Peter Baumann
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3698417 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Peter Baumann |
| PRENOMES | Peter |
| SOBRENOME | Baumann |
| ASSINATURA | BAUMANN P |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Swarthmore College |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0991-6288 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 36 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 31 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 35 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1993 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Analyticity and the challenge of open texture
Datacubes as enabler for advanced decision support systems in land management
Informed, wise, land management has been a challenge since a long time, but has gained extra importance through the need for responding to climate change effects. The European Green Deal is one example of a concertation effort in a world where data availability, sharing options, and just‐in‐time exploitation are not entirely solved. The LandSupport service responds to this challenge through a combination of a Spatial Decision Support System on to…
The Landsupport Geospatial Decision Support System ( S‐dss ) Vision
Nowadays, there is contrasting evidence between the ongoing continuing and widespread environmental degradation and the many means to implement environmental sustainability actions starting from good policies (e.g. EU New Green Deal, CAP), powerful technologies (e.g. new satellites, drones, IoT sensors), large databases and large stakeholder engagement (e.g. EIP‐AGRI, living labs). Here, we argue that to tackle the above contrasting issues dealin…
What's a(t) stake? On stakes, encroachers, knowledge
According to subject‐sensitive invariantism (SSI), whether S knows that p depends not only on the subject's epistemic position (the presence of a true belief, sufficient warrant, etc.) but also on non‐epistemic factors present in the subject's situation; such factors are seen as “encroaching” on the subject's epistemic standing. Not the only such non‐epistemic factor but the most prominent one consists in the subject's practical stakes. Stakes‐ba…
Thomas Reid, Common Sense, and Pragmatism
This paper deals with a less well-known connection between Thomas Reid’s conception of common sense and pragmatism. The paper starts with an exposition of the different principles of common sense one can find in Reid’s writings and a discussion of their epistemic status. The main focus of the paper is on what one may call ‘Reid’s dilemma of common sense’. I argue that Reid’s writings not only present us with a dilemma of common sense but that the…
Contextual Causal Dependence and Causal Contrastivism
Trolleys, Transplants and Inequality
Enlightenment as perfection, perfection as enlightenment? Kant on thinking for oneself and perfecting oneself
Kant's views about the nature and value of enlightenment have been discussed very much since 1784, and without ever losing any of their relevance and importance. I will discuss a topic that has not been discussed quite that extensively: Kant's conception of enlightenment as it relates to the idea of perfection (Vollkommenheit) in particular. Is the project of enlightenment also a project of perfection (and vice versa), and if yes, in what sense a…
Rational intransitive preferences
According to a widely held view, rationality demands that the preferences of a person be transitive. The transitivity assumption is an axiom in standard theories of rational choice. It is also prima facie very plausible. I argue here that transitivity is not a necessary condition of rationality; it is a constraint only in some cases. The argument presented here is based on the non-linearity of differential utility functions. This paper has four p…
Sorry if! On Conditional Apologies
Inductive knowledge and lotteries
Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto b…
Jennifer R. Cash, Cultural Revival and the Persistence of Identity in Moldova
For nearly three-quarters of a century, anthropologists, alongside folklorist, sociologists, and others have steadily documented multiple processes of cultural revival and revitalization, amassing a rich body of evidence to testify to the flexibility and resilience of culture. This focus on successful revivals has generated a wide literature that parallels and supports the growing attention to identity and ethnicity as key concerns across the soc…
Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism
The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject-sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.), but also by non-epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject-sensitive invar…
Erkenntnistheorie
Erkenntnistheorie
On Reflection
Journal Article On Reflection Get access On Reflection. By Kornblith Hilary. (Oxford: OUP, 2012. Pp. x + 177. Price £27.50.) Peter Baumann Peter Baumann Swarthmore College, USA E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 64, Issue 256, July 2014, Pages 510–512, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu029 Published: 12 June 2014
I Know. Modal Epistemology and Scepticism
Wolfgang Freitag's stimulating recent book deals with two basic questions of epistemology: What is knowledge? And can we have any knowledge, especially about the world around us? Freitag answers the first question in the first of the two parts of the book. He develops a new version of a modal account of knowledge, a ‘normality’ view. The second part of the book deals with a particular form of epistemic scepticism, namely with what is usually call…
Knowledge and Dogmatism
There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions o…
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology
Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lu…
Empiricism, stances, and the problem of voluntarism
The Case for Contextualism
Epistemic contextualism is the view that the truth‐conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the context of the attributor. One speaker L in an ordinary context with relaxed standards for knowledge might say something true by uttering ‘Moore knows he has hands’, while another speaker H in a more demanding context with tighter standards for knowledge might say something true by uttering ‘Moore does not know he has hands’. There is no contradi…
Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall
Contextualism and the Factivity Problem
Epistemological contextualism ‐ the claim that the truth‐value of knowledge‐attributions can vary with the context of the attributor ‐ has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However,…
Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism
In his recent book "Moral Skepticisms" Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral a…
Erkenntnistheorie
Was ist Erkenntnis? Was können wir wissen? Welche Rolle spielt die Erfahrung? Was ist Wahrheit? Die Erkenntnistheorie als zentrale Disziplin der Philosophie geht diesen Fragen auf den Grund. Die 2. Au
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology
Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lu…
Empiricism, stances, and the problem of voluntarism
On the Subtleties of Reidian Pragmatism
Die Motive des Gehorsams bei Max Weber
Der Aufsatz behandelt ein ebenso zentrales wie vernachlässigtes Thema der Weberschen Herrschaftssoziologie: die Unterscheidung verschiedener Motive der „Fügsamkeit“. Webers Liste der Gehorsamsmotive weist ein wichtiges Problem auf: Sie scheint inkohärent zu sein, ohne einheitlichen Gesichtspunkt der Unterscheidung. Dies stellt den besonderen Stellenwert des Legitimationsglaubens unter den Gehorsamsmotiven und seine zentrale Bedeutung für stabile …
Knowledge and Dogmatism
There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions o…
Contextualism and the Factivity Problem
Epistemological contextualism ‐ the claim that the truth‐value of knowledge‐attributions can vary with the context of the attributor ‐ has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However,…
Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism
In his recent book "Moral Skepticisms" Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral a…
Theory Choice and the Intransitivity of ‘Is a Better Theory Than’
There is a very plausible transitivity principle for theory choice. It says that if all criteria of theory evaluation are considered, and theory A is a better theory than theory B, and theory B is a better theory than theory C, then A is a better theory than C. I argue against this principle. It turns out that whenever there are two or more relevant and independent criteria of theory evaluation, and that whenever at least of one the criteria is ‘…
Practical conflicts
Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts? In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyse the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge th…
Rational intransitive preferences
According to a widely held view, rationality demands that the preferences of a person be transitive. The transitivity assumption is an axiom in standard theories of rational choice. It is also prima facie very plausible. I argue here that transitivity is not a necessary condition of rationality; it is a constraint only in some cases. The argument presented here is based on the non-linearity of differential utility functions. This paper has four p…
Jennifer R. Cash, Cultural Revival and the Persistence of Identity in Moldova
For nearly three-quarters of a century, anthropologists, alongside folklorist, sociologists, and others have steadily documented multiple processes of cultural revival and revitalization, amassing a rich body of evidence to testify to the flexibility and resilience of culture. This focus on successful revivals has generated a wide literature that parallels and supports the growing attention to identity and ethnicity as key concerns across the soc…
Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall
Motivation und Macht
Die Motive des Gehorsams bei Max Weber
Der Aufsatz behandelt ein ebenso zentrales wie vernachlässigtes Thema der Weberschen Herrschaftssoziologie: die Unterscheidung verschiedener Motive der „Fügsamkeit“. Webers Liste der Gehorsamsmotive weist ein wichtiges Problem auf: Sie scheint inkohärent zu sein, ohne einheitlichen Gesichtspunkt der Unterscheidung. Dies stellt den besonderen Stellenwert des Legitimationsglaubens unter den Gehorsamsmotiven und seine zentrale Bedeutung für stabile …
Can Reliabilists Believe in Subjective Probability
According to reliabilist conceptions of knowledge, knowledge implies reliable true belief. Since reliability is an irreducibly probabilistic notion, one's view of knowledge also depends on one's view of probability. If one believes that all probability is subjective probability, knowledge becomes a relativized concept: knowledge is relative to a given body of beliefs of a given person at a given time. Since such a relativized conception of knowle…
Die Autonomie der Person
Erkenntnistheorie
Erkenntnistheorie.
Practical Conflicts
On the Subtleties of Reidian Pragmatism
Practical conflicts
Practical conflicts pervade human life. Agents have many different desires, goals, and commitments, all of which can come into conflict with each other. How can practical reasoning help to resolve these practical conflicts? In this collection of essays a distinguished roster of philosophers analyse the diverse forms of practical conflict. Their aim is to establish an understanding of the sources of these conflicts, to investigate the challenge th…
Theory Choice and the Intransitivity of ‘Is a Better Theory Than’
There is a very plausible transitivity principle for theory choice. It says that if all criteria of theory evaluation are considered, and theory A is a better theory than theory B, and theory B is a better theory than theory C, then A is a better theory than C. I argue against this principle. It turns out that whenever there are two or more relevant and independent criteria of theory evaluation, and that whenever at least of one the criteria is ‘…
Erkenntnistheorie
Was ist Erkenntnis? Was können wir wissen? Welche Rolle spielt die Erfahrung? Was ist Wahrheit? Die Erkenntnistheorie als zentrale Disziplin der Philosophie geht diesen Fragen auf den Grund. Die 2. Au
Erkenntnistheorie
Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall
Contextualism and the Factivity Problem
Epistemological contextualism ‐ the claim that the truth‐value of knowledge‐attributions can vary with the context of the attributor ‐ has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However,…
Problems for Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Contrastivism
In his recent book "Moral Skepticisms" Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail for contrastivism with respect to justified moral belief and moral knowledge. I raise three questions concerning this view. First, how would Sinnott-Armstrong account for constraints on admissible contrast classes? Secondly, how would he deal with notorious problems concerning relevant reference classes? Finally, how can he account for basic features of moral a…
The Case for Contextualism
Epistemic contextualism is the view that the truth‐conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the context of the attributor. One speaker L in an ordinary context with relaxed standards for knowledge might say something true by uttering ‘Moore knows he has hands’, while another speaker H in a more demanding context with tighter standards for knowledge might say something true by uttering ‘Moore does not know he has hands’. There is no contradi…
Empiricism, stances, and the problem of voluntarism
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology
Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lu…
Knowledge and Dogmatism
There is a sceptical puzzle according to which knowledge appears to license an unacceptable kind of dogmatism. Here is a version of the corresponding sceptical argument: (1) If a subject S knows a proposition p, then it is OK for S to ignore all evidence against p as misleading; (2) It is never OK for any subject to ignore any evidence against their beliefs as misleading; (3) Hence, nobody knows anything.I distinguish between different versions o…
On Reflection
Journal Article On Reflection Get access On Reflection. By Kornblith Hilary. (Oxford: OUP, 2012. Pp. x + 177. Price £27.50.) Peter Baumann Peter Baumann Swarthmore College, USA E-mail: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 64, Issue 256, July 2014, Pages 510–512, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu029 Published: 12 June 2014
I Know. Modal Epistemology and Scepticism
Wolfgang Freitag's stimulating recent book deals with two basic questions of epistemology: What is knowledge? And can we have any knowledge, especially about the world around us? Freitag answers the first question in the first of the two parts of the book. He develops a new version of a modal account of knowledge, a ‘normality’ view. The second part of the book deals with a particular form of epistemic scepticism, namely with what is usually call…
Erkenntnistheorie
Erkenntnistheorie
Jennifer R. Cash, Cultural Revival and the Persistence of Identity in Moldova
For nearly three-quarters of a century, anthropologists, alongside folklorist, sociologists, and others have steadily documented multiple processes of cultural revival and revitalization, amassing a rich body of evidence to testify to the flexibility and resilience of culture. This focus on successful revivals has generated a wide literature that parallels and supports the growing attention to identity and ethnicity as key concerns across the soc…
Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism
The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject-sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.), but also by non-epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject-sensitive invar…
Philosophy (23 obras) · Epistemology (17 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (17 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 obras) · Psychology (9 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Sociology (7 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 obras)