Roderick M Chisholm

Dados Biográficos

ID3597601
NOMERoderick M Chisholm
PRENOMESRoderick M
SOBRENOMEChisholm
ASSINATURACHISHOLM R M
AFILIAÇÕESBrown University
VERIFICADONão
TOTAL DE OBRAS73
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES87
TOTAL COMO AUTOR72
TOTAL COMO EDITOR1
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1941
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2020
ÍNDICE H5

  • The Problem of the Criterion

    Roderick M Chisholm, Roderick ChisholmCHAPTERArguing about Knowledge2020

    "The problem of the criterion" seems to the author to be one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. The mind cannot attain to certainty until it has found within itself a sufficient reason for adhering to the testimony of such an authority. The criterion should be objective. The ultimate reason for believing cannot be a merely subjective state of the thinking subject. A man is aware that he can refl…

  • The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm

    Timm Triplett, Lewis Edwin Hahn et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Review2000

  • A Realistic Theory of Categories

    H Scott Hestevold, Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2000

  • A Realistic Theory of Categories

    Gary S Rosenkrantz, Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1998

  • Ontologically Dependent Entities

    Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1994Citada por: 3

    A discussion of the distinction between ontologically dependent and ontologically non-dependent entities presupposes a general theory of categories. I assume that there are four basic types of entity: states; contingent individuals; abstract; and necessary substance. The general theory would involve five dichotomies-five ways of dividing things into exclusive and exhaustive subsets. The dichotomies are these: (1) Things which are contingent and t…

  • Das Problem der Sätze der ersten Person

    Roderick M Chisholm, Roderick Chisholm et al.ARTICLEProtoSociology1993

    I shall propose that the primary form of all references is that reference to ourselves that we normally express when we use the first-person pronoun. In the case of believing, this reference may be called 'direct attribution'. Our reference to all other things is by way of such reference to ourselves. I shall argue that; although we express ourselves in first-person sentences, the reference to ourselves that we thus express does not involve the a…

  • Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology

    John Haldane, Hans Burkhardt et al.BOOKHandbook of Metaphysics and…1991

    Plantinga on Essentialism, Sklar on Space-Time, Stroll on Surfaces and Walton on Fiction are all examples.This two-volume work is clearly printed and well constructed, being likely to withstand the wear a reference text can be expected to suffer.It is a delight to dip into; the phrase 'hard to put down' is certainly apt.At £210, however, it is not likely to appeal to individual buyers and, notwithstanding its merits, I cannot say that the conside…

  • On the Simplicity of the Soul

    Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1991Citada por: 3

    of Nyssa tells us Plato asserted that the intellectual substance which is called the soul is united to the body by a kind of spiritual contact; and this is understood in the sense in which a thing that moves or acts touches the thing that is moved or is passive, And hence Plato used to say, as the aforesaid Gregory relates, that man is not something that is composed of soul and body, but is a soul using a body, so that he is understood to be in a…

  • Firth and the Ethics of Belief

    Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1991Citada por: 4

    I trust that I may begin on a personal note. It was one September day in 1938 that I first met Rod Firth when we both enrolled in Ralph Barton Perry's seminar on The General Theory of Value. Firth and I began almost at once to discuss and to argue about philosophy and we continued to do this for almost fifty years. I am honored and deeply moved to be able to take part in this symposium. One of topics that concerned both of us during all those yea…

  • Referring to Things That No Longer Exist

    Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1990Citada por: 2

    If we take tense seriously and have no illusions with respect to everlasting existence, we should be puzzled about how it is that we are able to refer to those things that once existed but no longer exist. It is reasonable to suppose (1) that Socrates no longer exists and (2) that we may refer to him. We may judge, say, that he was the first great philosopher to die by drinking hemlock. To make a judgment about someone, it might be supposed, is t…

  • Brentano and Intrinsic Value

    James C Klagge, Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1989

    Introduction 2. Thought and its objects 3. The phenomena of love and hate 4. Correct judement 5. Correct emotion 6. The hierarchy of values 7. Organic unities 8. Evil Index

  • The Evidence of the Senses

    Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophical Perspectives1988Citada por: 2Referências: 1

    I return to an ancient philosophical question: What kind of evidence is provided by senses? Many will feel, I'm sure, that there is nothing new to be said about this question. And perhaps they are right. But, given present state of philosophy, something, even if it is nothing new, needs to be said about it. For there is still a great deal of confusion about nature of perceptual evidence. The most unfortunate confusion, I think, gives rise to beli…

  • The indispensability of internal justification

    Open AccessRoderick M ChisholmARTICLESynthese1988Citada por: 7

  • Back to Things in Themselves

    Roderick M Chisholm, Josef SeifertARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1988

    Analytical Table of Contents. Preface Part 1: The Classical Principle of Phenomenology: Back to Themselves Part 2: The Cogito and Indubitable Knowledge Part 3: Objective Knowledge of Things in Themselves

  • Intentionality, Sense and the Mind

    Roderick M Chisholm, Maurita J Harney et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1987

    To say that thought is intentional is to say that thought is directed to some object. Objects to which thought is directed are problematic: unlike the objects of physical acts - like hitting - they need not exist in reality: I may think of a unicorn, or imagine a centaur, even though such objects do not exist. However, in most cases my thoughts are directed to existing objects: I may think of President Carter or I may envy Mrs. Thatcher. In such …

  • The First Person

    Jaegwon Kim, Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1986Citada por: 3

  • Franz Brentano on the Ontology of Mind

    Kevin Mulligan, Barry Smith et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1985Citada por: 3

  • The primacy of the intentional

    Open AccessRoderick M ChisholmARTICLESynthese1984

  • The Foundations of Knowing

    Joseph Levine, Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1984

  • The First Person

    Steven E Boër, Roderick M Chisholm et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Review1983

  • The Theory of Categories

    Open AccessFranz Brentano, Roderick M Chisholm et al.BOOKTheory of Categories1981

  • Aristotle and his World View

    J E Llewelyn, Franz Brentano et al.ARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1979

    Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Aristatle and his World View. By Franz Brentano. Edited and translated by Rolf George and Roderick M. Chisholm. ( California University Press. 1978. Pp. xii+138. Price $7.00) J. E. Llewelyn J. E. Llewelyn Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 117, October 1979, Pages 355–356, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219451 Published: 01 Octobe…

  • Intrinsic Value

    Roderick M ChisholmCHAPTERValues and Morals1978

  • Person and Object

    Virgil C Aldrich, Roderick M ChisholmARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1978Citada por: 9

  • The Intent to Deceive

    Roderick M Chisholm, Thomas D Feehan et al.ARTICLEThe Journal of Philosophy1977