Gil Merom
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 260989 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Gil Merom |
| PRENOMES | Gil |
| SOBRENOME | Merom |
| ASSINATURA | MEROM G |
| AFILIAÇÕES | The University of Sydney |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6628-6991 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 12 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 25 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1990 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2017 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat
ISRAELI DECISION MAKERS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY ATTENTIVE to the Iranian nuclear threat since the 1990s.1 They have debated extensively the threat of nuclear Iran and have consistently found it intolerable.2 The United States and Western powers brought Iran to the negotiation table and to signing a nuclear deal through escalating cycles of sanctions.3 A successful conclusion of the negotiations should have presumably alleviated the concerns of ala…
The Logic and Illogic of an Israeli Unilateral Preventive Strike on Iran
The Israeli political leadership has invested massively in preparing a credible preventive strike option on Iran’s nuclear program. The article assesses this option in the context of Israel’s operational acumen and strategic preferences. It points out to a critical gap between the capacity to achieve the operational objectives and the strategic utility of a preventive strike. It then discusses the logical fallacies underlying Israeli leaders’ exp…
The age of asocial war
Why, in spite of past failures, do liberal democracies continue to intervene militarily and fight counterinsurgency wars? The answer is grounded in learning. Liberal democracies acknowledge past failures, tracing them to the interaction between the events on the battlefield and society at home. Specifically, they identify the educated middle class and its mix of expedient and altruistic motivations as preventing effective military campaigns and v…
The Second Lebanon War
There is next to consensus that the second 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon was a hasty military adventure that ended in failure. This article takes a different view. Relying on recently published testimonies and accounts, it is argued that the decision to go to war was calculated and grounded in widely shared assumptions that Israel's deteriorating deterrence posture required an offensive booster. After mapping Israeli failures, this article argues t…
The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria
The French War in Algeria (1954-1962) deserves attention, above all, because of the remarkable divorce between France’s military success and the failure to secure her preferred political results. This article identifies the agent responsible for that discrepancy and for the eventual French capitulation as essentially social, explaining how the defining struggle over Algeria’s future revolved round issues of purpose and identity. Specifically, the…
How Democracies Lose Small Wars
How Democracies Lose Small Wars
In this 2003 book, Gil Merom argues that modern democracies fail in insurgency wars because they are unable to find a winning balance between expedient and moral tolerance to the costs of war. Small wars, he argues, are lost at home when a critical minority mass shifts the center of gravity from the battlefield to the market place of ideas. Merom analyzes the role of brutality in counterinsurgency, the historical foundations of moral and expedien…
Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace
This is primarily a theoretical article. It aspires to fill the void left by realist neglect of regional analysis. The article starts with a presentation of a power-based analysis of the interaction between systemic and regional level actors, and of basic patterns of regional stability, conflict and peace. Next, it offers two amendments to the conventional realist analysis of regions. The first amendment discusses regional order in terms of unit-…
A "Grand Design"? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War
This article deals with one example of the debate over which factors, structural or personal, are more important in explaining the course of national history. At issue is the French retreat from Algeria and particularly that France abandoned that country because of the "grand design" of one great leader, Charles de Gaulle. We examine the main tenets of this thesis, discussing whether the French economy forced de Gaulle to give up Algeria; whether…
Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism
Journal Article Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism Get access Gil Merom Gil Merom GIL MEROM is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University, and a U2000 Fellow in the Department of Government and Public Administration, Sydney University. His most recent articles include "Strong Powers in Small Wars: The Unnoticed Foundations of Success," and "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End…
Strong powers in small wars
This essay discusses how strong military powers successfully conduct counter‐insurgency campaigns. In particular, it notes the pivotal role savagery plays in such encounters, and the social and institutional conditions that facilitate the resort to extreme levels of brutality. Finally, the essay demonstrates how states (including infant democracies) employ various compartmentalisation techniques in order to win insurgency wars, once the key condi…
Democracy, Dependency, and Destabilization
Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism
Journal Article Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism Get access Gil Merom Gil Merom GIL MEROM is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University, and a U2000 Fellow in the Department of Government and Public Administration, Sydney University. His most recent articles include "Strong Powers in Small Wars: The Unnoticed Foundations of Success," and "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End…
Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat
ISRAELI DECISION MAKERS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY ATTENTIVE to the Iranian nuclear threat since the 1990s.1 They have debated extensively the threat of nuclear Iran and have consistently found it intolerable.2 The United States and Western powers brought Iran to the negotiation table and to signing a nuclear deal through escalating cycles of sanctions.3 A successful conclusion of the negotiations should have presumably alleviated the concerns of ala…
How Democracies Lose Small Wars
Strong powers in small wars
This essay discusses how strong military powers successfully conduct counter‐insurgency campaigns. In particular, it notes the pivotal role savagery plays in such encounters, and the social and institutional conditions that facilitate the resort to extreme levels of brutality. Finally, the essay demonstrates how states (including infant democracies) employ various compartmentalisation techniques in order to win insurgency wars, once the key condi…
Democracy, Dependency, and Destabilization
The age of asocial war
Why, in spite of past failures, do liberal democracies continue to intervene militarily and fight counterinsurgency wars? The answer is grounded in learning. Liberal democracies acknowledge past failures, tracing them to the interaction between the events on the battlefield and society at home. Specifically, they identify the educated middle class and its mix of expedient and altruistic motivations as preventing effective military campaigns and v…
The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria
The French War in Algeria (1954-1962) deserves attention, above all, because of the remarkable divorce between France’s military success and the failure to secure her preferred political results. This article identifies the agent responsible for that discrepancy and for the eventual French capitulation as essentially social, explaining how the defining struggle over Algeria’s future revolved round issues of purpose and identity. Specifically, the…
Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace
This is primarily a theoretical article. It aspires to fill the void left by realist neglect of regional analysis. The article starts with a presentation of a power-based analysis of the interaction between systemic and regional level actors, and of basic patterns of regional stability, conflict and peace. Next, it offers two amendments to the conventional realist analysis of regions. The first amendment discusses regional order in terms of unit-…
Democracy, Dependency, and Destabilization
Strong powers in small wars
This essay discusses how strong military powers successfully conduct counter‐insurgency campaigns. In particular, it notes the pivotal role savagery plays in such encounters, and the social and institutional conditions that facilitate the resort to extreme levels of brutality. Finally, the essay demonstrates how states (including infant democracies) employ various compartmentalisation techniques in order to win insurgency wars, once the key condi…
A "Grand Design"? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War
This article deals with one example of the debate over which factors, structural or personal, are more important in explaining the course of national history. At issue is the French retreat from Algeria and particularly that France abandoned that country because of the "grand design" of one great leader, Charles de Gaulle. We examine the main tenets of this thesis, discussing whether the French economy forced de Gaulle to give up Algeria; whether…
Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism
Journal Article Israel's National Security and the Myth of Exceptionalism Get access Gil Merom Gil Merom GIL MEROM is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University, and a U2000 Fellow in the Department of Government and Public Administration, Sydney University. His most recent articles include "Strong Powers in Small Wars: The Unnoticed Foundations of Success," and "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End…
How Democracies Lose Small Wars
In this 2003 book, Gil Merom argues that modern democracies fail in insurgency wars because they are unable to find a winning balance between expedient and moral tolerance to the costs of war. Small wars, he argues, are lost at home when a critical minority mass shifts the center of gravity from the battlefield to the market place of ideas. Merom analyzes the role of brutality in counterinsurgency, the historical foundations of moral and expedien…
Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace
This is primarily a theoretical article. It aspires to fill the void left by realist neglect of regional analysis. The article starts with a presentation of a power-based analysis of the interaction between systemic and regional level actors, and of basic patterns of regional stability, conflict and peace. Next, it offers two amendments to the conventional realist analysis of regions. The first amendment discusses regional order in terms of unit-…
The Social Origins of the French Capitulation in Algeria
The French War in Algeria (1954-1962) deserves attention, above all, because of the remarkable divorce between France’s military success and the failure to secure her preferred political results. This article identifies the agent responsible for that discrepancy and for the eventual French capitulation as essentially social, explaining how the defining struggle over Algeria’s future revolved round issues of purpose and identity. Specifically, the…
How Democracies Lose Small Wars
The Second Lebanon War
There is next to consensus that the second 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon was a hasty military adventure that ended in failure. This article takes a different view. Relying on recently published testimonies and accounts, it is argued that the decision to go to war was calculated and grounded in widely shared assumptions that Israel's deteriorating deterrence posture required an offensive booster. After mapping Israeli failures, this article argues t…
The age of asocial war
Why, in spite of past failures, do liberal democracies continue to intervene militarily and fight counterinsurgency wars? The answer is grounded in learning. Liberal democracies acknowledge past failures, tracing them to the interaction between the events on the battlefield and society at home. Specifically, they identify the educated middle class and its mix of expedient and altruistic motivations as preventing effective military campaigns and v…
Israeli Perceptions of the Iranian Nuclear Threat
ISRAELI DECISION MAKERS HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY ATTENTIVE to the Iranian nuclear threat since the 1990s.1 They have debated extensively the threat of nuclear Iran and have consistently found it intolerable.2 The United States and Western powers brought Iran to the negotiation table and to signing a nuclear deal through escalating cycles of sanctions.3 A successful conclusion of the negotiations should have presumably alleviated the concerns of ala…
The Logic and Illogic of an Israeli Unilateral Preventive Strike on Iran
The Israeli political leadership has invested massively in preparing a credible preventive strike option on Iran’s nuclear program. The article assesses this option in the context of Israel’s operational acumen and strategic preferences. It points out to a critical gap between the capacity to achieve the operational objectives and the strategic utility of a preventive strike. It then discusses the logical fallacies underlying Israeli leaders’ exp…
Political science (12 obras) · Sociology (12 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Law (9 obras) · Political economy (9 obras) · Politics (9 obras) · History (6 obras) · Democracy (4 obras) · History (4 obras) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (4 obras)