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Thomas C Schelling

Dados Biográficos

ID285855
NOMEThomas C Schelling
PRENOMESThomas C
SOBRENOMESchelling
ASSINATURASCHELLING T C
AFILIAÇÕESHarvard University Press
VERIFICADONão
TOTAL DE OBRAS64
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES961
TOTAL COMO AUTOR67
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1948
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2014
ÍNDICE H8
  • Economics and Sociology

    Richard Swedberg, Gary S Becker et al.•BOOK•Economics and Sociology :…•2020

  • Arms and Influence

    Thomas C Schelling•BOOK•Arms and Influence•2020

    “This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new…

  • Arms and Influence

    Thomas C Schelling•BOOK•Arms and Influence•2020

  • An evaluation of the FDA's analysis of the costs and benefits of the graphic warning label regulation

    Open Access•Frank J Chaloupka, Kenneth E Warner et al.•ARTICLE•Tobacco Control•2014

    The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory authority over cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products and authorised it to assert jurisdiction over other tobacco products. As with other Federal agencies, FDA is required to assess the costs and benefits of its significant regulatory actions. To date, FDA has issued economic impact analyses of one proposed and one final rule re…

  • Gérer le changement climatique

    Open Access•Roger Guesnerie, James A Mirrlees et al.•ARTICLE•La lettre du Collège de France•2010

    Colloque organisé par le Pr Nicholas Stern, chaire de Développement durable – Environnement, énergie et société, 2009-2010 et le Pr Roger Guesnerie, chaire de Théorie économique et organisation sociale, 7-8 juin 2010

  • A world without nuclear weapons

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2009•Citada por: 7

  • Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Negotiation and Conflict…•2008

  • Get Over It ‐ Winter 2006

    Open Access•Tariq Ramadan, Salman Rushdie et al.•ARTICLE•New Perspectives Quarterly•2008

  • Arms and influence

    Thomas C Schelling•BOOK•Arms and influence•2008

  • An Astonishing Sixty Years

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2006

    Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8, 2005

  • Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays

    G John Ikenberry, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•2006•Citada por: 1

  • Reciprocal measures for arms stabilization

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2005•Citada por: 1

  • The strategy of conflict

    Thomas C Schelling•BOOK•The strategy of conflict•2002

    Explores the international politics of threat, or, deterrence

  • What Makes Greenhouse Sense? Time to Rethink the Kyoto Protocol

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•2002

    The Kyoto Protocol should not be a parti san issue. The percentage reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions to which the United States committed itself by signing the 1997 Protocol to the 1992 UN Frame work Convention on Climate Change was probably unachievable when the protocol was adopted. The protocol then languished in Washington for the final three years of the Clinton administration, which chose not to present it to the Senate for ratification…

  • Rationally Coping with Lapses from Rationality

    Thomas C Schelling•CHAPTER•Game Theory, Experience,…•1998

  • The Cost of Combating Global Warming

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1997•Citada por: 3

    veloping world, they assert, will have to be at the expense of the rich nations. Their diagnosis is wrong, but their conclusion is right. Any costs of mitigating climate change during the coming decades will surely be borne by the high-income coun tries. But the benefits, despite what spokespeople for the developing world say, will overwhelmingly accrue to future generations in the developing world. Any action combating global warming will be, in…

  • Assessing alternative drug control regimes

    Open Access•Robert J Maccoun, Robert Maccoun et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1996•Referências: 6

    The debate over alternative regimes for currently illicit psychoactive substances focuses on polar alternatives: harsh prohibition and sweeping legalization. This study presents an array of alternatives that lies between these extremes. The current debate lacks an explicit and inclusive framework for making comparative judgments. In this study, we sketch out such a framework, as a reminder of possible policy levers and their costs and benefits th…

  • Vietnam

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Asian Journal of Political Science•1996

  • Criteria for determining an optimal cigarette tax

    Kenneth E Warner, Frank J Chaloupka et al.•ARTICLE•Tobacco Control•1995

    Correspondence to: Kenneth E Warner, Department of Health Management and Policy, School of Public Health, University of Michigan, 109 S Observatory, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-2029, USA Abstract In the debate on cigarette taxation, both supporters and opponents of higher taxes often appeal to economic theory and analysis. To evaluate the criteria for defining an optimal cigarette excise tax from the perspective of economics, the Office on Smoking …

  • Introductory remarks

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Tobacco Control•1993

    It is just ten years since David Hamburg and I convened a group at Harvard to think about setting up an institute concerned with smoking.John Pinney and several others here today participated in the group

  • Retail stores' compliance with a city no-smoking law

    Nancy A Rigotti, Michael A Stoto et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Public Health•1993•Citada por: 1•Referências: 4

    OBJECTIVES. Laws restricting smoking in public places and workplaces can protect the public only if they are obeyed. We sought to assess compliance with a Cambridge, Mass, no-smoking ordinance. METHODS. We prospectively observed 174 retail stores 1 month before and 3, 11, and 24 months after the law took effect. At 24 months, we interviewed one employee per store. RESULTS. Full compliance with the law was low; at 24 months, only 4% of stores disp…

  • Workplace compliance with a no-smoking law

    Nancy A Rigotti, David Bourne et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Public Health•1992•Citada por: 3•Referências: 5

    BACKGROUND. Compliance with state and local laws restricting smoking in public places and workplaces has not been systematically evaluated. METHODS. We assessed workplace compliance with a comprehensive no-smoking law adopted in Brookline, Mass, and tested whether mailing information to businesses increased awareness of and compliance with the law. We conducted a random sample telephone survey of 299 businesses (87% response rate). Self-reported …

  • Economics and Sociology

    Open Access•Richard Swedberg, Gary S Becker et al.•BOOK•Economics and Sociology :…•1990

    The boundary between economics and sociology is presently being redefined--but how, why, and by whom? Richard Swedberg answers these questions in this thought-provoking book of conversations with well-known economists and sociologists. Among the economists interviewed are Gary Becker, Amartya Sen, Kenneth Arrow, and Albert O. Hirschman; the sociologists include Daniel Bell, Harrison White, James Coleman, and Mark Granovetter. The picture that eme…

  • Abolition of Ballistic Missiles

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•International Security•1987•Citada por: 1

  • What Went Wrong with Arms Control

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1985•Citada por: 8

Próximo
  • Dynamic models of segregation

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Journal of Mathematical Sociology•1971•Citada por: 659•Referências: 2

    Some segregation results from the practices of organizations, some from specialized communication systems, some from correlation with a variable that is non‐random; and some results from the interplay of individual choices. This is an abstract study of the interactive dynamics of discriminatory individual choices. One model is a simulation in which individual members of two recognizable groups distribute themselves in neighborhoods defined by ref…

  • Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1973•Citada por: 84•Referências: 2

    This paper is about binary choices with externalities. These are either-or situations,not choices of degree or quantity. An externality is present when you care about my choice or my choice affects yours. You may not care, but need to know-whether to pass on left or right when we meet. You may not need to know, but care---you will drive whether or not I drive--- but prefer that I keep off the road.You may both care and need to know. The literatur…

  • Conflict and Defense

    J E Meade, Kenneth E Boulding et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1963•Citada por: 40

  • The strategy of conflict . Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1958•Citada por: 38•Referências: 7

    tual dependence-the non-zero-sum involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations, criminal deterrence, class war, race war, price war, and blackmail; maneuvering in a bureaucracy or a social hierarchy or in a traffic jam; and the coercion of one's own children-traditional game theory has not yielded comparable insight or advice. These are the games in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependen…

  • Micromotives and Macrobehaviour

    Jack Dowie, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1980•Citada por: 28

  • Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1961•Citada por: 12•Referências: 9

    Games have been used in the study of international politics; if they were not so demanding of time and energy, they would probably be used more. A Berlin crisis, or a busy day in the life of the United Nations, lends itself to this procedure. Participants usually represent “countries” and they may be encouraged to play the “role” of the country, acting as they believe the country would act, or they may be encouraged to behave in the game as they …

  • Nuclear Strategy in Europe

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1962•Citada por: 11

    D iscussion of troop requirements and weaponry for NATO is much concerned with the battlefield consequences of different troop strengths and nuclear doctrines. But the battlefield criterion is only one criterion, and when nuclears are introduced it is secondary. The idea that European armament should be designed for resisting Soviet invasion, and is to be judged by its ability to contain an attack, is based on the notion that limited war is a tac…

  • What Went Wrong with Arms Control

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1985•Citada por: 8

  • A world without nuclear weapons

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2009•Citada por: 7

  • Confidence in Crisis

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•International Security•1984•Citada por: 7

    The importance of confidence, of reciprocated expectations of non-hostile behavior, and of measures that may generate such confidence was exquisitely expressed 2400 years ago, as reported by Xenophon in his chronicles of the Persian Expedition. Mutual suspicion arose between the Greek army departing Persia and the Persian army escorting them. The Greek leader called for an interview with the Persian try to put a stop these suspicions before they …

  • The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1962•Citada por: 7

  • Game theory and the study of ethical systems

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1968•Citada por: 6•Referências: 6

  • Fights, Games, and Debates

    Anatol Rapoport, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Harvard Law Review•1961•Citada por: 6

  • Arms Control

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1960•Citada por: 6•Referências: 1

    This article proposes that there be discussed with the Russians the establishment (for each of us, separately, and perhaps for other countries) of a Special Surveillance Force. Its function would be to observe the enemy's behavior, at the enemy's invitation, and to report home instantly through authentic channels. The purpose is to help tranquilize crises that threaten to erupt into general war, particularly crises aggravated by the instability o…

  • Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•International Security•1982•Citada por: 5

    Sometime in the 1980s an that is not a national government may acquire a few nuclear weapons. If not in the 1980s then in the 1990s. The likelihood will grow as more and more national governments acquire fissionable material from their own weapon programs, their research programs, their reactor-fuel programs, or from the waste products of their electric power reactors. By organization I mean a political movement, a government in exile, a separati…

  • Strategic Analysis and Social Problems

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Social Problems•1965•Citada por: 5•Referências: 2

    whatever I meant. So with the uneasy feeling that it had just been used on me, I set out to characterize the strategic approach. Let me illustrate what I have in mind. First consider a jury that must unanimously find a man guilty of murder or acquit him, and may unanimously recommend clemency if they find him guilty. It matters which vote comes first. If twelve find him guilty and only six then vote for clemency, some among the six may wish they …

  • Strategic Problems of an International Armed Force

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•International Organization•1963•Citada por: 5•Referências: 1

    The relation of an international military authority to the industrial (once nuclear) powers in a disarmed world is an intriguing one. We should not expect much success in finding an ideal strategy for it. It is hard enough to find one for the United States, Britain, or the Soviet Union in the familiar world of competitive military force

  • Vietnam Reappraised

    Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P Huntington et al.•ARTICLE•International Security•1981•Citada por: 4

  • Who Will Have the Bomb

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•International Security•1976•Citada por: 4

    The question is as interesting as the answer. What do we mean by the bomb? Who it now? Does India have the bomb? Most of us would answer yes. Why do we answer yes? Because India a nuclear device-call it a bomb. Do we know that India actually possesses another one? No. Does it matter? Probably not. Therefore, when we say that India the bomb we do not mean literally that India possesses another nuclear explosive. In fact, it matters little whether …

  • American Foreign Assistance

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1955•Citada por: 4•Referências: 1

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • The Cost of Combating Global Warming

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1997•Citada por: 3

    veloping world, they assert, will have to be at the expense of the rich nations. Their diagnosis is wrong, but their conclusion is right. Any costs of mitigating climate change during the coming decades will surely be borne by the high-income coun tries. But the benefits, despite what spokespeople for the developing world say, will overwhelmingly accrue to future generations in the developing world. Any action combating global warming will be, in…

  • Workplace compliance with a no-smoking law

    Nancy A Rigotti, David Bourne et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Public Health•1992•Citada por: 3•Referências: 5

    BACKGROUND. Compliance with state and local laws restricting smoking in public places and workplaces has not been systematically evaluated. METHODS. We assessed workplace compliance with a comprehensive no-smoking law adopted in Brookline, Mass, and tested whether mailing information to businesses increased awareness of and compliance with the law. We conducted a random sample telephone survey of 299 businesses (87% response rate). Self-reported …

  • War Without Pain, and Other Models

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1963•Citada por: 3•Referências: 7

    I don't know how many economists, teaching business fluctuations or the corn-hog cycle, have devoted an hour to the household thermostat; I know several. Cybernetics, I am told, drew attention to similarities between vacuum tubes and animal nerve cells, and made predictions about the human nervous system that were verified by surgery. An article on feedback related artillery fire-control and automatic oil-pipeline systems to the ecological comple…

  • Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays

    G John Ikenberry, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•2006•Citada por: 1

  • Reciprocal measures for arms stabilization

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Daedalus•2005•Citada por: 1

  • Income Determination

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1948

    THE graphic method of determining the level of income which is consistent with a consumption function and given investment is familiar to most students.1 The method is that of plotting the aggregate demand function (consumption demand function with investment superimposed vertically) against national income; the intersection of this line with a forty-five degree line through the origin indicates the level of income at which income equals assumed …

  • An Introduction to National Income and Income Analysis

    Thomas C Schelling, Richard Ruggles•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1951

  • National Income Behavior

    James Tobin, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1952

  • Trade Policy in 1954

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Current History•1954

    Essay| September 01 1954 Trade Policy in 1954 Thomas C. Schelling Thomas C. Schelling Associate Professor of Economics, Yale University THOMAS C. SCHELLING, before becoming Associate Professor of Economics at Yale University, was for five years an economist with the foreign assistant programs in Copenhagen, Paris and Washington. He is the author of National Income Behavior, and received his Ph.D. from Harvard. Search for other works by this autho…

  • National Income, 1954 Edition

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1955

  • American Foreign Assistance

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1955•Citada por: 4•Referências: 1

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Economic Change

    Thomas C Schelling, Simon Kuznets•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1956

  • Bargaining, communication, and limited war

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Conflict Resolution•1957

    Limited war requires limits; so do strate? gic maneuvers if they are to be stabilized short of war. But limits require agreement or at least some kind of mutual recognirion and acquiescence. And agreement on limits is difficult to reach, not only because of the uncertainties and the acute divergence of interests but because negoriation is severely inhibited both during war and before it begins and because communication becomes difficult between a…

  • An International Economy

    Thomas C Schelling, Gunnar Myrdal•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1957

  • The strategy of conflict . Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1958•Citada por: 38•Referências: 7

    tual dependence-the non-zero-sum involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations, criminal deterrence, class war, race war, price war, and blackmail; maneuvering in a bureaucracy or a social hierarchy or in a traffic jam; and the coercion of one's own children-traditional game theory has not yielded comparable insight or advice. These are the games in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependen…

  • For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1959

  • Surprise attack and disarmament

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Survival•1960•Referências: 2

    ‘Disarmament’ has covered a variety of schemes, some ingenious and some sentimental, for co-operation among potential enemies to reduce the likelihood of war or to reduce its scope and violence. Most proposals have taken as a premise that a reduction in the quantity and potency of weapons, particularly of ‘offensive’ weapons and of weapons that either deliberately or incidentally cause great civilian agony and destruction, promotes this purpose. …

  • Arms Control

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1960•Citada por: 6•Referências: 1

    This article proposes that there be discussed with the Russians the establishment (for each of us, separately, and perhaps for other countries) of a Special Surveillance Force. Its function would be to observe the enemy's behavior, at the enemy's invitation, and to report home instantly through authentic channels. The purpose is to help tranquilize crises that threaten to erupt into general war, particularly crises aggravated by the instability o…

  • The Strategy of Conflict

    William J Baumol, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•The Review of Economics and…•1961

  • Reciprocal measures for arms stabilization

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Survival•1961

  • The Strategy of Conflict

    Peter O Steiner, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Economica•1961

  • Fights, Games, and Debates

    Anatol Rapoport, Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Harvard Law Review•1961•Citada por: 6

  • Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1961•Citada por: 12•Referências: 9

    Games have been used in the study of international politics; if they were not so demanding of time and energy, they would probably be used more. A Berlin crisis, or a busy day in the life of the United Nations, lends itself to this procedure. Participants usually represent “countries” and they may be encouraged to play the “role” of the country, acting as they believe the country would act, or they may be encouraged to behave in the game as they …

  • Nuclear strategy in Europe

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Survival•1962

    D sISCUSSION of troop requirements and weaponry for NATO is much concerned with the battlefield consequences of different troop strengths and nuclear doctrines. But the battlefield criterion is only one criterion, and when nuclears are introduced it is secondary. The idea that European armament should be designed for resisting Soviet invasion, and is to be judged by its ability to contain an attack, is based on the notion that limited war is a ta…

  • Nuclear Strategy in Europe

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1962•Citada por: 11

    D iscussion of troop requirements and weaponry for NATO is much concerned with the battlefield consequences of different troop strengths and nuclear doctrines. But the battlefield criterion is only one criterion, and when nuclears are introduced it is secondary. The idea that European armament should be designed for resisting Soviet invasion, and is to be judged by its ability to contain an attack, is based on the notion that limited war is a tac…

  • The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Foreign Affairs•1962•Citada por: 7

  • Conflict and Defense

    J E Meade, Kenneth E Boulding et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1963•Citada por: 40

  • War Without Pain, and Other Models

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•World Politics•1963•Citada por: 3•Referências: 7

    I don't know how many economists, teaching business fluctuations or the corn-hog cycle, have devoted an hour to the household thermostat; I know several. Cybernetics, I am told, drew attention to similarities between vacuum tubes and animal nerve cells, and made predictions about the human nervous system that were verified by surgery. An article on feedback related artillery fire-control and automatic oil-pipeline systems to the ecological comple…

  • Strategic Problems of an International Armed Force

    Open Access•Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•International Organization•1963•Citada por: 5•Referências: 1

    The relation of an international military authority to the industrial (once nuclear) powers in a disarmed world is an intriguing one. We should not expect much success in finding an ideal strategy for it. It is hard enough to find one for the United States, Britain, or the Soviet Union in the familiar world of competitive military force

  • Signals and feedback

    Thomas C Schelling•ARTICLE•Survival•1965

Political science (40 obras) · Economics (33 obras) · Law (18 obras) · Computer Science (16 obras) · Law (14 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Sociology (10 obras) · Law and economics (9 obras) · Military History and Strategy (9 obras) · Political economy (9 obras)

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