Miguel R Rueda
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 366355 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Miguel R Rueda |
| PRENOMES | Miguel R |
| SOBRENOME | Rueda |
| ASSINATURA | RUEDA M R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Emory University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7365-7722 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 115 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 13 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2015 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
How Do Electoral Outcomes Affect Campaign Contributions? The Role of Personal Loyalty and Investment Motives
How do electoral outcomes affect campaign contributions? We argue that in contexts where personal connections to the candidate and investment motivations dominate ideology and partisanship as drivers of donations, two main factors shape donors’ future behaviour: 1) government benefits accrued by donors (for example, contracts) and 2) whether the supported candidate runs again in future elections. Using data from Colombian mayoral elections, a con…
Do More Disaggregated Electoral Results Deter Aggregation Fraud
The level of aggregation at which electoral results are published can impact election integrity. Publishing results at a more granular level – such as at the level of the polling station – enables civil society watchdogs to independently verify vote totals, helping to deter aggregation fraud. While this logic undergirds the recommendations of the international organizations monitoring elections to publish more granular electoral results, to date …
Post-Instrument Bias
When using instrumental variables, researchers often assume that causal effects are only identified conditional on covariates. We show that the role of these covariates is often unclear and that there exists confusion regarding their ability to mitigate violations of the exclusion restriction. We explain when and how existing adjustment strategies may lead to “post‐instrument” bias. We then discuss assumptions that are sufficient to identify vari…
Post-Instrument Bias in Linear Models
Post-instrument covariates are often included as controls in instrumental variable (IV) analyses to address a violation of the exclusion restriction. However, we show that such analyses are subject to biases unless strong assumptions hold. Using linear constant-effects models, we present asymptotic bias formulas for three estimators (with and without measurement error): IV with post-instrument covariates, IV without post-instrument covariates, an…
Competition and Civilian Victimization
Violence against civilians in civil war is widely thought of as a strategic choice by combatant groups. We argue that a common strategic logic of competition underlies diverse theories of civilian victimization. We develop a theory of strategic complements in victimization, hypothesizing that an armed group’s propensity to victimize civilians will increase with its expectation that its competitors will act likewise. We test this argument by struc…
Do Campaign Contribution Limits Curb the Influence of Money in Politics
Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge of whether and how these limits achieve this goal. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number of public contracts assigned to donors to the elected candidate. T…
National Electoral Thresholds and Disproportionality
We model the conditional distribution of seats given vote shares induced by national electoral systems using a stochastic threshold of representation and a disproportionality parameter that regulates allocation for parties above the threshold. We establish conditions for the parameters of this model to be identified from observed seats/votes data, and develop a Maximum a Posteriori Expectation-Maximization (MAP-EM) algorithm to estimate them. We …
Political Agency, Election Quality, and Corruption
How does electoral manipulation affect elected officials’ willingness to satisfy their constituents? Although the literature has highlighted the role of elections as mechanisms of accountability, we do not know how elections whose integrity is compromised influence elected officials’ actions in office. We present a model of accountability that allows for electoral manipulation and derive three results: (i) rent extraction increases with the level…
Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation
How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives' presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party's vote share. The evidence sugges…
Omitted Variables, Countervailing Effects, and the Possibility of Overadjustment
The effect of conditioning on an additional covariate on confounding bias depends, in part, on covariates that are unobserved. We characterize the conditions under which the interaction between a covariate that is available for conditioning and one that is not can affect bias. When the confounding effects of two covariates, one of which is observed, are countervailing (in opposite directions), conditioning on the observed covariate can increase b…
Popular Support, Violence, and Territorial Control in Civil War
I study civilians’ cooperation with an armed group in an irregular war. In the model, civilians differ in their valuation of siding with the armed group and make cooperation decisions without knowing others’ motivations or cooperation choices. I find that a superior military force is not sufficient to bring high cooperation and that full cooperation can only be attained if military power is complemented by expectations of punishment for helping t…
Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation
Vote buying is widespread in developing democracies despite the secret ballot. What explains its resilience? I argue that brokers condition future payments on published electoral results to enforce these transactions and that this is effective at inducing voters' compliance only when the results of small voting groups are available. Using monitors' and citizens' reports of electoral manipulation and survey data from Colombia, I find a robust nega…
Buying votes with imperfect local knowledge and a secret ballot
How do politicians buy votes in secret ballot elections? I present a model of vote buying in which a broker sustains bribed voters’ compliance by conditioning future bribes on whether her candidate’s votes reach an optimally set threshold. Unlike previous explanations of compliance, the threshold mechanism does not require brokers to observe individual voters’ political preferences or even vote totals of the bribed voters. I show that when there …
Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation
Vote buying is widespread in developing democracies despite the secret ballot. What explains its resilience? I argue that brokers condition future payments on published electoral results to enforce these transactions and that this is effective at inducing voters' compliance only when the results of small voting groups are available. Using monitors' and citizens' reports of electoral manipulation and survey data from Colombia, I find a robust nega…
Buying votes with imperfect local knowledge and a secret ballot
How do politicians buy votes in secret ballot elections? I present a model of vote buying in which a broker sustains bribed voters’ compliance by conditioning future bribes on whether her candidate’s votes reach an optimally set threshold. Unlike previous explanations of compliance, the threshold mechanism does not require brokers to observe individual voters’ political preferences or even vote totals of the bribed voters. I show that when there …
Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation
How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives' presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party's vote share. The evidence sugges…
Do Campaign Contribution Limits Curb the Influence of Money in Politics
Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge of whether and how these limits achieve this goal. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number of public contracts assigned to donors to the elected candidate. T…
Popular Support, Violence, and Territorial Control in Civil War
I study civilians’ cooperation with an armed group in an irregular war. In the model, civilians differ in their valuation of siding with the armed group and make cooperation decisions without knowing others’ motivations or cooperation choices. I find that a superior military force is not sufficient to bring high cooperation and that full cooperation can only be attained if military power is complemented by expectations of punishment for helping t…
Political Agency, Election Quality, and Corruption
How does electoral manipulation affect elected officials’ willingness to satisfy their constituents? Although the literature has highlighted the role of elections as mechanisms of accountability, we do not know how elections whose integrity is compromised influence elected officials’ actions in office. We present a model of accountability that allows for electoral manipulation and derive three results: (i) rent extraction increases with the level…
Omitted Variables, Countervailing Effects, and the Possibility of Overadjustment
The effect of conditioning on an additional covariate on confounding bias depends, in part, on covariates that are unobserved. We characterize the conditions under which the interaction between a covariate that is available for conditioning and one that is not can affect bias. When the confounding effects of two covariates, one of which is observed, are countervailing (in opposite directions), conditioning on the observed covariate can increase b…
Competition and Civilian Victimization
Violence against civilians in civil war is widely thought of as a strategic choice by combatant groups. We argue that a common strategic logic of competition underlies diverse theories of civilian victimization. We develop a theory of strategic complements in victimization, hypothesizing that an armed group’s propensity to victimize civilians will increase with its expectation that its competitors will act likewise. We test this argument by struc…
National Electoral Thresholds and Disproportionality
We model the conditional distribution of seats given vote shares induced by national electoral systems using a stochastic threshold of representation and a disproportionality parameter that regulates allocation for parties above the threshold. We establish conditions for the parameters of this model to be identified from observed seats/votes data, and develop a Maximum a Posteriori Expectation-Maximization (MAP-EM) algorithm to estimate them. We …
How Do Electoral Outcomes Affect Campaign Contributions? The Role of Personal Loyalty and Investment Motives
How do electoral outcomes affect campaign contributions? We argue that in contexts where personal connections to the candidate and investment motivations dominate ideology and partisanship as drivers of donations, two main factors shape donors’ future behaviour: 1) government benefits accrued by donors (for example, contracts) and 2) whether the supported candidate runs again in future elections. Using data from Colombian mayoral elections, a con…
Buying votes with imperfect local knowledge and a secret ballot
How do politicians buy votes in secret ballot elections? I present a model of vote buying in which a broker sustains bribed voters’ compliance by conditioning future bribes on whether her candidate’s votes reach an optimally set threshold. Unlike previous explanations of compliance, the threshold mechanism does not require brokers to observe individual voters’ political preferences or even vote totals of the bribed voters. I show that when there …
Popular Support, Violence, and Territorial Control in Civil War
I study civilians’ cooperation with an armed group in an irregular war. In the model, civilians differ in their valuation of siding with the armed group and make cooperation decisions without knowing others’ motivations or cooperation choices. I find that a superior military force is not sufficient to bring high cooperation and that full cooperation can only be attained if military power is complemented by expectations of punishment for helping t…
Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation
Vote buying is widespread in developing democracies despite the secret ballot. What explains its resilience? I argue that brokers condition future payments on published electoral results to enforce these transactions and that this is effective at inducing voters' compliance only when the results of small voting groups are available. Using monitors' and citizens' reports of electoral manipulation and survey data from Colombia, I find a robust nega…
Omitted Variables, Countervailing Effects, and the Possibility of Overadjustment
The effect of conditioning on an additional covariate on confounding bias depends, in part, on covariates that are unobserved. We characterize the conditions under which the interaction between a covariate that is available for conditioning and one that is not can affect bias. When the confounding effects of two covariates, one of which is observed, are countervailing (in opposite directions), conditioning on the observed covariate can increase b…
Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation
How do parties protect themselves from electoral manipulation? To answer this question, we study the drivers of polling station party representatives' presence and their impact on electoral outcomes in an environment where electoral irregularities are common. Using election data from the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, we find a robust positive correlation between the presence of party representatives and that party's vote share. The evidence sugges…
National Electoral Thresholds and Disproportionality
We model the conditional distribution of seats given vote shares induced by national electoral systems using a stochastic threshold of representation and a disproportionality parameter that regulates allocation for parties above the threshold. We establish conditions for the parameters of this model to be identified from observed seats/votes data, and develop a Maximum a Posteriori Expectation-Maximization (MAP-EM) algorithm to estimate them. We …
Political Agency, Election Quality, and Corruption
How does electoral manipulation affect elected officials’ willingness to satisfy their constituents? Although the literature has highlighted the role of elections as mechanisms of accountability, we do not know how elections whose integrity is compromised influence elected officials’ actions in office. We present a model of accountability that allows for electoral manipulation and derive three results: (i) rent extraction increases with the level…
Competition and Civilian Victimization
Violence against civilians in civil war is widely thought of as a strategic choice by combatant groups. We argue that a common strategic logic of competition underlies diverse theories of civilian victimization. We develop a theory of strategic complements in victimization, hypothesizing that an armed group’s propensity to victimize civilians will increase with its expectation that its competitors will act likewise. We test this argument by struc…
Do Campaign Contribution Limits Curb the Influence of Money in Politics
Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge of whether and how these limits achieve this goal. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number of public contracts assigned to donors to the elected candidate. T…
Post-Instrument Bias
When using instrumental variables, researchers often assume that causal effects are only identified conditional on covariates. We show that the role of these covariates is often unclear and that there exists confusion regarding their ability to mitigate violations of the exclusion restriction. We explain when and how existing adjustment strategies may lead to “post‐instrument” bias. We then discuss assumptions that are sufficient to identify vari…
Post-Instrument Bias in Linear Models
Post-instrument covariates are often included as controls in instrumental variable (IV) analyses to address a violation of the exclusion restriction. However, we show that such analyses are subject to biases unless strong assumptions hold. Using linear constant-effects models, we present asymptotic bias formulas for three estimators (with and without measurement error): IV with post-instrument covariates, IV without post-instrument covariates, an…
How Do Electoral Outcomes Affect Campaign Contributions? The Role of Personal Loyalty and Investment Motives
How do electoral outcomes affect campaign contributions? We argue that in contexts where personal connections to the candidate and investment motivations dominate ideology and partisanship as drivers of donations, two main factors shape donors’ future behaviour: 1) government benefits accrued by donors (for example, contracts) and 2) whether the supported candidate runs again in future elections. Using data from Colombian mayoral elections, a con…
Do More Disaggregated Electoral Results Deter Aggregation Fraud
The level of aggregation at which electoral results are published can impact election integrity. Publishing results at a more granular level – such as at the level of the polling station – enables civil society watchdogs to independently verify vote totals, helping to deter aggregation fraud. While this logic undergirds the recommendations of the international organizations monitoring elections to publish more granular electoral results, to date …
Law (9 obras) · Law (9 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Economics (8 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (7 obras) · Politics (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Business (5 obras) · Econometrics (4 obras) · Mathematics (4 obras)