Friedel Bolle
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 302401 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Friedel Bolle |
| PRENOMES | Friedel |
| SOBRENOME | Bolle |
| ASSINATURA | BOLLE F |
| AFILIAÇÕES | European University Viadrina |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7586-4693 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 28 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 55 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 28 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1983 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Voting behavior under outside pressure
When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium strategy guaranteeing true majority results. Simultaneous voting suffers from a plethora of equilibria, often contradicting true majorities. Experimental r…
The flip side of power
In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the committee chair is said to be more powerful. Players with a veto right are even more powerful still. Similarly, the production of threshold public goods may involve “tie-breaking players” (with more effective contributions) and “veto players” (specialists or larger players) w…
Die Familie als Gegenstand sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung
Voting Games
The central institution in democracies and shareholder firms is decision-making by voting. If all voters made decisions as if their vote were decisive, then true majority decisions would be obtained with certainty. Often, however, voters have incentives to hide their true preferences, thus preventing true majorities. In addition to mixed-strategy equilibria, in most voting games there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium where all voters decide …
Power attitudes and stealing
Acts of taking money away from others and acts of reverting this behavior are investigated in an experimental survey that includes attitudinal questions concerning power and responsibility. Decisions to "steal or not" and "revert stealing or not" were made either before, or after the attitudinal questions. All possible individual combinations between stealing and reverting the stealing from others are frequently observed. Answering questions conc…
When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as…
Role‐dependent Social Preferences
Bargaining results emerge from the interplay of strategic options and social preferences. For every bargaining game, however, the advantage of a player having certain preferences in terms of negotiated equilibrium revenues might differ. We explore the hypothesis that preferences change according to the players' strength combination. Simple 1×1 bargaining experiments from the literature are discussed, and 2×2 as well as 2×3 assignment market exper…
Exploiting one’s power with a guilty conscience
How much social insurance do you want? An experimental study
Transaction Costs and Capacity Costs as Interrelated Determinants of Vertical Integration in Oligopolies
This paper considers a two-stage oligopoly model with downstream retailers and two types of transaction costs (in contracting retailers and in direct retailing). Our analysis shows how transaction costs affect vertical integration in a strategic model of oligopoly, and it relates transaction costs to other characteristics of oligopolistic industries. In particular, we show that long- and short-term capacity costs interrelate in a rather complex m…
Power comes with responsibility—or does it
Can We Compare Life Satisfaction Between Nationalities? Evaluating Actual and Imagined Situations
Introducing a Signaling Institution
Trustworthiness can be conveyed by sending a costly signal in advance. In an experiment, we find that the smaller the percentage of trustworthy people in a group, the higher is their percentage of signaling. The introduction of signaling has strong distributional effects. It may be efficient because only under this institution can large-scale justified trust develop. In other circumstances, it may be (and in this investigation is only slightly) i…
Punishment as a public good. When should monopolists care about a consumer boycott
Iff You Want Me, I Don't Want You
The usual assumption in models of asymmetric information is that I know my attributes and you do not. But sometimes the asymmetry seems to be reversed: You (a woman, a firm) know better than I (a man, a job applicant) my market value. This may result in a dilemma because equilibrium strategies may be described by the title of this paper. (Iff means: if and only if.) The result resembles the “No-Trade-Theorem” of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) Milgrom,…
Spectrum Auctions
Spectrum auctions are multiple-unit auctions where the objects auctioned are not necessarily identical. It is shown that the requirement of independent bids in such auctions can prevent the existence of pure strategy equilibria (which implies inefficiency). Thus, we suggest that spectrum auctions should allow combinatorial bids. Additionally, all the auctions mentioned were multiple-round auctions - those are shown to offer an invitation to collu…
Preferences in distributing scarce goods
Team selection
Team selection Factor pricing with discrete and inhomogeneous factors
Team selection — An experimental investigation
Why and when to love your enemy
On Love and Altruism
Welfare interdependencies between individuals are sometimes expressed as consumption externalities and sometimes as utility externalities. Besides the question of whether it is possible to decide between these approaches on the basis of observations, the connection of the approaches is rather interesting. The derivation of consumption externalities from utility externalities is nontrivial and allows far-reaching interpretations. Widespread love w…
High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter
Prisoners' Dilemma as a game with incomplete information
High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter
Can We Compare Life Satisfaction Between Nationalities? Evaluating Actual and Imagined Situations
Prisoners' Dilemma as a game with incomplete information
On Love and Altruism
Welfare interdependencies between individuals are sometimes expressed as consumption externalities and sometimes as utility externalities. Besides the question of whether it is possible to decide between these approaches on the basis of observations, the connection of the approaches is rather interesting. The derivation of consumption externalities from utility externalities is nontrivial and allows far-reaching interpretations. Widespread love w…
Exploiting one’s power with a guilty conscience
Preferences in distributing scarce goods
Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as…
Why and when to love your enemy
Die Familie als Gegenstand sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung
When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
How much social insurance do you want? An experimental study
Power comes with responsibility—or does it
Iff You Want Me, I Don't Want You
The usual assumption in models of asymmetric information is that I know my attributes and you do not. But sometimes the asymmetry seems to be reversed: You (a woman, a firm) know better than I (a man, a job applicant) my market value. This may result in a dilemma because equilibrium strategies may be described by the title of this paper. (Iff means: if and only if.) The result resembles the “No-Trade-Theorem” of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) Milgrom,…
Team selection — An experimental investigation
On the Oligopolistic Extraction of Non-Renewable Common-Pool Resources
In recent literature the extraction of common-pool resources ha s been discussed under the aspect of whether or not they can be used efficiently when a finite number of agents has access to the resource. The objective of this paper is the derivation of a necessary equilibrium condition in a simple model. This condition has severe consequences for existence propositions in papers of M.C. Kemp and N.V. Long_(1980), J. McMillan and H.W. Sinn_(1984),…
Towards a theory of yes-no-voting
On the Oligopolistic Extraction of Non-Renewable Common-Pool Resources
In recent literature the extraction of common-pool resources ha s been discussed under the aspect of whether or not they can be used efficiently when a finite number of agents has access to the resource. The objective of this paper is the derivation of a necessary equilibrium condition in a simple model. This condition has severe consequences for existence propositions in papers of M.C. Kemp and N.V. Long_(1980), J. McMillan and H.W. Sinn_(1984),…
The Significance of Motivational Variables in International Public Welfare Expenditures
High reward experiments without high expenditure for the experimenter
Prisoners' Dilemma as a game with incomplete information
On Love and Altruism
Welfare interdependencies between individuals are sometimes expressed as consumption externalities and sometimes as utility externalities. Besides the question of whether it is possible to decide between these approaches on the basis of observations, the connection of the approaches is rather interesting. The derivation of consumption externalities from utility externalities is nontrivial and allows far-reaching interpretations. Widespread love w…
Why and when to love your enemy
Team selection — An experimental investigation
Team selection Factor pricing with discrete and inhomogeneous factors
Team selection
Preferences in distributing scarce goods
Spectrum Auctions
Spectrum auctions are multiple-unit auctions where the objects auctioned are not necessarily identical. It is shown that the requirement of independent bids in such auctions can prevent the existence of pure strategy equilibria (which implies inefficiency). Thus, we suggest that spectrum auctions should allow combinatorial bids. Additionally, all the auctions mentioned were multiple-round auctions - those are shown to offer an invitation to collu…
Punishment as a public good. When should monopolists care about a consumer boycott
Iff You Want Me, I Don't Want You
The usual assumption in models of asymmetric information is that I know my attributes and you do not. But sometimes the asymmetry seems to be reversed: You (a woman, a firm) know better than I (a man, a job applicant) my market value. This may result in a dilemma because equilibrium strategies may be described by the title of this paper. (Iff means: if and only if.) The result resembles the “No-Trade-Theorem” of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) Milgrom,…
Introducing a Signaling Institution
Trustworthiness can be conveyed by sending a costly signal in advance. In an experiment, we find that the smaller the percentage of trustworthy people in a group, the higher is their percentage of signaling. The introduction of signaling has strong distributional effects. It may be efficient because only under this institution can large-scale justified trust develop. In other circumstances, it may be (and in this investigation is only slightly) i…
Can We Compare Life Satisfaction Between Nationalities? Evaluating Actual and Imagined Situations
Transaction Costs and Capacity Costs as Interrelated Determinants of Vertical Integration in Oligopolies
This paper considers a two-stage oligopoly model with downstream retailers and two types of transaction costs (in contracting retailers and in direct retailing). Our analysis shows how transaction costs affect vertical integration in a strategic model of oligopoly, and it relates transaction costs to other characteristics of oligopolistic industries. In particular, we show that long- and short-term capacity costs interrelate in a rather complex m…
Power comes with responsibility—or does it
How much social insurance do you want? An experimental study
Exploiting one’s power with a guilty conscience
Role‐dependent Social Preferences
Bargaining results emerge from the interplay of strategic options and social preferences. For every bargaining game, however, the advantage of a player having certain preferences in terms of negotiated equilibrium revenues might differ. We explore the hypothesis that preferences change according to the players' strength combination. Simple 1×1 bargaining experiments from the literature are discussed, and 2×2 as well as 2×3 assignment market exper…
Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as…
When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
Voting Games
The central institution in democracies and shareholder firms is decision-making by voting. If all voters made decisions as if their vote were decisive, then true majority decisions would be obtained with certainty. Often, however, voters have incentives to hide their true preferences, thus preventing true majorities. In addition to mixed-strategy equilibria, in most voting games there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium where all voters decide …
Power attitudes and stealing
Acts of taking money away from others and acts of reverting this behavior are investigated in an experimental survey that includes attitudinal questions concerning power and responsibility. Decisions to "steal or not" and "revert stealing or not" were made either before, or after the attitudinal questions. All possible individual combinations between stealing and reverting the stealing from others are frequently observed. Answering questions conc…
Economics (23 obras) · Microeconomics (19 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (15 obras) · Computer Science (12 obras) · Law (11 obras) · Political science (11 obras) · Psychology (11 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (10 obras) · Mathematical economics (10 obras) · Social Psychology (9 obras)