Mark Siderits
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 237684 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Mark Siderits |
| PRENOMES | Mark |
| SOBRENOME | Siderits |
| ASSINATURA | SIDERITS M |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Illinois State University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 26 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 23 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 25 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1976 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness
Born believer
A Response to Karsten Struhl’s “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self”
Realisms Interlinked
Book titles that are intriguing are often uninformative, but the title of this richly rewarding book is an exception. Arindam Chakrabarti’s thesis is that realism about external objects, realism about selves (as subjects of experience), and realism about the existence of other minds (other subjectivities) are interlinked. Using resources drawn from classical Indian metaphysics and epistemology, as well as from recent work in analytic metaphysics,…
Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness
Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness brings Buddhist voices to the study of consciousness. This book explores a variety of different Buddhist approaches to consciousness that developed out of the Buddhist theory of non-self. Topics taken up in these investigations include: how we are able to cognize our own cognitions; whether all conscious states involve conceptualization; whether distinct forms of cognition can operate simultaneously in a singl…
McAllister, Patrick
The Prapañca Paradox
Defending the Semantic Interpretation
Causation, ‘Humean’ Causation and Emptiness
Editors’ Preface
Self, No Self?
'Self, No Self?' is the first book of its kind. It brings together leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives.
Is Reductionism Expressible?
Buddhists hold that there is no self. Their view is best represented as a form of ontological reductionism. But this claim is controversial, since Buddhists do not typically put theirs as the view that a person just consists in certain other things. Instead, they explain their view by employing the notion that there are two kinds of truth. They say that while it is conventionally true that there are persons, the ultimate truth is that there are i…
Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy
My visiting professorship in the Philosophy Department at Liverpool came about thanks to the generosity of the Leverhulme Trust, which awarded a grant in connection with the development of the new
Causation and Emptiness in Early Madhyamaka
Reason's Traces
On the soteriological significance of emptiness
Deductive, Inductive, Both or Neither
Epistemology, Meaning and Metaphysics after Matilal
Buddhist Reductionism
N?g?rjuna as anti-realist
The sense-reference distinction in Indian philosophy of language
Word meaning, sentence meaning, and apoha
More things in heaven and earth
The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology II
The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology. I
A Note on the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth
The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology II
Defending the Semantic Interpretation
Causation and Emptiness in Early Madhyamaka
Word meaning, sentence meaning, and apoha
The Prapañca Paradox
Deductive, Inductive, Both or Neither
N?g?rjuna as anti-realist
The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology. I
Buddhist Reductionism
Zeno and Nagarjuna on Motion
A Note on the Early Buddhist Theory of Truth
The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology. I
The Madhyamaka critique of epistemology II
More things in heaven and earth
Word meaning, sentence meaning, and apoha
The sense-reference distinction in Indian philosophy of language
N?g?rjuna as anti-realist
Buddhist Reductionism
Epistemology, Meaning and Metaphysics after Matilal
On the soteriological significance of emptiness
Deductive, Inductive, Both or Neither
Causation and Emptiness in Early Madhyamaka
Reason's Traces
Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy
My visiting professorship in the Philosophy Department at Liverpool came about thanks to the generosity of the Leverhulme Trust, which awarded a grant in connection with the development of the new
Is Reductionism Expressible?
Buddhists hold that there is no self. Their view is best represented as a form of ontological reductionism. But this claim is controversial, since Buddhists do not typically put theirs as the view that a person just consists in certain other things. Instead, they explain their view by employing the notion that there are two kinds of truth. They say that while it is conventionally true that there are persons, the ultimate truth is that there are i…
Self, No Self?
'Self, No Self?' is the first book of its kind. It brings together leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives.
Editors’ Preface
Defending the Semantic Interpretation
Causation, ‘Humean’ Causation and Emptiness
McAllister, Patrick
The Prapañca Paradox
Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness
Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness brings Buddhist voices to the study of consciousness. This book explores a variety of different Buddhist approaches to consciousness that developed out of the Buddhist theory of non-self. Topics taken up in these investigations include: how we are able to cognize our own cognitions; whether all conscious states involve conceptualization; whether distinct forms of cognition can operate simultaneously in a singl…
Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness
Born believer
A Response to Karsten Struhl’s “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self”
Philosophy (23 obras) · Epistemology (21 obras) · Indian and Buddhist Studies (15 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Buddhism (10 obras) · Philosophy of religion (10 obras) · Theology (10 obras) · Indian History and Philosophy (9 obras) · Chinese history and philosophy (6 obras) · Linguistics (6 obras)