Ananish Chaudhuri
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3713845 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Ananish Chaudhuri |
| PRENOMES | Ananish |
| SOBRENOME | Chaudhuri |
| ASSINATURA | CHAUDHURI A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Auckland |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4862-6523 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 20 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 52 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 20 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2000 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Prosocial Phenotype Predicts Political Views on Hierarchy and Redistribution 18 Months Later
Cross-sectional research has identified robust correlations between prosocial behavior in economic games and political views, but this research is limited in its ability to draw causal inferences. Here, we conducted a longitudinal cross-lagged panel study of prosociality and political views with a New Zealand sample ( n = 631). Across two waves separated by 18 months, we measured self-reported political views and employed a battery of economic ga…
Validation of the Mini‐Ipip6 Short‐Form Personality Inventory
This study validated the Mini‐IPIP6 short‐form measure of Honesty‐Humility to predict cooperative behaviour in online economic games. A subsample of participants from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study completed four online economic games for money, in addition to the Mini‐IPIP6 six‐factor personality inventory ( N = 979). Cooperative behaviour was modelled as a latent variable reflecting behaviour across the four games. Honesty‐Humility …
Selecting the ‘Best’? Competing Dimensions of Politician Quality in the Developing World
Evidence suggests that politicians in advanced democracies are positively selected on characteristics relevant to their suitability for political office. Whereas stereotypes abound, much less is known about the quality of politicians in developing countries. Drawing on unique experimental and survey data on village-level politicians in West Bengal, India, we find some evidence of positive selection into office: elected politicians are more educat…
The Dual Foundations of Political Ideology Are Ubiquitous across Human Social Life
Time in Office and the Changing Gender Gap in Dishonesty
Increasing the share of women in politics is often promoted as a means to reduce corruption. Recent studies indicate the importance of considering the gender gap in corruption as a dynamic, rather than static, phenomenon. Our study combines data from surveys and incentivized behavioral games among 400 inexperienced and experienced local politicians in West Bengal, India. We find no gender gap in attitudes toward corruption. However, in incentiviz…
Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology Predict Divergent Responses to Covid-19
Political conservatives' opposition to COVID-19 restrictions is puzzling given the well-documented links between conservatism and conformity, threat sensitivity, and pathogen aversion. We propose a resolution based on the Dual Foundations Theory of ideology, which holds that ideology comprises two dimensions, one reflecting trade-offs between threat-driven conformity and individualism, and another reflecting trade-offs between empathy-driven coop…
The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology
Belief heterogeneity and contributions decay among conditional cooperators in public goods games
What’s in a frame? Goal framing, trust and reciprocity
Team versus individual behavior in the minimum effort coordination game
Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments
I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are…
Gender, Culture, and Corruption
A substantial body of recent research looks at differences in the behavior of men and women in diverse economic transactions. We contribute to this literature by investigating gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem. Our study departs from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using economic experiments. Based on data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Sin…
Talking Ourselves to Efficiency
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the…
Experiments in Economics
Are humans fair by nature? Why do we often willingly trust strangers or cooperate with them even if those actions leave us vulnerable to exploitation? Does this natural inclination towards fairness or trust have implications in the market-place? Traditional economic theory would perhaps think not, perceiving human interaction as self-interested at heart. There is increasing evidence however that social norms and norm-driven behaviour such as a pr…
Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game
We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhi…
Information Structure and Contractual Choice in Franchising
We develop a formal model to explain the existence of dual distribution in franchising by assuming variations in location profitability. We posit that location quality dictates the choice between franchising and company ownership. We analyze the contract choice problem when location quality is (1) private information for the franchisor; (2) private information for the franchisee, and (3) common knowledge. We show that (1) can result in the coexis…
Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity
On the Choice of Tenancy Contracts in Rural India
This paper uses data from rural India to analyse how cultivating household and plot level characteristics affect contract choice on a particular plot of land. We estimate a sequential choice model where the landowner first decides whether to cultivate the land on his own (possibly with hired labour) or to lease it out. If the latter, then a choice is made between fixed‐rent or share‐cropping. One interesting finding is that the greater the value …
Sharecropping contracts in rural India
In this article we examine the terms of sharecropping contracts using data from rural India. We examine the effect of - (1) the sharing of input costs between landlord and tenant; (2) the tenant's capacity to borrow; and (3) the existence of outside employment opportunities for the tenant — on the share parameter. We regress the share paid by the household on a set of cultivating household and village level characteristics and find that cost shar…
Talking Ourselves to Efficiency
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the…
The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology
Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology Predict Divergent Responses to Covid-19
Political conservatives' opposition to COVID-19 restrictions is puzzling given the well-documented links between conservatism and conformity, threat sensitivity, and pathogen aversion. We propose a resolution based on the Dual Foundations Theory of ideology, which holds that ideology comprises two dimensions, one reflecting trade-offs between threat-driven conformity and individualism, and another reflecting trade-offs between empathy-driven coop…
Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness
Belief heterogeneity and contributions decay among conditional cooperators in public goods games
What’s in a frame? Goal framing, trust and reciprocity
Time in Office and the Changing Gender Gap in Dishonesty
Increasing the share of women in politics is often promoted as a means to reduce corruption. Recent studies indicate the importance of considering the gender gap in corruption as a dynamic, rather than static, phenomenon. Our study combines data from surveys and incentivized behavioral games among 400 inexperienced and experienced local politicians in West Bengal, India. We find no gender gap in attitudes toward corruption. However, in incentiviz…
Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game
We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhi…
Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity
On the Choice of Tenancy Contracts in Rural India
This paper uses data from rural India to analyse how cultivating household and plot level characteristics affect contract choice on a particular plot of land. We estimate a sequential choice model where the landowner first decides whether to cultivate the land on his own (possibly with hired labour) or to lease it out. If the latter, then a choice is made between fixed‐rent or share‐cropping. One interesting finding is that the greater the value …
Sharecropping contracts in rural India
In this article we examine the terms of sharecropping contracts using data from rural India. We examine the effect of - (1) the sharing of input costs between landlord and tenant; (2) the tenant's capacity to borrow; and (3) the existence of outside employment opportunities for the tenant — on the share parameter. We regress the share paid by the household on a set of cultivating household and village level characteristics and find that cost shar…
Sharecropping contracts in rural India
In this article we examine the terms of sharecropping contracts using data from rural India. We examine the effect of - (1) the sharing of input costs between landlord and tenant; (2) the tenant's capacity to borrow; and (3) the existence of outside employment opportunities for the tenant — on the share parameter. We regress the share paid by the household on a set of cultivating household and village level characteristics and find that cost shar…
Information Structure and Contractual Choice in Franchising
We develop a formal model to explain the existence of dual distribution in franchising by assuming variations in location profitability. We posit that location quality dictates the choice between franchising and company ownership. We analyze the contract choice problem when location quality is (1) private information for the franchisor; (2) private information for the franchisee, and (3) common knowledge. We show that (1) can result in the coexis…
Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity
On the Choice of Tenancy Contracts in Rural India
This paper uses data from rural India to analyse how cultivating household and plot level characteristics affect contract choice on a particular plot of land. We estimate a sequential choice model where the landowner first decides whether to cultivate the land on his own (possibly with hired labour) or to lease it out. If the latter, then a choice is made between fixed‐rent or share‐cropping. One interesting finding is that the greater the value …
Trust and trustworthiness in a sequential bargaining game
We use a two‐person extensive form bargaining game to explore individuals' trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the ‘self‐interested’ outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But people with low‐trust scores often exhi…
Experiments in Economics
Are humans fair by nature? Why do we often willingly trust strangers or cooperate with them even if those actions leave us vulnerable to exploitation? Does this natural inclination towards fairness or trust have implications in the market-place? Traditional economic theory would perhaps think not, perceiving human interaction as self-interested at heart. There is increasing evidence however that social norms and norm-driven behaviour such as a pr…
Gender, Culture, and Corruption
A substantial body of recent research looks at differences in the behavior of men and women in diverse economic transactions. We contribute to this literature by investigating gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem. Our study departs from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using economic experiments. Based on data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta), and Sin…
Talking Ourselves to Efficiency
We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass on advice to their successors who take their place in the game. We conjectured that this inter-generational design might enable subjects to converge to the…
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments
I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are…
Gender differences in trust and trustworthiness
Team versus individual behavior in the minimum effort coordination game
What’s in a frame? Goal framing, trust and reciprocity
Belief heterogeneity and contributions decay among conditional cooperators in public goods games
The dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology
Dual Evolutionary Foundations of Political Ideology Predict Divergent Responses to Covid-19
Political conservatives' opposition to COVID-19 restrictions is puzzling given the well-documented links between conservatism and conformity, threat sensitivity, and pathogen aversion. We propose a resolution based on the Dual Foundations Theory of ideology, which holds that ideology comprises two dimensions, one reflecting trade-offs between threat-driven conformity and individualism, and another reflecting trade-offs between empathy-driven coop…
Time in Office and the Changing Gender Gap in Dishonesty
Increasing the share of women in politics is often promoted as a means to reduce corruption. Recent studies indicate the importance of considering the gender gap in corruption as a dynamic, rather than static, phenomenon. Our study combines data from surveys and incentivized behavioral games among 400 inexperienced and experienced local politicians in West Bengal, India. We find no gender gap in attitudes toward corruption. However, in incentiviz…
Prosocial Phenotype Predicts Political Views on Hierarchy and Redistribution 18 Months Later
Cross-sectional research has identified robust correlations between prosocial behavior in economic games and political views, but this research is limited in its ability to draw causal inferences. Here, we conducted a longitudinal cross-lagged panel study of prosociality and political views with a New Zealand sample ( n = 631). Across two waves separated by 18 months, we measured self-reported political views and employed a battery of economic ga…
Validation of the Mini‐Ipip6 Short‐Form Personality Inventory
This study validated the Mini‐IPIP6 short‐form measure of Honesty‐Humility to predict cooperative behaviour in online economic games. A subsample of participants from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study completed four online economic games for money, in addition to the Mini‐IPIP6 six‐factor personality inventory ( N = 979). Cooperative behaviour was modelled as a latent variable reflecting behaviour across the four games. Honesty‐Humility …
Selecting the ‘Best’? Competing Dimensions of Politician Quality in the Developing World
Evidence suggests that politicians in advanced democracies are positively selected on characteristics relevant to their suitability for political office. Whereas stereotypes abound, much less is known about the quality of politicians in developing countries. Drawing on unique experimental and survey data on village-level politicians in West Bengal, India, we find some evidence of positive selection into office: elected politicians are more educat…
The Dual Foundations of Political Ideology Are Ubiquitous across Human Social Life
Economics (14 obras) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (12 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Social Psychology (10 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Microeconomics (8 obras) · Social Psychology (8 obras) · Sociology (6 obras) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (5 obras) · Law (5 obras)