section of the journal, letters must be relatively short (fewer than 1,000 words). Submit letters directly to [email protected]. The editors will choose which letters to publish. All letters may be lightly edited for style and length
In Response to Saltman
Saltman's comment ( PS , July 2004, 383) simply ignores the bulk of my previous letter ( PS , January 2004, 1–2) which dealt with Alabama. I gather that there he agrees with Russell and myself. Thus, there is no dispute on the question of whether Nixon or Kennedy had more popular votes in 1960. His criticism concerns my feeling, originally suggested by Russell, that with more political honesty on the part of the Chicago and Texas machines, Nixon …
Problems of Voting
Nixon, like Gore, also Won Popular Vote, but Lost Election
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Undemocratic Governments
I wish to thank Friedrich Schneider, University of Linz, and Anne van Aaken, Humboldt‐University Berlin, for their very helpful comments on this paper. Special thanks also go to Stephan Meier, University of Zurich, for helping me revise the paper.
Efficient Rent-Seeking
Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk 'Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the groun…
Some Further Thoughts on Voting
Simple
In honor of a colleague, Mancur Olson, 1932–1998
Externalities and government
Which rectangle
Where is the rectangle
On ?Group size and the free-rider hypothesis
Further Comments on Penalty and Crime
Punishment is defined as the properly discounted imprisonment that a criminal can expect if he commits a crime. The specific term in prison enacted by the legislature, however, may not deter crime. This is because the prospects for actually serving that sentence are small. Tsebelis apparently believes that the police sabotage legislature acts in order to reach their own goals. Assuming that the police are free from supervision that might be true,…
The reluctant gamesperson ? A comment on Baye, Kovenock and De Vries
Are rents fully dissipated? Comment
Public choice ? What I hope for the next twenty-five years
The Calculus of Consent
The paradox of revolution
Problems of Majority Voting
Why so much stability
A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices
This paper describes and elaborates a process first discovered by Edward H. Clarke that motivates individuals to reveal their true preferences for public goods. The essence of the process is that each individual is offered a chance to change the outcome that would occur without his vote by paying a special charge equal to the net cost to others that results from including his vote in the decision. Because the special charge on any one person is n…
Public Decisions as Public Goods
A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities
Efficient rents 3 back to the bog
Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking
Federalism
The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking
Journal Article The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking Get access The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking. By GORDON TULLOCK. (Boston, Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. Pp. ix+104. £25.75 hardback, Dfl. 95.00 hardback. ISBN 07923 9011 3.) Dennis C. Mueller Dennis C. Mueller University of Maryland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100…
The expanding public sector
Dynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy
The Paradox of Not Voting for Oneself
In most states it is permitted to write in the names on the ballot, and these write-in candidates can win if they assemble enough votes. Thus, in all elections in which I might conceivably participate, there are at least three candidates: the Republicans, the Democrats, and my own favorite candidate for president-Gordon Tullock. Indeed, using the notation of the Ferejohn and Fiorina article, assuming that we are talking about 1972, I would find k…
A (partial) rehabilitation of the public interest theory
Where is the rectangle
Computer Simulation of a Small Voting System
Journal Article Computer Simulation of a Small Voting System Get access Gordon Tullock, Gordon Tullock Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Colin D. Campbell Colin D. Campbell Dartmouth College. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 80, Issue 317, 1 March 1970, Pages 97–104, https://doi.org/10.2307/2230441 Published:…
Some Further Thoughts on Voting
Games and Preference
Game theory has had a considerable impact on the way we talk about problems and on our reasoning. But this has been more or less a philosophical effect. When it comes to formal reasoning, the calculation of a mixed strategy is characteristically either impossible or misleading
Problems of Majority Voting
The costs of rent seeking
Demand-revealing process, coalitions, and public goods
The Paradox of Voting-A Possible Method of Calculation
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Externalities and government
The reluctant gamesperson ? A comment on Baye, Kovenock and De Vries
Hyperinflation in China, 1937-49
Paper Money-a Cycle in Cathay
Problems of Majority Voting
The Calculus of Consent
Aphorisms for the Ambitious
Propositions of applied social science are today more numerous but usually no more precise than those of the seventeenth century. Gordon Tullock, of the Department of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, introduces a rare collec tion of aphorisms as follows
Soviet Economic Warfare. Robert Loring Allen
Problems of Majority Voting
The Historic Figure
A Practical Guide for Ambitious Politicians, or Walsingham's Manual
The Economics of the Political Parties . Seymour E. Harris
Effects of Stabilization
The Calculus of Consent
Journal Article The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy Get access The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. By J. M. Buchanan and G. Tuxlock. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962. Pp. x + 361. $6.95.) J. E. Meade J. E. Meade Christ's College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 73, Issue…
A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities
The Politics of Bureaucracy
The Revolution in Fiscal Theory
Information without profit
Bureaucracy & Democracy
The Paradox of Voting-A Possible Method of Calculation
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The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem
Aggregation of preferences, 256. — The paradox of voting and its significance, 257. — Voting in a simple model, 258. — Some complications, 260. — Unimportance of the paradox, 263. — Voting in a more realistic model, 264. — Conclusion, 270.
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft
In recent years a considerable number of studies have been published that purport to measure the welfare costs of monopolies and tariffs. The results have uniformly shown very small costs for practices that economists normally deplore. This led Mundell to comment in 1962 that “Unless there is a thorough theoretical re-examination of the validity of the tools upon which these studies are founded someone will inevitably draw the conclusion that eco…
The Prisoner's Dilemma and Mutual Trust
The Rand-Parkinson effect
Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade
Journal Article Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. Policy, by Alexander Eckstein Get access Communist China’s Economic Growth and Foreign Trade: Implications for U.S. Policy by Alexander Eckstein. New York, Toronto, and London, McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1966.—xi, 366 pp. $8.50. Gordon Tullock Gordon Tullock University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Acade…
The Organization of Inquiry
Journal Article G. Tullock. The Organization of Inquiry Get access The Organization of Inquiry. By G. Tullock. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966. Pp. 232. $5.50.) T. H. Marshall T. H. Marshall Cambridge. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 77, Issue 308, 1 December 1967, Pages 869–871, https://doi.org/10.2307/2229577 Published: 01 December 1967
Do freely competitive markets misallocate charity? A comment on Tullock's analysis
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