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W H Tsai

Dados Biográficos

ID27779
NOMEW H Tsai
PRENOMESW H
SOBRENOMETsai
ASSINATURATSAI W H
AFILIAÇÕESAcademia Sinica
ORCID0000-0003-4803-6953
VERIFICADOSim
TOTAL DE OBRAS35
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES163
TOTAL COMO AUTOR35
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO2013
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2026
ÍNDICE H8
  • The limitations of the foot-in-the-door effect in China’s united front work toward Taiwan

    Open Access•Pin-Hsuan Wu, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Asian and African…•2026

    This study employs the foot-in-the-door (FITD) effect as an analytical framework for examining the effectiveness of China’s united front efforts targeting Kinmen. FITD refers to a persuasion technique characterized by the gradual commitment of resources to achieve incremental effects on the recipient. Operationally, we establish a United Front Effectiveness Index (UFEI) to quantify and interpret the FITD concept. Focusing on the case of Kinmen Co…

  • Dual Authoritative Mediation

    Open Access•Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2026

    The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is employing mechanisms inspired by the ‘Fengqiao experience’ to mediate grassroots conflicts. Our findings show that in urban areas, community support officers from the People’s Police have played a critical role in this task. They liaise with residents’ committees and other relevant units to conduct ‘dual authoritative mediation’. This practice reflects the roles of the police as holders of state authority and …

  • Explaining the Dramatic Policy Changes in Xi Jinping’s China

    Open Access•W H Tsai•ARTICLE•China Report•2026

    Should we regard the Xi Jinping and Hu–Wen eras as two completely different and separate periods? It is true that Xi Jinping has changed many of the norms of the Hu–Wen era, but the roots of many of his ‘reforms’ may have originated from some problems during the Hu–Wen era. I believe that agency and structure are two important aspects of our analysis of the Chinese Communist Party’s dramatic policy changes during the Xi era. Furthermore, this stu…

  • Social Credit

    W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2025

  • Archaeological Nationalism in Contemporary China and the Official Construction of Ancient Chinese History

    Open Access•Jean Yu‐chen Tseng, J Tseng et al.•ARTICLE•Nations and Nationalism•2025•Referências: 16

    This paper examines the archaeological nationalism of the Chinese state. The existence of the Xia dynasty, long regarded by Chinese scholars to be China's first dynasty, has become a contentious issue in both Chinese and Western academic circles. During Jiang Zemin's tenure, the Chinese government began to leverage state power to support archaeological efforts aimed at substantiating the historical reality of the Xia dynasty. The Project to Trace…

  • The Norm Saboteur

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Journal of Asian and African…•2025•Referências: 25

    Now that Xi Jinping has ended the fixed term system for China's top leader and undermined the norms governing the cultivation of a successor, scholars have begun speculating on how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will organize the transfer of power in the post-Xi era. For this, I propose a "struggle-development" model for the period of Xi's tenure and characterize him as a "norm saboteur." I also discuss two possible scenarios for political suc…

  • Centralizing Rules

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2024•Citada por: 1•Referências: 4

    How does the Chinese Communist Party ensure that its officials remain loyal to the top leader, and what mechanisms does the leader use to get cadres to comply with his policies and intentions? We argue that Party regulations play a very important role in ensuring loyalty. These regulations, both written and unwritten, constitute a system of authoritarian legality through which Xi Jinping ensures that cadres practice the “two safeguards,” thus enh…

  • Social brokers in grassroots governance

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2024•Citada por: 1•Referências: 33

    One important and interesting aspect of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) efforts to revitalize the Chinese countryside in recent years has been the attempt to make use of prominent local people - known as xinxiangxian (新乡贤, meaning 'new rural meritorious people'). As social brokers, xinxiangxian differ from other agents. The attributes of this new class have yet to be regularized through central government statute, which means that the CCP's p…

  • Urban Management in Authoritarian China

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2023•Citada por: 2

    Comprehensive law enforcement' is an important part of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) thinking on urban management. It involves all government departments and units related to law enforcement working together to improve their administrative efficiency. Since 2009, the CCP has absorbed some elements of the Western concept of the 'smart city', including the use of big data analysis and technology in implementing and enforcing the law. At the…

  • The Recruitment Process for Grassroots Cadres in a Chinese County

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Modern China•2023•Citada por: 2•Referências: 18

    Through field research conducted within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) County S Organization Department, this article finds that, under the CCP’s 2012 Eighteenth Party Congress policies of strengthening local governance and “whoever recommends a cadre is responsible for their performance,” the powers of the county organization departments have been enhanced. The main task of an organization department is the selection of cadres for posting…

  • Fast Track Promotion for Grassroots Cadres

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Issues & Studies•2022•Referências: 11

    Although the “selected graduate” (xuandiaosheng) system is not new, Xi Jinping has changed it substantially since he came to power. This paper introduces the concept of the “promotion ladder” to describe how low-ranking cadres must wait longer for promotion than do mid- and high-ranking cadres. This promotion ladder often leads to low-ranking cadres hitting a ceiling in their careers. For this reason, section-level cadres need a fast track that w…

  • Beautiful Countryside Construction,” Policy Inspection Teams, and Grassroots Political Participation in China

    Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2022•Citada por: 1

    This article seeks to demonstrate that there is a certain degree of political participation in contemporary China. We argue that the qunzhong, or ‘masses’, in China can be divided into three categories: members of autonomous grassroots organizations, local elites (xin xiangxian), and victims of rights violations, and we illustrate our discussion of the impact of these three groups on policy through the example of the ‘Beautiful Countryside Constr…

  • The Role of China’s County-level Research Offices in Policy Adaptation

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Chinese Political…•2022•Citada por: 1•Referências: 30

  • The policy implementation strategies of county cadres

    Open Access•Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2022•Citada por: 6•Referências: 46

    Using the concept of 'hedging', we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated task…

  • Dual Elite Recruitment Logic and Political Manipulation under Xi Jinping

    Chien-wen Kou, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Issues & Studies•2021•Citada por: 1•Referências: 12

    Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of “dual elite recruitment logic” as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in t…

  • Hobbling Big Brother

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2021•Citada por: 4•Referências: 8

    This article argues that policy implementation in China has moved toward a system under which the center formulates a blueprint or “top-level design” from which local officials devise detailed regulations through a process of “crossing the river by feeling for stones.” This applies to the development of China’s new social credit system. To minimize political risk, when implementing it local officials have selected easier goals from the “top-level…

  • A Mechanism of Coded Communication

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Modern China•2021•Citada por: 1•Referências: 11

    Studies of the official media of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long focused on interpretations of political propaganda. In this article, we propose another model—the “secret code communication” model. We find that the main audience for some of the official media consists not of members of the public but rather cadres. The China Central Television (CCTV) program Xinwen Lianbo is a typical example. The program operates according to a very …

  • Ideological Education and Practical Training at a County Party School

    Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2020•Citada por: 2•Referências: 6

    Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is concentrating efforts on the cultivation of outstanding local cadres in order to improve local governance. For this purpose, it is strengthening the functions of local Party schools that offer students both political and administrative education to create a cohort of cadres who are both “red and expert.” We discuss how this is done in terms of curriculum planning, types of classes, and the student …

  • Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2020•Citada por: 7•Referências: 3

    On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC…

  • Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2020•Citada por: 17•Referências: 22

    This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of 'institutionalized mobilization', we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and …

  • Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2019•Citada por: 8•Referências: 7

    How are bureaucrats controlled by their superiors in the Chinese political system? “Leading small groups” (领导小组) are among the most important mechanisms for integrating the interests and opinions of various government and Party departments so that superiors can ensure that their policies are implemented. This article analyzes the roles of the three main actors in the leading small groups: group leaders, the heads of the lead departments, and the …

  • Penetrating the Grassroots

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Problems of Post-Communism•2019•Citada por: 5•Referências: 12

    Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical…

  • The Impending Rise of the “Tsinghua Clique

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2019•Citada por: 9

    The Tsinghua clique is highly influential in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics. But in the past, alumni from other elite universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, also occupied positions as senior cadres, so Tsinghua did not have any more influence than they did. However, since 2002, Tsinghua University has developed a ‘cultivation/transfer’ system whereby the school, in a purposeful, calculating, and organi…

  • The Authority, Functions, and Political Intrigues of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2018•Citada por: 3•Referências: 2

    The General Office of the Party Central Committee is the core staff organization through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises power internally. This article discusses the attributes of the General Office’s directors and its important constituent departments, which include the Secretarial Bureau, Letters and Visits Bureau, Research Office, Security Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Confidential Communication Bureau, and Departmental Affairs Mana…

  • Medical Politics and the CCP’s Healthcare System for State Leaders

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2018•Citada por: 1

    The health of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders is a sensitive and closely guarded secret, and academic literature on the topic has been sorely lacking as a consequence. Using the most up-to-date information, the author of this article will lift the cloak of mystery surrounding official CCP healthcare, detailing the operation of a confidential healthcare system established to provide state leaders with comprehensive medical treatment. The mai…

Próximo
  • Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion

    Chien-wen Kou, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2014•Citada por: 41•Referências: 2

    Within the operational procedures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadre appointment system, age restrictions hinder cadre promotion. As a result, three different methods have emerged to bypass these restrictions, allowing officials to attain faster promotion. These three methods are the Communist Youth League route, temporary transferred duty and non-regulation promotion. This article will explain the age restriction system, and then outline…

  • Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2020•Citada por: 17•Referências: 22

    This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of 'institutionalized mobilization', we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and …

  • How ‘Networked Authoritarianism’ was Operationalized in China

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2016•Citada por: 14

    Does network technology weaken the ability of authoritarian regimes to govern their citizens? Arguments and discussion regarding this proposition can be found in existing studies. Scholars who support this point of view believe that certain developments in network technology led to the outbreak of the Jasmine Revolution in Arab countries in 2011. This chain of rebellions provides an obvious and affirmative example of this theory. However, as far …

  • The Impending Rise of the “Tsinghua Clique

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2019•Citada por: 9

    The Tsinghua clique is highly influential in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics. But in the past, alumni from other elite universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, also occupied positions as senior cadres, so Tsinghua did not have any more influence than they did. However, since 2002, Tsinghua University has developed a ‘cultivation/transfer’ system whereby the school, in a purposeful, calculating, and organi…

  • The CCP's Learning System

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2013•Citada por: 9•Referências: 7

    In an attempt to mold itself into a “learning Party”, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has recently borrowed the theory of the “learning organization”, a concept derived from Western management. This article argues that, in the process of molding the CCP into a “learning Party”, President Hu Jintao has employed two functions of learning inherited from Party history—thought unification and regime adaptation—to reinforce his own political legitima…

  • Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2019•Citada por: 8•Referências: 7

    How are bureaucrats controlled by their superiors in the Chinese political system? “Leading small groups” (领导小组) are among the most important mechanisms for integrating the interests and opinions of various government and Party departments so that superiors can ensure that their policies are implemented. This article analyzes the roles of the three main actors in the leading small groups: group leaders, the heads of the lead departments, and the …

  • Enabling China’s Voice to Be Heard by the World

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Problems of Post-Communism•2016•Citada por: 8•Referências: 4

    As China becomes a more prominent international player, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has stepped up its external propaganda in a bid to promote its image as a superpower. The operations of the CCP’s external propaganda system are no longer guided by dogma; rather, these incorporate many Western theories related to “public diplomacy,” which emphasizes the role played by non-governmental actors and the use of a softer approach. However, the CC…

  • Concentrating Power to Accomplish Big Things

    W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2016•Citada por: 8

    This article discusses the operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pishi system from the perspective of decision making. As an authoritarian regime, the CCP ‘concentrates power to accomplish big things’, demonstrating the extent of the CCP’s state capacity. This article argues that, through a wide range of documentation, the CCP provides leaders with a channel for resource accumulation, to issue pishi (written directives). Next, mishu (se…

  • Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2020•Citada por: 7•Referências: 3

    On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC…

  • The policy implementation strategies of county cadres

    Open Access•Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2022•Citada por: 6•Referências: 46

    Using the concept of 'hedging', we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated task…

  • A Model of Adaptive Mobilization

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Modern China•2017•Citada por: 6•Referências: 24

    Diaoyan (investigation and research) occupies a special place in the politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The concept can be broken down into two distinct types: symbolic diaoyan, and standard diaoyan. The former refers to the phenomenon of top leaders promoting and initiating the coordinated implementation of a particular political line. Leaders first promote their ideas through symbolic trips and speeches, and observe the extent of su…

  • Penetrating the Grassroots

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Problems of Post-Communism•2019•Citada por: 5•Referências: 12

    Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical…

  • Hobbling Big Brother

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2021•Citada por: 4•Referências: 8

    This article argues that policy implementation in China has moved toward a system under which the center formulates a blueprint or “top-level design” from which local officials devise detailed regulations through a process of “crossing the river by feeling for stones.” This applies to the development of China’s new social credit system. To minimize political risk, when implementing it local officials have selected easier goals from the “top-level…

  • The Authority, Functions, and Political Intrigues of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2018•Citada por: 3•Referências: 2

    The General Office of the Party Central Committee is the core staff organization through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises power internally. This article discusses the attributes of the General Office’s directors and its important constituent departments, which include the Secretarial Bureau, Letters and Visits Bureau, Research Office, Security Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Confidential Communication Bureau, and Departmental Affairs Mana…

  • Framing the Funeral

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2016•Citada por: 3•Referências: 1

    Influenced by Confucian culture and Soviet traditions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gives special attention to the arrangements for officials’ funerals. The format of these funerals is framed according to the officials’ rank and political performance. This article primarily discusses the funerals of national leaders and identifies five different roles: great leader, eminent leader, deposed leader, political offender, and political traitor. T…

  • Urban Management in Authoritarian China

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2023•Citada por: 2

    Comprehensive law enforcement' is an important part of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) thinking on urban management. It involves all government departments and units related to law enforcement working together to improve their administrative efficiency. Since 2009, the CCP has absorbed some elements of the Western concept of the 'smart city', including the use of big data analysis and technology in implementing and enforcing the law. At the…

  • The Recruitment Process for Grassroots Cadres in a Chinese County

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Modern China•2023•Citada por: 2•Referências: 18

    Through field research conducted within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) County S Organization Department, this article finds that, under the CCP’s 2012 Eighteenth Party Congress policies of strengthening local governance and “whoever recommends a cadre is responsible for their performance,” the powers of the county organization departments have been enhanced. The main task of an organization department is the selection of cadres for posting…

  • Ideological Education and Practical Training at a County Party School

    Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2020•Citada por: 2•Referências: 6

    Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is concentrating efforts on the cultivation of outstanding local cadres in order to improve local governance. For this purpose, it is strengthening the functions of local Party schools that offer students both political and administrative education to create a cohort of cadres who are both “red and expert.” We discuss how this is done in terms of curriculum planning, types of classes, and the student …

  • Centralizing Rules

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2024•Citada por: 1•Referências: 4

    How does the Chinese Communist Party ensure that its officials remain loyal to the top leader, and what mechanisms does the leader use to get cadres to comply with his policies and intentions? We argue that Party regulations play a very important role in ensuring loyalty. These regulations, both written and unwritten, constitute a system of authoritarian legality through which Xi Jinping ensures that cadres practice the “two safeguards,” thus enh…

  • Social brokers in grassroots governance

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2024•Citada por: 1•Referências: 33

    One important and interesting aspect of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) efforts to revitalize the Chinese countryside in recent years has been the attempt to make use of prominent local people - known as xinxiangxian (新乡贤, meaning 'new rural meritorious people'). As social brokers, xinxiangxian differ from other agents. The attributes of this new class have yet to be regularized through central government statute, which means that the CCP's p…

  • Beautiful Countryside Construction,” Policy Inspection Teams, and Grassroots Political Participation in China

    Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2022•Citada por: 1

    This article seeks to demonstrate that there is a certain degree of political participation in contemporary China. We argue that the qunzhong, or ‘masses’, in China can be divided into three categories: members of autonomous grassroots organizations, local elites (xin xiangxian), and victims of rights violations, and we illustrate our discussion of the impact of these three groups on policy through the example of the ‘Beautiful Countryside Constr…

  • The Role of China’s County-level Research Offices in Policy Adaptation

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Chinese Political…•2022•Citada por: 1•Referências: 30

  • Dual Elite Recruitment Logic and Political Manipulation under Xi Jinping

    Chien-wen Kou, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Issues & Studies•2021•Citada por: 1•Referências: 12

    Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of “dual elite recruitment logic” as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in t…

  • A Mechanism of Coded Communication

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Modern China•2021•Citada por: 1•Referências: 11

    Studies of the official media of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long focused on interpretations of political propaganda. In this article, we propose another model—the “secret code communication” model. We find that the main audience for some of the official media consists not of members of the public but rather cadres. The China Central Television (CCTV) program Xinwen Lianbo is a typical example. The program operates according to a very …

  • Medical Politics and the CCP’s Healthcare System for State Leaders

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2018•Citada por: 1

    The health of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders is a sensitive and closely guarded secret, and academic literature on the topic has been sorely lacking as a consequence. Using the most up-to-date information, the author of this article will lift the cloak of mystery surrounding official CCP healthcare, detailing the operation of a confidential healthcare system established to provide state leaders with comprehensive medical treatment. The mai…

  • Secret Codes of Political Propaganda

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Quarterly•2013

    Within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), some Party units have established a largely unknown network of writing teams which propagate the policies or perspectives of a particular unit by publishing feature articles in Party journals. These writing teams often make use of a pseudonym in the form of a person's name, leading outsiders to believe that the work is written by a journalist. In fact, the pseudonyms of the Party unit writing teams functi…

  • The CCP's Learning System

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2013•Citada por: 9•Referências: 7

    In an attempt to mold itself into a “learning Party”, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has recently borrowed the theory of the “learning organization”, a concept derived from Western management. This article argues that, in the process of molding the CCP into a “learning Party”, President Hu Jintao has employed two functions of learning inherited from Party history—thought unification and regime adaptation—to reinforce his own political legitima…

  • Lifting the Veil of the CCP’s Mishu System

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2014•Citada por: 1•Referências: 2

    This article analyzes the Chinese Communist Party’s opaque mishu (secretary) system. It consists of two branches: institutional mishu and personal mishu. The former are mainly employed in Party Committee general offices, to assist the Committee leadership and liaise between departments to push Committee policies and to administer and compile relevant documents to support the policy-making process. Personal mishu work instead in the individual lea…

  • Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion

    Chien-wen Kou, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2014•Citada por: 41•Referências: 2

    Within the operational procedures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadre appointment system, age restrictions hinder cadre promotion. As a result, three different methods have emerged to bypass these restrictions, allowing officials to attain faster promotion. These three methods are the Communist Youth League route, temporary transferred duty and non-regulation promotion. This article will explain the age restriction system, and then outline…

  • Delicacies for a Privileged Class in a Risk Society

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Issues & Studies•2016•Citada por: 1•Referências: 8

    This paper discusses the history and operation of the tegong (special supplies) system for foodstuffs operated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The system has been in existence since the Yan’an period and is still being practiced today. It was originally introduced to deal with China’s shortage economy during the era of Mao Zedong. Nowadays, the issue of food safety has made China a risk society, making it necessary for the CCP to provide it…

  • Framing the Funeral

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2016•Citada por: 3•Referências: 1

    Influenced by Confucian culture and Soviet traditions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gives special attention to the arrangements for officials’ funerals. The format of these funerals is framed according to the officials’ rank and political performance. This article primarily discusses the funerals of national leaders and identifies five different roles: great leader, eminent leader, deposed leader, political offender, and political traitor. T…

  • Enabling China’s Voice to Be Heard by the World

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Problems of Post-Communism•2016•Citada por: 8•Referências: 4

    As China becomes a more prominent international player, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has stepped up its external propaganda in a bid to promote its image as a superpower. The operations of the CCP’s external propaganda system are no longer guided by dogma; rather, these incorporate many Western theories related to “public diplomacy,” which emphasizes the role played by non-governmental actors and the use of a softer approach. However, the CC…

  • Concentrating Power to Accomplish Big Things

    W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2016•Citada por: 8

    This article discusses the operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pishi system from the perspective of decision making. As an authoritarian regime, the CCP ‘concentrates power to accomplish big things’, demonstrating the extent of the CCP’s state capacity. This article argues that, through a wide range of documentation, the CCP provides leaders with a channel for resource accumulation, to issue pishi (written directives). Next, mishu (se…

  • How ‘Networked Authoritarianism’ was Operationalized in China

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2016•Citada por: 14

    Does network technology weaken the ability of authoritarian regimes to govern their citizens? Arguments and discussion regarding this proposition can be found in existing studies. Scholars who support this point of view believe that certain developments in network technology led to the outbreak of the Jasmine Revolution in Arab countries in 2011. This chain of rebellions provides an obvious and affirmative example of this theory. However, as far …

  • A Model of Adaptive Mobilization

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Modern China•2017•Citada por: 6•Referências: 24

    Diaoyan (investigation and research) occupies a special place in the politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The concept can be broken down into two distinct types: symbolic diaoyan, and standard diaoyan. The former refers to the phenomenon of top leaders promoting and initiating the coordinated implementation of a particular political line. Leaders first promote their ideas through symbolic trips and speeches, and observe the extent of su…

  • The Authority, Functions, and Political Intrigues of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2018•Citada por: 3•Referências: 2

    The General Office of the Party Central Committee is the core staff organization through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises power internally. This article discusses the attributes of the General Office’s directors and its important constituent departments, which include the Secretarial Bureau, Letters and Visits Bureau, Research Office, Security Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Confidential Communication Bureau, and Departmental Affairs Mana…

  • Medical Politics and the CCP’s Healthcare System for State Leaders

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2018•Citada por: 1

    The health of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders is a sensitive and closely guarded secret, and academic literature on the topic has been sorely lacking as a consequence. Using the most up-to-date information, the author of this article will lift the cloak of mystery surrounding official CCP healthcare, detailing the operation of a confidential healthcare system established to provide state leaders with comprehensive medical treatment. The mai…

  • Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2019•Citada por: 8•Referências: 7

    How are bureaucrats controlled by their superiors in the Chinese political system? “Leading small groups” (领导小组) are among the most important mechanisms for integrating the interests and opinions of various government and Party departments so that superiors can ensure that their policies are implemented. This article analyzes the roles of the three main actors in the leading small groups: group leaders, the heads of the lead departments, and the …

  • Penetrating the Grassroots

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Problems of Post-Communism•2019•Citada por: 5•Referências: 12

    Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical…

  • The Impending Rise of the “Tsinghua Clique

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2019•Citada por: 9

    The Tsinghua clique is highly influential in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics. But in the past, alumni from other elite universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, also occupied positions as senior cadres, so Tsinghua did not have any more influence than they did. However, since 2002, Tsinghua University has developed a ‘cultivation/transfer’ system whereby the school, in a purposeful, calculating, and organi…

  • Ideological Education and Practical Training at a County Party School

    Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2020•Citada por: 2•Referências: 6

    Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is concentrating efforts on the cultivation of outstanding local cadres in order to improve local governance. For this purpose, it is strengthening the functions of local Party schools that offer students both political and administrative education to create a cohort of cadres who are both “red and expert.” We discuss how this is done in terms of curriculum planning, types of classes, and the student …

  • Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level

    Xingmiu Liao, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2020•Citada por: 7•Referências: 3

    On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC…

  • Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2020•Citada por: 17•Referências: 22

    This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of 'institutionalized mobilization', we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and …

  • Dual Elite Recruitment Logic and Political Manipulation under Xi Jinping

    Chien-wen Kou, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Issues & Studies•2021•Citada por: 1•Referências: 12

    Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of “dual elite recruitment logic” as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in t…

  • Hobbling Big Brother

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•The China Journal•2021•Citada por: 4•Referências: 8

    This article argues that policy implementation in China has moved toward a system under which the center formulates a blueprint or “top-level design” from which local officials devise detailed regulations through a process of “crossing the river by feeling for stones.” This applies to the development of China’s new social credit system. To minimize political risk, when implementing it local officials have selected easier goals from the “top-level…

  • A Mechanism of Coded Communication

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Modern China•2021•Citada por: 1•Referências: 11

    Studies of the official media of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long focused on interpretations of political propaganda. In this article, we propose another model—the “secret code communication” model. We find that the main audience for some of the official media consists not of members of the public but rather cadres. The China Central Television (CCTV) program Xinwen Lianbo is a typical example. The program operates according to a very …

  • Fast Track Promotion for Grassroots Cadres

    W H Tsai, Wen‐hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Issues & Studies•2022•Referências: 11

    Although the “selected graduate” (xuandiaosheng) system is not new, Xi Jinping has changed it substantially since he came to power. This paper introduces the concept of the “promotion ladder” to describe how low-ranking cadres must wait longer for promotion than do mid- and high-ranking cadres. This promotion ladder often leads to low-ranking cadres hitting a ceiling in their careers. For this reason, section-level cadres need a fast track that w…

  • Beautiful Countryside Construction,” Policy Inspection Teams, and Grassroots Political Participation in China

    Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Contemporary China•2022•Citada por: 1

    This article seeks to demonstrate that there is a certain degree of political participation in contemporary China. We argue that the qunzhong, or ‘masses’, in China can be divided into three categories: members of autonomous grassroots organizations, local elites (xin xiangxian), and victims of rights violations, and we illustrate our discussion of the impact of these three groups on policy through the example of the ‘Beautiful Countryside Constr…

  • The Role of China’s County-level Research Offices in Policy Adaptation

    Open Access•W H Tsai, Wen-Hsuan Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Chinese Political…•2022•Citada por: 1•Referências: 30

  • The policy implementation strategies of county cadres

    Open Access•Gang Tian, W H Tsai et al.•ARTICLE•China Information•2022•Citada por: 6•Referências: 46

    Using the concept of 'hedging', we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated task…

China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (32 obras) · Political science (31 obras) · China (28 obras) · Law (28 obras) · Politics (28 obras) · Law (27 obras) · Communism (23 obras) · Public Administration (19 obras) · Chinese history and philosophy (18 obras) · Public Administration (18 obras)

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