Gabriel Geisler Mesevage
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3097384 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Gabriel Geisler Mesevage |
| PRENOMES | Gabriel Geisler |
| SOBRENOME | Mesevage |
| ASSINATURA | MESEVAGE G G |
| AFILIAÇÕES | King's College London |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2014 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Missing markets. Microstructure and liquidity on the London Stock Exchange
This paper studies the behavior of specialist dealers operating in the London Stock Exchange in the 1870s. The LSE was a free-entry exclusive dealers market, where dealers were free to choose which securities to deal in. We show that dealers concentrated their market making in the most liquid securities. A combination of adverse selection and inventory costs prevented the development of liquid markets in most securities, with dealers opting inste…
The new poor law and the health of the population of England and Wales
We estimate the impact of reductions in poor law expenditure on rural life expectancy and mortality rates in England and Wales following the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. Given the scale of cuts imposed, our estimates imply 8-10 per cent increases in mortality at ages 1-4 years and 2-4 per cent falls in rural expectation of life at birth. This is consistent with the reformers' policy of reducing child allowances for larger families. These results …
Private Benefits, Public Vices
Vote trading among lawmakers (logrolling) can enable political rent-seeking but is difficult to identify. To achieve identification, we explore the rules governing voting for railway projects in the U.K. Parliament during the Railway Mania of the 1840s. Parliamentary rules barred MPs from voting directly for their interests. Even so, they could trade votes to ensure their interests prevailed. We find that logrolling was significant, accounting fo…
Social Networks in Economic History
The separation of information and lending and the rise of rating agencies in the USA (1841–1907)
This paper provides a new interpretation of the early rise of rating agencies in the USA (initially known as ‘mercantile agencies’). We explain this American exceptionality through an inductive approach that revisits the conventional parallel with the UK. In contrast with earlier narratives that have emphasised the role of Common Law and the greater understanding of American judges that would have supported the rise of an ethos of ‘transparency’,…
The Untold History of Transparency
This paper discusses the origins of rating in the second half of the nineteenth century. We review and criticize existing narratives, which—echoing a story told by lawyers favorable to (or employed by) the agencies—have alleged that a cultural shift in normative views, evidenced in an evolution of court decisions, provided legal protection (against libel) to agencies, and permitted the development of printed credit reports. Such a view is inconsi…
Social Networks in Economic History
The Untold History of Transparency
This paper discusses the origins of rating in the second half of the nineteenth century. We review and criticize existing narratives, which—echoing a story told by lawyers favorable to (or employed by) the agencies—have alleged that a cultural shift in normative views, evidenced in an evolution of court decisions, provided legal protection (against libel) to agencies, and permitted the development of printed credit reports. Such a view is inconsi…
Private Benefits, Public Vices
Vote trading among lawmakers (logrolling) can enable political rent-seeking but is difficult to identify. To achieve identification, we explore the rules governing voting for railway projects in the U.K. Parliament during the Railway Mania of the 1840s. Parliamentary rules barred MPs from voting directly for their interests. Even so, they could trade votes to ensure their interests prevailed. We find that logrolling was significant, accounting fo…
The separation of information and lending and the rise of rating agencies in the USA (1841–1907)
This paper provides a new interpretation of the early rise of rating agencies in the USA (initially known as ‘mercantile agencies’). We explain this American exceptionality through an inductive approach that revisits the conventional parallel with the UK. In contrast with earlier narratives that have emphasised the role of Common Law and the greater understanding of American judges that would have supported the rise of an ethos of ‘transparency’,…
The Untold History of Transparency
This paper discusses the origins of rating in the second half of the nineteenth century. We review and criticize existing narratives, which—echoing a story told by lawyers favorable to (or employed by) the agencies—have alleged that a cultural shift in normative views, evidenced in an evolution of court decisions, provided legal protection (against libel) to agencies, and permitted the development of printed credit reports. Such a view is inconsi…
Social Networks in Economic History
Private Benefits, Public Vices
Vote trading among lawmakers (logrolling) can enable political rent-seeking but is difficult to identify. To achieve identification, we explore the rules governing voting for railway projects in the U.K. Parliament during the Railway Mania of the 1840s. Parliamentary rules barred MPs from voting directly for their interests. Even so, they could trade votes to ensure their interests prevailed. We find that logrolling was significant, accounting fo…
The new poor law and the health of the population of England and Wales
We estimate the impact of reductions in poor law expenditure on rural life expectancy and mortality rates in England and Wales following the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. Given the scale of cuts imposed, our estimates imply 8-10 per cent increases in mortality at ages 1-4 years and 2-4 per cent falls in rural expectation of life at birth. This is consistent with the reformers' policy of reducing child allowances for larger families. These results …
Missing markets. Microstructure and liquidity on the London Stock Exchange
This paper studies the behavior of specialist dealers operating in the London Stock Exchange in the 1870s. The LSE was a free-entry exclusive dealers market, where dealers were free to choose which securities to deal in. We show that dealers concentrated their market making in the most liquid securities. A combination of adverse selection and inventory costs prevented the development of liquid markets in most securities, with dealers opting inste…
Political science (5 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Economics (3 obras) · Sociology (3 obras) · Business (2 obras) · Geography (2 obras) · Historical Economic and Social Studies (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Narrative (2 obras) · Politics (2 obras)