Luis Fernando Medina
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 254191 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Luis Fernando Medina |
| PRENOMES | Luis Fernando |
| SOBRENOME | Medina |
| ASSINATURA | MEDINA L F |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Virginia |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9222-0806 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 14 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2005 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation
We inquire how a commodity cartel is created by studying the negotiations between Colombia and Brazil to stabilize the international coffee market in the 1930s. We show how differences among actors involved in the industry within the negotiating countries in terms of land ownership and type of coffee produced, prevented early cartelization agreements. Cartelization was only achieved when four factors converged: financial and infrastructural capab…
The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation
Blueprints for Red Insurgencies
Increasingly, scholars agree that role of ideology in civil wars goes beyond mere window-dressing. With respect to leftist insurgencies, we argue that ideology provides insurgent groups an understanding of pivotal constituents (urban or rural) and the timing of revolution (imminent or distant). These factors shape insurgent groups' politico-military strategies, which may be insurrectionary, militarist Maoist, or protracted people's war. We develo…
From green to ripe
Armed conflict in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) was only settled after 50 years and several attempts at negotiations. This sequence of events fits the pattern of "conflict ripeness" first proposed by William Zartman. But using a successful settlement as a way to determine ripeness can be tautological. To address this issue, we develop a formal model to identify the level of ripeness at which a conflict is sett…
Imperfect Knowledge and Stable Governance in Democracies
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model of elections and government formation where voters do not have perfect knowledge about the parties’ ideological position. Although voters are boundedly rational, they are forward-looking in that they try to assess the likely impact of the different parties over the resulting government. Thus, their decision rules combine sincere and strategic voting: they form preferences about the different partie…
Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination
In the literature on democratisation, the Spanish case has a paradigmatic status, especially for the negotiations between the regime and the opposition. While these negotiations did stabilise the new regime, the transition was driven by the regime's elites. The key event was the approval of the Law for Political Reform in November 1976, when the legislature voted its own demise. The change was done according to the rules of the system. To explain…
A Gulp of Water in the Neva? The Bolshevik Revolution's First Centennial
The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action Theory
The theory of collective action has long since moved beyond the “free-rider problem” as originally stated by Olson (1965) . It is now recognized that large-scale participation is possible even without selective incentives, but this has raised new questions. I discuss two types of contributions from the past few years. Some of the recent literature has remained close to the canonical game-theoretic framework, clarifying many analytical issues and …
Is there really a turnout paradox
This paper challenges the notion that voting games with purely instrumental players cannot account for high turnout (the ‘turnout paradox’). Although it has been known for over 25 years that such games can generate high-turnout equilibria, the said equilibria have been rejected on the grounds that they are fragile. This paper shows that this claim is incorrect because it is based on a computation of pivot probabilities that is not consistent with…
Patrons, Clients and Policies
Ruling Oneself Out
A Unified Theory of Collective Action and Social Change
Current theorists assume that people are unable to coordinate strategies, but Medina suggests this is an implausible proposition. He provides an analysis of what happens if we account for the fact that group members may communicate expectations to each other. work of considerable theoretical and methodological complexity, A Unified Theory of Collective Action and Social Change seeks to show how individuals gauge the value of their participation i…
Party Discipline with Legislative Initiative
This article analyses the role of parties in political systems with legislative initiative. The model explicitly takes into account the multi-district nature of elections so that voters recognize that they are not voting for a policy but for members of a policy-making body. In this setting, parties can attain their ideological goals without resorting to extreme discipline of their members in the legislature. With respect to the electorate, althou…
The Comparative Statics of Collective Action
The prevailing approaches to collective action in the rational choice paradigm often lead to implausible conclusions and tend to lack predictive power. This article introduces a method to overcome these difficulties. The method is based on the notion of stability sets of pure-strategy equilibria, already familiar from the literature on equilibrium selection and with close counterparts in evolutionary game theory. With the help of some simple exam…
Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination
In the literature on democratisation, the Spanish case has a paradigmatic status, especially for the negotiations between the regime and the opposition. While these negotiations did stabilise the new regime, the transition was driven by the regime's elites. The key event was the approval of the Law for Political Reform in November 1976, when the legislature voted its own demise. The change was done according to the rules of the system. To explain…
The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action Theory
The theory of collective action has long since moved beyond the “free-rider problem” as originally stated by Olson (1965) . It is now recognized that large-scale participation is possible even without selective incentives, but this has raised new questions. I discuss two types of contributions from the past few years. Some of the recent literature has remained close to the canonical game-theoretic framework, clarifying many analytical issues and …
From green to ripe
Armed conflict in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) was only settled after 50 years and several attempts at negotiations. This sequence of events fits the pattern of "conflict ripeness" first proposed by William Zartman. But using a successful settlement as a way to determine ripeness can be tautological. To address this issue, we develop a formal model to identify the level of ripeness at which a conflict is sett…
Is there really a turnout paradox
This paper challenges the notion that voting games with purely instrumental players cannot account for high turnout (the ‘turnout paradox’). Although it has been known for over 25 years that such games can generate high-turnout equilibria, the said equilibria have been rejected on the grounds that they are fragile. This paper shows that this claim is incorrect because it is based on a computation of pivot probabilities that is not consistent with…
The Comparative Statics of Collective Action
The prevailing approaches to collective action in the rational choice paradigm often lead to implausible conclusions and tend to lack predictive power. This article introduces a method to overcome these difficulties. The method is based on the notion of stability sets of pure-strategy equilibria, already familiar from the literature on equilibrium selection and with close counterparts in evolutionary game theory. With the help of some simple exam…
The Comparative Statics of Collective Action
The prevailing approaches to collective action in the rational choice paradigm often lead to implausible conclusions and tend to lack predictive power. This article introduces a method to overcome these difficulties. The method is based on the notion of stability sets of pure-strategy equilibria, already familiar from the literature on equilibrium selection and with close counterparts in evolutionary game theory. With the help of some simple exam…
Party Discipline with Legislative Initiative
This article analyses the role of parties in political systems with legislative initiative. The model explicitly takes into account the multi-district nature of elections so that voters recognize that they are not voting for a policy but for members of a policy-making body. In this setting, parties can attain their ideological goals without resorting to extreme discipline of their members in the legislature. With respect to the electorate, althou…
A Unified Theory of Collective Action and Social Change
Current theorists assume that people are unable to coordinate strategies, but Medina suggests this is an implausible proposition. He provides an analysis of what happens if we account for the fact that group members may communicate expectations to each other. work of considerable theoretical and methodological complexity, A Unified Theory of Collective Action and Social Change seeks to show how individuals gauge the value of their participation i…
Patrons, Clients and Policies
Ruling Oneself Out
Is there really a turnout paradox
This paper challenges the notion that voting games with purely instrumental players cannot account for high turnout (the ‘turnout paradox’). Although it has been known for over 25 years that such games can generate high-turnout equilibria, the said equilibria have been rejected on the grounds that they are fragile. This paper shows that this claim is incorrect because it is based on a computation of pivot probabilities that is not consistent with…
The Analytical Foundations of Collective Action Theory
The theory of collective action has long since moved beyond the “free-rider problem” as originally stated by Olson (1965) . It is now recognized that large-scale participation is possible even without selective incentives, but this has raised new questions. I discuss two types of contributions from the past few years. Some of the recent literature has remained close to the canonical game-theoretic framework, clarifying many analytical issues and …
A Gulp of Water in the Neva? The Bolshevik Revolution's First Centennial
Imperfect Knowledge and Stable Governance in Democracies
In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model of elections and government formation where voters do not have perfect knowledge about the parties’ ideological position. Although voters are boundedly rational, they are forward-looking in that they try to assess the likely impact of the different parties over the resulting government. Thus, their decision rules combine sincere and strategic voting: they form preferences about the different partie…
Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination
In the literature on democratisation, the Spanish case has a paradigmatic status, especially for the negotiations between the regime and the opposition. While these negotiations did stabilise the new regime, the transition was driven by the regime's elites. The key event was the approval of the Law for Political Reform in November 1976, when the legislature voted its own demise. The change was done according to the rules of the system. To explain…
From green to ripe
Armed conflict in Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) was only settled after 50 years and several attempts at negotiations. This sequence of events fits the pattern of "conflict ripeness" first proposed by William Zartman. But using a successful settlement as a way to determine ripeness can be tautological. To address this issue, we develop a formal model to identify the level of ripeness at which a conflict is sett…
Blueprints for Red Insurgencies
Increasingly, scholars agree that role of ideology in civil wars goes beyond mere window-dressing. With respect to leftist insurgencies, we argue that ideology provides insurgent groups an understanding of pivotal constituents (urban or rural) and the timing of revolution (imminent or distant). These factors shape insurgent groups' politico-military strategies, which may be insurrectionary, militarist Maoist, or protracted people's war. We develo…
The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation
We inquire how a commodity cartel is created by studying the negotiations between Colombia and Brazil to stabilize the international coffee market in the 1930s. We show how differences among actors involved in the industry within the negotiating countries in terms of land ownership and type of coffee produced, prevented early cartelization agreements. Cartelization was only achieved when four factors converged: financial and infrastructural capab…
The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation
Law (9 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Politics (9 obras) · Economics (8 obras) · Sociology (8 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Political economy (6 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras)