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Jeremy Bulow

Dados Biográficos

ID3591453
NOMEJeremy Bulow
PRENOMESJeremy
SOBRENOMEBulow
ASSINATURABULOW J
AFILIAÇÕESNational Bureau of Economic Research
VERIFICADONão
TOTAL DE OBRAS14
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES125
TOTAL COMO AUTOR14
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1980
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2015
ÍNDICE H6
  • Equity Recourse Notes

    Open Access•Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2015•Referências: 11

    We propose a new form of hybrid capital for banks, Equity Recourse Notes (ERNs), which (i) ameliorate booms and busts by creating counter‐cyclical incentives for banks to raise capital, and so encourage bank lending in bad times; (ii) help solve the too‐big‐to‐fail problem; and (iii) reduce the regulatory system's reliance on accounting measures of capital. ERNs avoid the flaws of existing contingent convertible bonds (cocos) – in particular, the…

  • Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus

    Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2012•Citada por: 1•Referências: 1

    Price controls lead to misallocation of goods and encourage rent-seeking. The misallocation effect alone ensures that a price control always reduces consumer surplus in an otherwise-competitive market with convex demand if supply is more elastic than demand; or with log-convex demand (e.g., constantelasticity) even if supply is inelastic. The same results apply whether rationed goods are allocated by costless lottery, or whether costly rent-seeki…

  • The Donation Booth

    Ian Ayres, Jeremy Bulow•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1998•Citada por: 3

    In this article, Professors Ayres and Bulow argue that, instead of mandating disclosure of all campaign contributions, we should instead consider mandating that all contributions be anonymous.Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to sell access or influence.Forcing donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts can discou…

  • Rational Frenzies and Crashes

    Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Citada por: 3•Referências: 2

    Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later, rather than only now or never, their current 'willingness to pay' is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is. A consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information, leading to both 'frenzies,' in which demand feeds on itself, and 'crashes,' in which price drops disco…

  • Cleaning up Third World Debt Without Getting Taken to the Cleaners

    Open Access•Jeremy Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1990•Citada por: 5•Referências: 4

    Should taxpayers of wealthy countries finance a leveraged buyout of third world debt? The case for establishing an international debt discount facility rests on the belief that the overhang of foreign commercial bank debt is stifling growth in the Highly Indebted Countries, and that coordination problems among private sector banks are blocking efficiency-enhancing debt reduction schemes. Thus there is scope for a multilateral government agency to…

  • A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt

    Jeremy Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Citada por: 29

    Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels

  • The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions

    Jeremy Bulow, John Roberts•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Citada por: 12•Referências: 2

    The authors show that the seller's problem in devising an optimal auction is virtually identical to the monopolist's problem in third-degree price discrimination. More generally, many of the important results and elegant techniques developed in the field of mechanism design can be reinterpreted in the language of standard microtheory. They illustrate this by considering the problem of bilateral exchange with privately-known values. Copyright 1989…

  • A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Labor Economics•1986

    This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers. In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage. This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets. The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena. It provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates. It also can provide the basi…

  • Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry

    Jeremy Bulow, John Geanakoplos et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1985•Citada por: 9•Referências: 1

    Journal Article Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry Get access Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy Bulow Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John Geanakoplos, John Geanakoplos Cowles Foundation, Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Paul Klemperer Paul Klemperer St Catherine's College, Oxford, and Graduate School of Business,…

  • A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment

    Jeremy Bulow, Lawrence H Summers et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•1985•Citada por: 37•Referências: 4

    This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers.In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage.This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets.The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena.it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates.it also can provide the basis for…

  • The Taxation of Risky Assets

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1984

    This paper reconsiders the effects of taxation on risky assets, recognizing the importance of variations in asset prices. We show that earlier analyses which assumed that depreciation rates are constant and that the future price of capital goods is known with certainty are very misleading, as guides to the effects of corporate taxes. We then examine the concept of economic depreciation in a risky environment, and show that depreciation allowances…

  • A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983•Citada por: 14

  • Durable-Goods Monopolists

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Citada por: 12

    Durable-goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist. To the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it, or to make binding promises about his future production, such problems are ameliorated. Given the inability to do the above, the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms …

  • On Beating the Market

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1980

  • A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment

    Jeremy Bulow, Lawrence H Summers et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•1985•Citada por: 37•Referências: 4

    This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers.In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage.This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets.The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena.it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates.it also can provide the basis for…

  • A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt

    Jeremy Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Citada por: 29

    Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels

  • A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983•Citada por: 14

  • The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions

    Jeremy Bulow, John Roberts•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Citada por: 12•Referências: 2

    The authors show that the seller's problem in devising an optimal auction is virtually identical to the monopolist's problem in third-degree price discrimination. More generally, many of the important results and elegant techniques developed in the field of mechanism design can be reinterpreted in the language of standard microtheory. They illustrate this by considering the problem of bilateral exchange with privately-known values. Copyright 1989…

  • Durable-Goods Monopolists

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Citada por: 12

    Durable-goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist. To the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it, or to make binding promises about his future production, such problems are ameliorated. Given the inability to do the above, the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms …

  • Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry

    Jeremy Bulow, John Geanakoplos et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1985•Citada por: 9•Referências: 1

    Journal Article Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry Get access Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy Bulow Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John Geanakoplos, John Geanakoplos Cowles Foundation, Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Paul Klemperer Paul Klemperer St Catherine's College, Oxford, and Graduate School of Business,…

  • Cleaning up Third World Debt Without Getting Taken to the Cleaners

    Open Access•Jeremy Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1990•Citada por: 5•Referências: 4

    Should taxpayers of wealthy countries finance a leveraged buyout of third world debt? The case for establishing an international debt discount facility rests on the belief that the overhang of foreign commercial bank debt is stifling growth in the Highly Indebted Countries, and that coordination problems among private sector banks are blocking efficiency-enhancing debt reduction schemes. Thus there is scope for a multilateral government agency to…

  • The Donation Booth

    Ian Ayres, Jeremy Bulow•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1998•Citada por: 3

    In this article, Professors Ayres and Bulow argue that, instead of mandating disclosure of all campaign contributions, we should instead consider mandating that all contributions be anonymous.Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to sell access or influence.Forcing donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts can discou…

  • Rational Frenzies and Crashes

    Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Citada por: 3•Referências: 2

    Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later, rather than only now or never, their current 'willingness to pay' is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is. A consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information, leading to both 'frenzies,' in which demand feeds on itself, and 'crashes,' in which price drops disco…

  • Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus

    Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2012•Citada por: 1•Referências: 1

    Price controls lead to misallocation of goods and encourage rent-seeking. The misallocation effect alone ensures that a price control always reduces consumer surplus in an otherwise-competitive market with convex demand if supply is more elastic than demand; or with log-convex demand (e.g., constantelasticity) even if supply is inelastic. The same results apply whether rationed goods are allocated by costless lottery, or whether costly rent-seeki…

  • On Beating the Market

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1980

  • Durable-Goods Monopolists

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Citada por: 12

    Durable-goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist. To the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it, or to make binding promises about his future production, such problems are ameliorated. Given the inability to do the above, the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms …

  • A Note on the Effect of Cost Changes on Prices

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1983•Citada por: 14

  • The Taxation of Risky Assets

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1984

    This paper reconsiders the effects of taxation on risky assets, recognizing the importance of variations in asset prices. We show that earlier analyses which assumed that depreciation rates are constant and that the future price of capital goods is known with certainty are very misleading, as guides to the effects of corporate taxes. We then examine the concept of economic depreciation in a risky environment, and show that depreciation allowances…

  • Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry

    Jeremy Bulow, John Geanakoplos et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1985•Citada por: 9•Referências: 1

    Journal Article Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry Get access Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy Bulow Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John Geanakoplos, John Geanakoplos Cowles Foundation, Yale University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Paul Klemperer Paul Klemperer St Catherine's College, Oxford, and Graduate School of Business,…

  • A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination and Keynesian Unemployment

    Jeremy Bulow, Lawrence H Summers et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•1985•Citada por: 37•Referências: 4

    This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers.In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage.This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets.The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena.it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates.it also can provide the basis for…

  • A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment

    Jeremy Bulow, Jeremy I Bulow et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Labor Economics•1986

    This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers. In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage. This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets. The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena. It provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates. It also can provide the basi…

  • A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt

    Jeremy Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Citada por: 29

    Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels

  • The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions

    Jeremy Bulow, John Roberts•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1989•Citada por: 12•Referências: 2

    The authors show that the seller's problem in devising an optimal auction is virtually identical to the monopolist's problem in third-degree price discrimination. More generally, many of the important results and elegant techniques developed in the field of mechanism design can be reinterpreted in the language of standard microtheory. They illustrate this by considering the problem of bilateral exchange with privately-known values. Copyright 1989…

  • Cleaning up Third World Debt Without Getting Taken to the Cleaners

    Open Access•Jeremy Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1990•Citada por: 5•Referências: 4

    Should taxpayers of wealthy countries finance a leveraged buyout of third world debt? The case for establishing an international debt discount facility rests on the belief that the overhang of foreign commercial bank debt is stifling growth in the Highly Indebted Countries, and that coordination problems among private sector banks are blocking efficiency-enhancing debt reduction schemes. Thus there is scope for a multilateral government agency to…

  • Rational Frenzies and Crashes

    Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1994•Citada por: 3•Referências: 2

    Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later, rather than only now or never, their current 'willingness to pay' is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is. A consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information, leading to both 'frenzies,' in which demand feeds on itself, and 'crashes,' in which price drops disco…

  • The Donation Booth

    Ian Ayres, Jeremy Bulow•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•1998•Citada por: 3

    In this article, Professors Ayres and Bulow argue that, instead of mandating disclosure of all campaign contributions, we should instead consider mandating that all contributions be anonymous.Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy votes, mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to sell access or influence.Forcing donors to funnel campaign contributions through blind trusts can discou…

  • Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus

    Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2012•Citada por: 1•Referências: 1

    Price controls lead to misallocation of goods and encourage rent-seeking. The misallocation effect alone ensures that a price control always reduces consumer surplus in an otherwise-competitive market with convex demand if supply is more elastic than demand; or with log-convex demand (e.g., constantelasticity) even if supply is inelastic. The same results apply whether rationed goods are allocated by costless lottery, or whether costly rent-seeki…

  • Equity Recourse Notes

    Open Access•Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2015•Referências: 11

    We propose a new form of hybrid capital for banks, Equity Recourse Notes (ERNs), which (i) ameliorate booms and busts by creating counter‐cyclical incentives for banks to raise capital, and so encourage bank lending in bad times; (ii) help solve the too‐big‐to‐fail problem; and (iii) reduce the regulatory system's reliance on accounting measures of capital. ERNs avoid the flaws of existing contingent convertible bonds (cocos) – in particular, the…

Economics (12 obras) · Business (8 obras) · Microeconomics (5 obras) · Computer Science (4 obras) · Finance (4 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 obras) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (3 obras) · Finance (3 obras) · Merger and Competition Analysis (3 obras) · Monetary economics (3 obras)

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