Raimo Tuomela
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 285624 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Raimo Tuomela |
| PRENOMES | Raimo |
| SOBRENOME | Tuomela |
| ASSINATURA | TUOMELA R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Helsinki |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 73 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 137 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 70 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 3 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1972 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Social Ontology in the Making
This collection does not only include articles by Raimo Tuomela and his co-authors which have been decisive in social ontology. An extensive introduction provides an account of the impact of the works, the most important debates in the field, and also addresses future issues. Thus, the book gives insights that are still viable and worthy of further scrutiny and development, making it an inspiring source for those engaged in the debates of the fie…
Shared Belief
Social Ontology
The main focus of this book about social ontology is collective intentionality (as expressed by joint intentions, wants, beliefs, and action) and group agency. The book gives the first full-blown theory of group reasons in the sense of members' participatory reasons as distinguished from a group agent's reasons for action.
Social Action
Essays on Explanation and Understanding
Reply to Wettersten’s Reply
Social Action
Cooperation as Joint Action
The paper studies cooperation as joint action, where joint action can, first, be conceptualized either individualistically in terms of the participants' individual goals and beliefs that the joint action is taken to serve. This is individualistic or ‛I-mode’ cooperation. Special version of it is ‛ pro-group I-mode’ cooperation, where the goals are shared. Second, cooperation can be of the kind where a group of persons act together as a group in t…
The We-Mode Approach
The paper is a response to some critical points and omissions in John Wettersten’s review of my recent book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). I point out in this short paper that the reviewer has not discussed the most central notions in the book relating to its “we-mode” approach, i.e. collective acceptance, group reasons, the collectivity condition, collective commitment and their role in acc…
Collective Intentions and Game Theory
The philosophy of sociality
Russell Hardin , Indeterminacy and Society (Princeton and Oxford
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Cooperation and trust in group context
Acting as a Group Member and Collective Commitment
In this paper we will study two central social notions, acting as a group member and collective commitment. Our study of the first of these notions is – as far as we know – the first systematic work on the topic. Acting as a group member is a central notion that obviously must be understood when speaking of the “we-perspective”, group life, and of social life more generally. Thus, not only philosophy of sociality, philosophy of social science, po…
Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality
The paper presents an account of social institutions on the basis of collective acceptance. Basically, collective acceptance by some members of a group involves the members' collectively coming to hold and holding a relevant social attitude (a "we-attitude"), viz. either one in the intention family of concepts or one in the belief family. In standard cases the collective acceptance must be in the "we-mode," viz. performed as a group member, and i…
Searle, Collective Intentionality, and Social Institutions
The Philosophy of Social Practices
This is a systematic philosophical and conceptual study of the notion of a social practice. Raimo Tuomela explains social practices in terms of the interlocking mental states of the agents; he shows how social practices (for example customs and traditions) are 'building blocks of society'; and he offers a clear and powerful account of the way in which social institutions are constructed from these building blocks as established, interconnected se…
Group Action and Group Responsibility
Cooperation in Institutional Context
Long-Term Cooperation
Cooperation and Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperation and Preferences
The Components of Social Control and Dependence
Collective and Joint Goals
Cooperation, Practical Reasoning, and Communication
Group beliefs
Cooperation
Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences
We Will Do It
1. You and I may intend that we jointly carry this heavy table upstairs. In this case we both can be said to have the group-intention to carry the table upstairs, for the content of the intention here involves that we perform something together and 'we' refers to our group. Group-intentions are expressible by means of locutions like We will do X, where the word 'will' is used conatively (rather than predictively, in the future tense) and X is a j…
Theory-distance and verisimilitude
Searle on Social Institutions
Philosophers have not done much analytical work concerning the structure of social reality and the nature of social institutions. Searle's book is therefore welcomed. It is written in a highly readable style without making serious compromises concerning analytical content. As the space allotted to me is limited I will go directly in medias res. Generally speaking, I regard most of Searle's account as acceptable, although I would like to formulate…
Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality
The paper presents an account of social institutions on the basis of collective acceptance. Basically, collective acceptance by some members of a group involves the members' collectively coming to hold and holding a relevant social attitude (a "we-attitude"), viz. either one in the intention family of concepts or one in the belief family. In standard cases the collective acceptance must be in the "we-mode," viz. performed as a group member, and i…
Collective action, supervenience, and constitution
Actions by Collectives
1. We commonly attribute actions to collectives. Thus, we use locutions like 'Firm F produced the goods G', 'Nation N1 attacked nation N2', 'The board dismissed Jones', 'The team scored', and so on. On the basis of examples like these it seems to be a worthwhile project to accept this commonsensical view at least in part and to think that true statements of the above kind can be made. I shall do so in this paper and investigate some central philo…
Acting as a Group Member and Collective Commitment
In this paper we will study two central social notions, acting as a group member and collective commitment. Our study of the first of these notions is – as far as we know – the first systematic work on the topic. Acting as a group member is a central notion that obviously must be understood when speaking of the “we-perspective”, group life, and of social life more generally. Thus, not only philosophy of sociality, philosophy of social science, po…
Collective Intentions and Game Theory
We-Intentions and Social Action
In the paper “We-intentions and Social Action” conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents’ I-intentions and beliefs. The n…
Inductive explanation
On the structuralist approach to the dynamics of theories
Collective and joint intention
Collective Acceptance and Collective Social Notions
Corporate Intention and Corporate Action
This paper comments on Coleman's account of group action (or corporate action, in his terminology), and his view is compared with the present author's largely complementary view (e.g., Tuomela 1993). Some criticisms concerning Coleman’s linear system of action are presented. One of the main points made is that a viable theory of social action must make use of a notion of joint intention and that Coleman’s theory is deficient on this score
Methodological Solipsism and Explanation in Psychology
This paper is a discussion of the tenability of methodological solipsism, which typically relies on the so-called Explanatory Thesis. The main arguments in the paper are directed against the latter thesis, according to which internal (or autonomous or narrow) psychological states as opposed to noninternal ones suffice for explanation in psychology. Especially, feedback-based actions are argued to require indispensable reference to noninternal exp…
Ruben and the Metaphysics of the Social World
Dispositions, realism, and explanation
Model theory and empirical interpretation of scientific theories
Cooperation and trust in group context
Empiricist vs. realist semantics and model theory
Model theory and empirical interpretation of scientific theories
Mario Bunge. Method, model and matter . Dordrecht
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Empiricist vs. realist semantics and model theory
Theoretical Concepts
Human Action and Its Explanation
Dispositions, realism, and explanation
On the structuralist approach to the dynamics of theories
Theory-distance and verisimilitude
Essays on Explanation and Understanding
I/Approaches to Teleology, Intentionality, and Historical Understanding.- Causal and Historical Explanation.- Against Reductionism and Purism : Tertium Datur.- Is Transcendental Hermeneutics Possible?.- The Intentions of Intentionality.- Comments on Professor Hintikka's Paper.- Reply to J. N. Findlay.- II/Causality and Intervention.- Causality and Action.- Causality and History.- An Analysis of Causality.- Explanation and Understanding of Human B…
Essays on Explanation and Understanding
Scientific Realism and Perception
Putnam's realisms
Human Action and its Explanation
1 Scientific Realism and Psychology.- Notes.- 2 Human Action.- 1. Actions as Achievements.- 2. Actions and Events.- 3. Actions and Action Statements.- Notes.- 3 Mental Episodes.- 1. The Stream of Consciousness and the Myth of the Given.- 2. Sellars' Analogy Account of Mental Episodes.- 3. Analogy and the Language of Thought.- 4. Rules of Language.- 5. Conceptuality and Mental Episodes.- Notes.- 4 Concept Formation in Psychology.- 1. Psychological…
Inductive explanation
A Theory of Social Action
The Structure of Social Action
Theories of Action
Social Action-Functions
We-Intentions and Social Action
In the paper “We-intentions and Social Action” conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents’ I-intentions and beliefs. The n…
Diskussion/Discussion. Replies to the Critics of A Theory of Social Action
The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author’s A Theory of social Action by Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin in this journal. As to Leist’s main criticisms, which concern the notions of social action, social practical reasoning, individualism, and social norms, they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer’s criticisms are on the whole well taken, and in fact all of them have been noted by the author in …
Science, Action and Reality
1: Philosophy and Transcendental Thinking.- 2: The Manifest Image and the Scientific Image.- I Conceptualizing the World.- II The Stereoscopic View of the World.- 3: The Myth of the Given World, Knowledge, and Language.- I The Myth and its Constituents.- II What is Wrong with the Myth?.- 4: Scientific Realism - Science's Own Philosophy.- I Kant and Scientific Realism.- II General Arguments for Scientific Realism.- Appendix on Quantum Mechanics, B…
We-intentions
Actions by Collectives
1. We commonly attribute actions to collectives. Thus, we use locutions like 'Firm F produced the goods G', 'Nation N1 attacked nation N2', 'The board dismissed Jones', 'The team scored', and so on. On the basis of examples like these it seems to be a worthwhile project to accept this commonsensical view at least in part and to think that true statements of the above kind can be made. I shall do so in this paper and investigate some central philo…
What Does Doing One’s Part of a Joint Action Involve
The paper gives a conceptual clarification of what the notion of a part of a joint action (project, etc;) involves. The - mutually recognized - division of a joint action into parts can be based on social norms (viz. formal or informal rules, or proper social norms such as conventions or group specific social norms) or it can be based on agreement, coercion, or some analogous social mechanism. The paper also discusses the notions of a we-intentio…
Collective action, supervenience, and constitution
Epistemology (58 obras) · Philosophy (55 obras) · Psychology (35 obras) · Sociology (30 obras) · Computer Science (25 obras) · Political science (24 obras) · Action (physics) (19 obras) · Law (17 obras) · Social Psychology (16 obras) · Philosophy (15 obras)