Kasper Lippert‐rasmussen
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3597548 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Kasper Lippert‐rasmussen |
| PRENOMES | Kasper |
| SOBRENOME | Lippert‐rasmussen |
| ASSINATURA | RASMUSSEN K L |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0950-0215 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 93 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 89 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 92 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1996 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
Expressionist relational egalitarianism
Schemmel’s Justice and Egalitarian Relations offers an ambitious account of an expressionist version of relational egalitarianism. His core argument for this account appeals to a series of cases that co-vary in terms of what they express and in terms of the degree to which they are unjust. I offer four criticisms of this argument, concluding that it fails to justify Schemmel’s favoured theory of justice.
Can Relational Egalitarians Supply Both an Account of Justice and an Account of the Value of Democracy or Must They Choose Which
Construed as a theory of justice, relational egalitarianism says that justice requires that people relate as equals. Construed as a theory of what makes democracy valuable, it says that democracy is a necessary, or constituent, part of the value of relating as equals. Typically, relational egalitarians want their theory to provide both an account of what justice requires and an account of what makes democracy valuable. We argue that relational eg…
Neither Direct, Nor Indirect
A Matter of Standing
Using experimental philosophy methodologies, this paper explores standing to blame and praise, specifically within respect to health and health advice. Our primary aim is to contribute insights to the literature on standing, while also addressing work in medical ethics on the appropriate roles of doctors. Two main principles regarding standing emerge from these areas: the Differential Relationship Principle and the Hypocrisy Principle. To propel …
Does harm or disrespect make discrimination wrong? An experimental approach
While standard forms of discrimination are widely considered morally wrong, philosophers disagree about what makes them so. Two accounts have risen to prominence in this debate: One stressing how wrongful discrimination disrespects the discriminatee, the other how the harms involved make discrimination wrong. While these accounts are based on carefully constructed thought experiments, proponents of both sides see their positions as in line with a…
Algorithmic and Non-Algorithmic Fairness
In the US context, critics of court use of algorithmic risk prediction algorithms have argued that COMPAS involves unfair machine bias because it generates higher false positive rates of predicted recidivism for black offenders than for white offenders. In response, some have argued that algorithmic fairness concerns, either also or only, calibration across groups–roughly, that a score assigned to different individuals by the algorithm involves t…
Kolodny on discrimination
According to Niko Kolodny, the commonplace claim that individuals ‘have claims to non-discriminatory social institutions and forms of treatment’ can be fully explained by neither appeals to claims against invasion, nor by an interest in improvement. To adequately explain the claim to non-discrimination we must appeal to the claim against inferiority. However, while the claim against inferiority explains important aspects of this commonplace, othe…
Does Lack of Commitment Undermine the Hypocrite's Standing to Blame
According to an influential account of standing, hypocritical blamers lack standing to blame in virtue of their lack of commitment to the norm etc. which they invoke. Nevertheless, the commitment account has the wrong shape for it to explain why hypocrites lack standing to blame. Building on the lessons of that critique I propose a novel account of what undermines standing to blame – the comparative fairness account. This differs from the commitm…
How should relational egalitarians think of social relations? Intergenerational justice and the Argument from Temporal Non-Overlap
Social relations play a crucial role in relational egalitarian accounts of justice. Intuitively, however, we can stand in relations of justice to future generations with whom we do not overlap in time and to whom we for that reason are not socially related. This is the background to the Argument from Temporal Non-Overlap and its conclusion that relational egalitarianism offers an incomplete theory of justice. I rebut attempts to resist the argume…
What is the folk concept of discrimination? Discriminators and comparators
According to many theorists, discrimination either requires a better treated comparator or can occur only if the discriminator belongs to a socially salient group different from that of the discriminatee. Both claims are philosophically important since they have important implications for which account of the moral wrongness of discrimination is correct, e.g., if no comparator is required, the wrongness of discrimination cannot result from treati…
Wrongful discrimination against non-pregnant people
A critical take on procreative justice
Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the princip…
Personality Discrimination and the Wrongness of Hiring Based on Extraversion
Employers sometimes use personality tests in hiring or specifically look for candidates with certain personality traits such as being social, outgoing, active, and extraverted. Therefore, they hire based on personality, specifically extraversion in part at least. The question arises whether this practice is morally permissible. We argue that, in a range of cases, it is not. The common belief is that, generally, it is not permissible to hire based…
Lesser transgressions and loss of standing to blame
In the Standard View, a blamee can dismiss another's blaming of her as hypocritical and thus standingless if, and only if, the blamer's violations of the norm he is invoking are as bad as the blamee's. I defend a counterexample to this view showing that blame can be hypocritical and thus standingless when, simultaneously with blaming, the blamer willingly violates, in a minor way, the norm he is invoking. If correct, this has important implicatio…
‘The many faces of laziness’
What do we owe to the lazy? On the assumption that the lazy are a paradigmatic case of people who are worse off, when they are through a fault, or choice, of their own, one might suspect that the answer is: not very much. This article shows that this suspicion is simple-minded. Four notions of laziness are distinguished. It is then shown that these notions differ – even from a luck egalitarian perspective – in ways bearing on the question of what…
Migration and discrimination
This special issue consists of four articles, contributed by David Owen; Désirée Lim, Sahar Akhtar and (as co-authors) Mollie Gerver, Miranda Simon, Patrick Lown and Dominik Duell. These contributions address issues related to migration policies with the aim of bringing normative theories of migration and discrimination into dialogue. These theories describe the various types of discrimination inherent in the domestic and global migration systems…
Can Experimental Political Philosophers be Modest in their Aims
The last two decades have seen an increasing interest in exploring philosophical questions using methods from empirical sciences, i.e., the so-called experimental philosophy approach. Political philosophy has so far been relatively unaffected by this trend. However, because political philosophers typically rely on traditional philosophical methods—most notably reflective equilibrium in a form which requires neither empirical examination of people…
Wrongful Discrimination Without Equal, Basic Moral Status
Many theorists think that discrimination is wrongful because it involves treating discriminatees as if they have a lower moral status than others when in fact all people are moral equals. However, there are strong reasons, expounded by Peter Singer and others, to doubt that all people are indeed moral equals. While it may turn out that, ultimately, these reasons can be shown to be unsound, we cannot rule out the possibility that we are not all mo…
Cost-Effectiveness and the Avoidance of Discrimination in Healthcare
Many ethical theorists believe that a given distribution of healthcare is morally justified only if (1) it is cost-effective and (2) it does not discriminate against older adults and disabled people. However, if (3) cost-effectiveness involves maximizing the number of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) added by a given unit of healthcare resource, or cost, it seems the pursuit of cost-effectiveness will inevitably discriminate against older adul…
Vote markets, democracy and relational egalitarianism
This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections to them, such as the complaint that they r…
Is there a duty not to compound injustice
In a series of excellent, recent papers, Deborah Hellman expounds the intuitively appealing idea that we have a duty not to compound injustice. Roughly, one compounds injustice when facts that obtain as a result of prior injustice form part of one’s reason for imposing further disadvantages on the victims of this prior injustice. This article identifies several complexities and problems motivating various amendments to Hellman’s formulation of th…
Is discrimination wrong because it is undeserved
Several leading theorists embrace the Simple Desert Account of Discrimination. This account involves two claims: it claims that a mismatch between what people deserve, on the one hand, and what they get, on the other hand, is (a) integral to discrimination, and (b) wrong. I shall query (a). First, I challenge what I see as the principal, positive argument for the Simple Desert Account. Second, in some cases wrongful discrimination brings about a …
Justice and Egalitarian Relations
Discrimination, Fairness, and the Use of Algorithms
Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals
When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an "egalitarian plateau".1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism—a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception …
Affirmative Action, Historical Injustice, and the Concept of Beneficiaries
Journal of Political PhilosophyVolume 25, Issue 1 p. 72-90 Original Article Affirmative Action, Historical Injustice, and the Concept of Beneficiaries† Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen Politics, University of Aarhus Philosophy, University of TromsøSearch for more papers by this author Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen Politics, University of Aarhus Philosophy, University of TromsøSearch for more papers by this a…
Against Self‐Ownership
TEST 02 - Elsevier's Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Search and access research from the science, technology, medicine, social sciences and arts and humanities fields.
Moral Status and the Impermissibility of Minimizing Violations
Is it unjust that elderly people suffer from poorer health than young people? Distributive and relational egalitarianism on age-based health inequalities
In any normal population, health is unequally distributed across different age groups. Are such age-based health inequalities unjust? A divide has recently developed within egalitarian theories of justice between relational egalitarians focusing on the egalitarian nature of social relations and luck egalitarians focusing on the distribution of goods such as welfare or resources. I argue that the most plausible versions of these two theories – ‘wh…
Arneson on Equality of Opportunity for Welfare
Estlund on Epistocracy
Essentialism vs. Constructivism
(2010). Essentialism vs. Constructivism: Introduction. Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory: Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 39-45
Vote Buying and Election Promises
Nothing Personal
Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals
When discussing theories of justice, most philosophers take the moral equality of human beings as their starting point. As Will Kymlicka says, in all contemporary plausible theories of justice, moral equality constitutes an "egalitarian plateau".1 Arguably, the most prominent novel theory of justice in recent years is relational egalitarianism—a theory on which justice requires people to relate as equals. Relational egalitarians are no exception …
A Duty not to Remain Silent
A notable feature of our practice of blaming is that blamees can dismiss blame for their own blameworthy actions when the blamer is censuring them hypocritically and, as it is often put, lacks standing to blame them as a result. This feature has received a good deal of philosophical attention in recent years. By contrast, no attention has been given the possibility that, likewise, refraining from blaming can be hypocritical and dismissed as stand…
Refugees and minorities
In many contexts, states have a duty to take special measures to protect minorities. Does this duty include prioritizing minority over majority refugees? To answer this question, we first show that a vulnerability-focused notion of ‘minorities’ is preferable to a numerical one. Given the vulnerability-focused notion, there is a presumption in favour of prioritizing minority over majority refugees. However, this presumption is sometimes defeated. …
Hurley on egalitarianism and the luck-neutralizing aim
Susan Hurley’s admirable new book, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, brings together recent developments in the fields of responsibility and egalitarian justice. This article focuses on Hurley’s critique of luck-neutralizing egalitarianism. The article concludes that the bad-luck-neutralizing aim serves better as a justificatory basis for egalitarianism than the more general luck-neutralizing aim. Since the former does not simply assume that we shoul…
Can Experimental Political Philosophers be Modest in their Aims
The last two decades have seen an increasing interest in exploring philosophical questions using methods from empirical sciences, i.e., the so-called experimental philosophy approach. Political philosophy has so far been relatively unaffected by this trend. However, because political philosophers typically rely on traditional philosophical methods—most notably reflective equilibrium in a form which requires neither empirical examination of people…
The Beam and the Mote
Most believe (or at least respond, if subjected to hypocritical blame, as if they believe) that even if one has done something blameworthy, one can dismiss blame on that account when it comes from a hypocritical blamer. This book examines the nature and ethics of standingless hypocritical blame. It argues that hypocrites lack standing to blame by virtue of their lack of commitment to the norms to which they appeal in their blame; that hypocritica…
The ethics of refugee prioritization
Faced with the worst displacement crisis since the second world war, many states are unlikely to accept as many refugees as they ought, and very few are likely to accept more than they are required
Human rights and Cohen’s anti-statism
G. A. Cohen’s critique of standard liberal interpretations of the difference principle has been very influential. According to Cohen, justice is not realized simply because the state’s tax policies and other distributive tools maximize the position of the worst off. Rather – possibly in addition to, but not to the exclusion of, certain state policies – justice requires talented people to improve the position of the worst off through their actions…
Discrimination and the aim of proportional representation
Many organizations, companies, and so on are committed to certain representational aims as regards the composition of their workforce. One motivation for such aims is the assumption that numerical underrepresentation of groups manifests discrimination against them. In this article, I articulate representational aims in a way that best captures this rationale. My main claim is that the achievement of such representational aims is reducible to the …
Are Some Inequalities more Unequal than Others? Nature, Nurture and Equality
Many egalitarians believe that social inequalities are worse than natural ones. Others deny that one can coherently distinguish between them. I argue that although one can separate the influence of these factors by an analysis of variance, the distinction is morally irrelevant. It might be alleged that my argument in favour of moral irrelevance attacks a straw man. While I think this allegation is incorrect, I accommodate it by distinguishing bet…
Pogge, poverty, and war
According to Thomas Pogge, rich people do not simply violate a positive duty of assistance to help the global poor; rather, they violate a negative duty not to harm them. They do so by imposing an unjust global economic structure on poor people. Assuming that these claims are correct, it follows that, ceteris paribus, wars waged by the poor against the rich to resist this imposition are morally equivalent to wars waged in self-defense against mil…
Introduction to the thematic issue ‘Refugee Crisis
This introduction discusses some of the background assumptions and recent developments of the current refugee crisis. In this issue, the crisis is not viewed as a primarily European, Western or even Syrian, Afghan, or Iraqi crisis, but as a global crisis that raises complex ethical and political challenges for all humanity. The contributions to this thematic issue discuss a variety of questions relating to the rights and duties of different actor…
Are Enabling and Allowing Harm Morally Equivalent
It is sometimes asserted that enabling harm is morally equivalent to allowing harm (the moral equivalence thesis). In this article, I criticize this view. Positively, I show that cases involving self-defence and cases involving people acting on the basis of a reasonable belief to the effect that certain obstacles to harm will remain in place, or will be put in place, show that enabling harm is harder to justify than allowing it. Negatively, I arg…
Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restrictions
In What Way are Constraints Paradoxical
It is impermissible to violate a constraint, even if by doing so a greater number of violations of the very same constraint were to be prevented. Most find this puzzling. But what makes the impermissibility of such minimizing violations puzzling? This article discusses some recent answers (by Scheffier, Kamm and Nagel) to this question. The article's first aim is to make clear in what way these answers differ. The second aim is to evaluate the an…
Moral Status and the Impermissibility of Minimizing Violations
On Denying A Significant Version Of The Constancy Assumption
With regard to intrinsically morally relevant factors it is natural to suppose that if a variation in a given factor makes a moral difference anywhere, then it makes the same moral difference everywhere (henceforth: the constancy assumption). Jonathan Dancy (and other moral particularists) reject the constancy assumption. Partly on the basis thereof, they infer that ethical decisions should be made “case by case, without the comforting support of…
Arneson on Equality of Opportunity for Welfare
In What Way are Constraints Paradoxical
It is impermissible to violate a constraint, even if by doing so a greater number of violations of the very same constraint were to be prevented. Most find this puzzling. But what makes the impermissibility of such minimizing violations puzzling? This article discusses some recent answers (by Scheffier, Kamm and Nagel) to this question. The article's first aim is to make clear in what way these answers differ. The second aim is to evaluate the an…
Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility
Measuring the disvalue of inequality over time
It is often assumed that when we measure the disvalue of inequality over time we should simply compare people's lives as a whole. Larry Temkin has shown this to be unwarranted. I argue that his case against the complete lives view is decisive in that the ranking‐order segment account not only accommodates the intuitions which favour the former view, but also gets support from the intuitions which conflict with it. According to the ranking‐order s…
Are Some Inequalities more Unequal than Others? Nature, Nurture and Equality
Many egalitarians believe that social inequalities are worse than natural ones. Others deny that one can coherently distinguish between them. I argue that although one can separate the influence of these factors by an analysis of variance, the distinction is morally irrelevant. It might be alleged that my argument in favour of moral irrelevance attacks a straw man. While I think this allegation is incorrect, I accommodate it by distinguishing bet…
Hurley on egalitarianism and the luck-neutralizing aim
Susan Hurley’s admirable new book, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge, brings together recent developments in the fields of responsibility and egalitarian justice. This article focuses on Hurley’s critique of luck-neutralizing egalitarianism. The article concludes that the bad-luck-neutralizing aim serves better as a justificatory basis for egalitarianism than the more general luck-neutralizing aim. Since the former does not simply assume that we shoul…
An Introduction to Contemporary Egalitarianism
1. What Is Equality? During the 1980s, the number of homeless people in the United States grew rapidly. This was due, among other things, to the Reagan administration’s severe cuts to the housing budget. In fact, by the end of the Reagan years the federal government was spending $8 billion annually on housing. The Carter administration had spent $32 billion annually at a time when homelessness was far less common (Singer 1993: 28). Most egalitari…
The badness of discrimination
Racial Profiling Versus Community
A police technique known as racial profiling draws on statistical beliefs about crime rates in racial groups. Supposing that such beliefs are true, and that racial profiling is effective in fighting crime, is such profiling morally justified? Recently, Risse and Zeckhauser have explored the racial profiling of African‐Americans and argued that justification is forthcoming from a utilitarian as well as deontological point of view. Drawing on criti…
Nothing Personal
Publicity and Egalitarian Justice
Recently, the issue of publicity has surfaced in discussions of the correct interpretation of the Rawlsian principles of justice. In an intriguing critique of G.A. Cohen's preferred interpretation of the difference principle as a principle that is incompatible with incentive-based inequalities, Andrew Williams points to a gap in Cohen's argument, alleging that Cohen's interpretation of the difference principle is unlikely to be compatible with th…
Understanding Particularism
Adherents of particularism draw rather strong implications of this view. However, particularism has never been stated in a canonical way. We locate the core of particularism as a claim about how different reasons combine to generate the Tightness or wrongness of an action. Using the notion of an ordering of alternatives containing separable factors, we show that particularism can be stated more generally as the denial that there exist separable f…
Discrimination and the aim of proportional representation
Many organizations, companies, and so on are committed to certain representational aims as regards the composition of their workforce. One motivation for such aims is the assumption that numerical underrepresentation of groups manifests discrimination against them. In this article, I articulate representational aims in a way that best captures this rationale. My main claim is that the achievement of such representational aims is reducible to the …
Against Self‐Ownership
TEST 02 - Elsevier's Scopus, the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature. Search and access research from the science, technology, medicine, social sciences and arts and humanities fields.
The Luck-Egalitarian Argument for Group Rights
Many believe that allocating individual rights and political powers differentially on the basis of ethnicity is incompatible with the fundamental values of liberal thought. However, Will Kymlicka has presented an influential luck-egalitarian argument in favour of such ‘group rights’. I set out this argument, and then critically discuss three of its premises. I argue that
Responsible nations
In National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller defends the view that a member of a nation can be collectively responsible for an outcome despite the fact that: (i) she did not control it; (ii) she actively opposed those of her nation's policies that produced the outcome; and (iii) actively opposing the relevant policy was costly for her. I argue that Miller's arguments in favor of this strong externalist view about responsibility and…
Reaction Qualifications Revisited
When, in a competitive sphere, people are selected on the basis of qualifications only, their chances of acquiring positions of advantage may seem to depend entirely upon their abilities, not discriminatory bias. However, if reaction qualifications - i.e. characteristics which contribute to a person's effectiveness by causing a favourable reaction in customers, co-workers etc. (for short: recipients) - are involved, this assumption is false. Buil…
Responsible nations
In National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller defends the view that a member of a nation can be collectively responsible for an outcome despite the fact that: (i) she did not control it; (ii) she actively opposed those of her nation's policies that produced the outcome; and (iii) actively opposing the relevant policy was costly for her. I argue that Miller's arguments in favor of this strong externalist view about responsibility and…
Kamm on Inviolability and Agent-Relative Restrictions
Scanlon on the Doctrine of Double Effect
Many philosophers see doctrine of double effect (henceforth DDE) as a crucial component of nonconsequentialist moral theories, for good or bad.1 Unsurprisingly, it is notoriously controversial. Even its formula tion is subject to considerable variation across philosophers. On one in fluential account, standard version of DDE says that the pursuit of a good tends to be less acceptable where a resulting harm is intended as a means than where it is …
Essentialism vs. Constructivism
(2010). Essentialism vs. Constructivism: Introduction. Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory: Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 39-45
Gender Constructions
Genetic determinists about gender think that gender differences are a result of biologically, hard-wired differences between the sexes reflecting differential sets of attributes maximizing fitness in human pre-history. Radical social constructivists about gender deny that it has any biological basis. I explore a moderate version of social constructivism—genetically constrained constructivism—about gender tied to a socio-biological approach to gen…
Vote Buying and Election Promises
Political science (71 obras) · Law (66 obras) · Sociology (63 obras) · Philosophy (59 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (55 obras) · Epistemology (52 obras) · Law and economics (45 obras) · Psychology (43 obras) · Economics (37 obras) · Social Psychology (35 obras)