Jc Beall
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3602144 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jc Beall |
| PRENOMES | Jc |
| SOBRENOME | Beall |
| ASSINATURA | BEALL J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Notre Dame |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1695-3458 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 3 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2000 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Contradictory Theology
Recent works in theology-including Beall (The Contradictory Christ and Divine Contradiction) and essays in Rutledge (Paradox and Contradiction in Theology)-have articulated or defended contradictory or contradictory-like theologies. Given the use of contemporary formal logic in setting out these theologies, a natural question concerning the existence of historical precedents to contradictory or contradictory-like theologies has arisen. In this ar…
Divine Contradiction
This is a collection of replies to critics of Divine Contradiction, each critic a symposiast in the Religious Studies symposium on said book
Divine Contradiction
Two doctrines (or axioms) of christian theology sharply distinguish christian monotheism from its traditional monotheistic siblings (viz. jewish and islamic monotheism): the incarnation of God and the triunity of God. Both doctrines, as many have long observed, face a conspicuous so-called logical problem – namely, apparent contradiction. How should the strong appearance of such fundamental contradiction be explained? Beall's answer: the incarnat…
Hegelian Conjunction, Hegelian Contradiction
Understanding what is the strictly formal import of Hegel's view is something on which few analytic philosophers have seen time worth spending. Still in our view there is enough in Hegel's work to suggest that a formal account of his dialectial process might be profitable both for better understanding Hegel's ideas and for introducing a new sort of glutty logic. The focus of our analysis is Hegel's Conjunction, which, in our view, is the crucial …
Fully divine and fully human
Philosophers and theologians have long recognized apparent contradictions in the Christian doctrine of the incarnation wherein Jesus is both fully divine and fully human and thereby exemplifies all properties essential to being divine and all properties essential to being human, including, respectively, immutability and mutability. In this article, we outline a new account of such apparent contradictions, wherein each such pair of (modal) propert…
Logic
Spandrels of Truth
J.C. Beall presents a new theory of 'transparent' truth. A prominent philosophical view of truth is as an entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. Beall's modest dialetheic theory shows how the notorious paradoxes associated with transparency can be dealt with.
Revenge of the Liar
"The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false, For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says (only) that it is…
Truth and Paradox
Book Review| July 01 2007 Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles Tim Maudlin, Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. xiv + 209 pp. JC Beall JC Beall Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 478–481. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-010 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation JC Beall; Truth and Paradox…
Deflationism and Paradox
Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of inter…
The Law of Non-Contradiction
The aim of this book is to present a comprehensive debate about the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), from discussions as to how the law is to be understood, to reasons for accepting or re-thinking the law, and to issues that raise challenges to the law, such as the Liar Paradox, and a ‘dialetheic’ resolution of that paradox. The essays in this collection address the ‘Law of Non-Contradiction’ (LNC), and the challenges posed to it by contemporary d…
Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction
We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence‐theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to r…
Existential Claims and Platonism
This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails.
A neglected deflationist approach to the liar
Journal Article A neglected deflationist approach to the liar Get access Jc Beall Jc Beall University of Connecticut344 Mansfield Road, U-54 Storrs, Connecticut 06269-2054, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 61, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 126–129, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/61.2.126 Published: 01 April 2001
On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism about Truth Predicates
A familiar view concerning sentences about the ethical or comical is that they are not truth‐apt – not capable of being true or false. Against this view Peter Geach famously noted that such sentences may figure in true (or false) conditionals and so must thereby be truth‐apt. In response to Geach's argument, Crispin Wright proposed a pluralism about truth predicates, a pluralism which sees Geach's conditional clauses as being true in a sense that…
On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism about Truth Predicates
A familiar view concerning sentences about the ethical or comical is that they are not truth‐apt – not capable of being true or false. Against this view Peter Geach famously noted that such sentences may figure in true (or false) conditionals and so must thereby be truth‐apt. In response to Geach's argument, Crispin Wright proposed a pluralism about truth predicates, a pluralism which sees Geach's conditional clauses as being true in a sense that…
Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction
We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence‐theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to r…
On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism about Truth Predicates
A familiar view concerning sentences about the ethical or comical is that they are not truth‐apt – not capable of being true or false. Against this view Peter Geach famously noted that such sentences may figure in true (or false) conditionals and so must thereby be truth‐apt. In response to Geach's argument, Crispin Wright proposed a pluralism about truth predicates, a pluralism which sees Geach's conditional clauses as being true in a sense that…
Existential Claims and Platonism
This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails.
A neglected deflationist approach to the liar
Journal Article A neglected deflationist approach to the liar Get access Jc Beall Jc Beall University of Connecticut344 Mansfield Road, U-54 Storrs, Connecticut 06269-2054, [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 61, Issue 2, April 2001, Pages 126–129, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/61.2.126 Published: 01 April 2001
Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction
We address an issue recently discussed by Graham Priest: whether the very nature of truth (understood as in correspondence theories) rules out true contradictions, and hence whether a correspondence‐theoretic notion of truth rules against dialetheism. We argue that, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, objections from within the correspondence theory do not stand in the way of dialetheism. We close by highlighting, but not attempting to r…
The Law of Non-Contradiction
The aim of this book is to present a comprehensive debate about the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC), from discussions as to how the law is to be understood, to reasons for accepting or re-thinking the law, and to issues that raise challenges to the law, such as the Liar Paradox, and a ‘dialetheic’ resolution of that paradox. The essays in this collection address the ‘Law of Non-Contradiction’ (LNC), and the challenges posed to it by contemporary d…
Deflationism and Paradox
Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of inter…
Truth and Paradox
Book Review| July 01 2007 Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles Tim Maudlin, Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004. xiv + 209 pp. JC Beall JC Beall Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2007) 116 (3): 478–481. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-010 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation JC Beall; Truth and Paradox…
Revenge of the Liar
"The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false, For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says (only) that it is…
Spandrels of Truth
J.C. Beall presents a new theory of 'transparent' truth. A prominent philosophical view of truth is as an entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. Beall's modest dialetheic theory shows how the notorious paradoxes associated with transparency can be dealt with.
Logic
Fully divine and fully human
Philosophers and theologians have long recognized apparent contradictions in the Christian doctrine of the incarnation wherein Jesus is both fully divine and fully human and thereby exemplifies all properties essential to being divine and all properties essential to being human, including, respectively, immutability and mutability. In this article, we outline a new account of such apparent contradictions, wherein each such pair of (modal) propert…
Hegelian Conjunction, Hegelian Contradiction
Understanding what is the strictly formal import of Hegel's view is something on which few analytic philosophers have seen time worth spending. Still in our view there is enough in Hegel's work to suggest that a formal account of his dialectial process might be profitable both for better understanding Hegel's ideas and for introducing a new sort of glutty logic. The focus of our analysis is Hegel's Conjunction, which, in our view, is the crucial …
Divine Contradiction
This is a collection of replies to critics of Divine Contradiction, each critic a symposiast in the Religious Studies symposium on said book
Divine Contradiction
Two doctrines (or axioms) of christian theology sharply distinguish christian monotheism from its traditional monotheistic siblings (viz. jewish and islamic monotheism): the incarnation of God and the triunity of God. Both doctrines, as many have long observed, face a conspicuous so-called logical problem – namely, apparent contradiction. How should the strong appearance of such fundamental contradiction be explained? Beall's answer: the incarnat…
Contradictory Theology
Recent works in theology-including Beall (The Contradictory Christ and Divine Contradiction) and essays in Rutledge (Paradox and Contradiction in Theology)-have articulated or defended contradictory or contradictory-like theologies. Given the use of contemporary formal logic in setting out these theologies, a natural question concerning the existence of historical precedents to contradictory or contradictory-like theologies has arisen. In this ar…
Philosophy (13 obras) · Epistemology (11 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (6 obras) · Contradiction (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Pragmatic theory of truth (3 obras) · Theology (3 obras)