Nicholas Sabin
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 367664 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Nicholas Sabin |
| PRENOMES | Nicholas |
| SOBRENOME | Sabin |
| ASSINATURA | SABIN N |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Universidad de Santiago de Chile |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6702-976X |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 2 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Moral dilemmas and trust in leaders during a global health crisis
Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with public policies. One potential determinant of trust is how leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past research suggests that utilitarian responses to dilemmas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some people to save many others ('instrumental harm') reduces trust, while maximizing the welfare of everyone equ…
Able but Unwilling to Enforce
It is known that greater social cohesion increases a group’s ability to enforce cooperation. Despite this, defectors often go unpunished, and groups with social structures that are a priori favorable often fail. A critical distinction is required between the structural effect on ability versus willingness to punish. The authors develop a theoretical framework in which variation in a group’s social structure generates a tension between ability and…
Moral dilemmas and trust in leaders during a global health crisis
Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with public policies. One potential determinant of trust is how leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past research suggests that utilitarian responses to dilemmas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some people to save many others ('instrumental harm') reduces trust, while maximizing the welfare of everyone equ…
Able but Unwilling to Enforce
It is known that greater social cohesion increases a group’s ability to enforce cooperation. Despite this, defectors often go unpunished, and groups with social structures that are a priori favorable often fail. A critical distinction is required between the structural effect on ability versus willingness to punish. The authors develop a theoretical framework in which variation in a group’s social structure generates a tension between ability and…
Able but Unwilling to Enforce
It is known that greater social cohesion increases a group’s ability to enforce cooperation. Despite this, defectors often go unpunished, and groups with social structures that are a priori favorable often fail. A critical distinction is required between the structural effect on ability versus willingness to punish. The authors develop a theoretical framework in which variation in a group’s social structure generates a tension between ability and…
Moral dilemmas and trust in leaders during a global health crisis
Trust in leaders is central to citizen compliance with public policies. One potential determinant of trust is how leaders resolve conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian ethical principles in moral dilemmas. Past research suggests that utilitarian responses to dilemmas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: sacrificing some people to save many others ('instrumental harm') reduces trust, while maximizing the welfare of everyone equ…
Political science (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Social Psychology (2 obras) · Cohesion (chemistry) (1 obras) · Complement (music) (1 obras) · Criminology (1 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (1 obras) · Dilemma (1 obras) · Economics (1 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 obras)