Terry Horgan
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3741799 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Terry Horgan |
| PRENOMES | Terry |
| SOBRENOME | Horgan |
| ASSINATURA | HORGAN T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Arizona |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3746-3813 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 11 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 16 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1996 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Naturally Free Action
Phenomenal Intentionality and Intentionality Holism
A number of philosophers, ourselves included, advocate the Phenomenal Intentionality thesis, which asserts that the fundamental kind of intentionality or aboutness is the intentionality of occurrent conscious states or processes. We take this to imply that phenomenal intentionality is both intrinsic and basic. We ourselves also maintain that phenomenal intentionality of the kind instantiated in humans can only occur within the context of a wider …
Expressing Gratitude as What’s Morally Expected
The Supervenient Causal Efficacy of Chromatically Illuminated Conscious Experience
In our work we have drawn attention to an aspect of conscious experience that we have labeled chromatic illumination, which consists of conscious appreciation of a large body of background information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We have also characterized the prototypica…
Chromatic Illumination
We argue that introspection reveals a ubiquitous aspect of conscious experience that hitherto has been largely unappreciated in philosophy of mind and in cognitive science: conscious appreciation of a large body of background information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We ca…
Pre-Reflective vs. Reflexive Self-Awareness
In this paper I propose an account pre-reflective self-awareness, both vis-à-vis onself and vis-à-vis one’s own phenomenally conscious mental states and processes. I argue that pre-reflective self-awareness is a form of acquaintance with oneself and with one’s phenomenal states that is distinctively direct in this sense: it is not mediated by mental representations of those states or of oneself. I also argue that there is an important kind of ref…
Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth
In his 2013 T heoria article, “Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin‐Earth Argument,” J orn S onderholm attempts to undermine our moral twin earth ( MTE ) argument against R ichard B oyd's moral semantics by debunking the semantic intuitions that are prompted by reflection on the thought experiment featured in the MTE argument. We divide our reply into three main sections. In section 1, we briefly review B oyd's moral semantics and…
Synchronic Bayesian updating and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Austere Realism
The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous commonsense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctedness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz Potrc argue that austere realism emerges naturally …
Metaethics after Moore
Presents sixteen essays that represent the work in metaethics after, and in some cases inspired by, the work of G E Moore. While normative ethics is concerned to answer first-order moral questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, metaethics is concerned to answer second-order non-moral questions about the semantics, and metaphysics
Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism
The Salem Witch Project
Biobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence
Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth
From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step
En años recientes, las defensas del realismo moral han adoptado lo que llamamos la “semántica moral de la nueva ola”, la cual analiza las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos morales tales como “bueno” y “correcto” semejantes a las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos para clases naturales en la ciencia, y se inspira también en temas funcionalistas de la filosofía de la mente. Este tipo de perspectiva semántica que encontramos…
Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism
Etude du rationalisme metaethique developpe par M. Smith dans son ouvrage intitule «The moral problem» (1994). Examinant la validite de l'analyse des raisons normatives chez Smith a la lumiere de la distinction entre rationalisme conceptuel et rationalisme substantif, l'A. montre que la theorie metaethique de Smith ne resout en rien le probleme moral qui consiste a reconcilier l'objectivite du discours moral avec la dimension pratique de la theor…
Synchronic Bayesian updating and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth
Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism
Etude du rationalisme metaethique developpe par M. Smith dans son ouvrage intitule «The moral problem» (1994). Examinant la validite de l'analyse des raisons normatives chez Smith a la lumiere de la distinction entre rationalisme conceptuel et rationalisme substantif, l'A. montre que la theorie metaethique de Smith ne resout en rien le probleme moral qui consiste a reconcilier l'objectivite du discours moral avec la dimension pratique de la theor…
From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step
En años recientes, las defensas del realismo moral han adoptado lo que llamamos la “semántica moral de la nueva ola”, la cual analiza las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos morales tales como “bueno” y “correcto” semejantes a las formas semánticas de funcionar de los términos para clases naturales en la ciencia, y se inspira también en temas funcionalistas de la filosofía de la mente. Este tipo de perspectiva semántica que encontramos…
Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism
Etude du rationalisme metaethique developpe par M. Smith dans son ouvrage intitule «The moral problem» (1994). Examinant la validite de l'analyse des raisons normatives chez Smith a la lumiere de la distinction entre rationalisme conceptuel et rationalisme substantif, l'A. montre que la theorie metaethique de Smith ne resout en rien le probleme moral qui consiste a reconcilier l'objectivite du discours moral avec la dimension pratique de la theor…
Biobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence
Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth
Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism
The Salem Witch Project
Metaethics after Moore
Presents sixteen essays that represent the work in metaethics after, and in some cases inspired by, the work of G E Moore. While normative ethics is concerned to answer first-order moral questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, metaethics is concerned to answer second-order non-moral questions about the semantics, and metaphysics
Synchronic Bayesian updating and the Sleeping Beauty problem
Austere Realism
The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous commonsense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctedness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz Potrc argue that austere realism emerges naturally …
Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth
In his 2013 T heoria article, “Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin‐Earth Argument,” J orn S onderholm attempts to undermine our moral twin earth ( MTE ) argument against R ichard B oyd's moral semantics by debunking the semantic intuitions that are prompted by reflection on the thought experiment featured in the MTE argument. We divide our reply into three main sections. In section 1, we briefly review B oyd's moral semantics and…
Pre-Reflective vs. Reflexive Self-Awareness
In this paper I propose an account pre-reflective self-awareness, both vis-à-vis onself and vis-à-vis one’s own phenomenally conscious mental states and processes. I argue that pre-reflective self-awareness is a form of acquaintance with oneself and with one’s phenomenal states that is distinctively direct in this sense: it is not mediated by mental representations of those states or of oneself. I also argue that there is an important kind of ref…
Chromatic Illumination
We argue that introspection reveals a ubiquitous aspect of conscious experience that hitherto has been largely unappreciated in philosophy of mind and in cognitive science: conscious appreciation of a large body of background information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We ca…
Expressing Gratitude as What’s Morally Expected
The Supervenient Causal Efficacy of Chromatically Illuminated Conscious Experience
In our work we have drawn attention to an aspect of conscious experience that we have labeled chromatic illumination, which consists of conscious appreciation of a large body of background information, and of the holistic relevance of this information to a cognitive task that is being consciously undertaken, without that information being represented by any conscious, occurrent, intentional mental state. We have also characterized the prototypica…
Phenomenal Intentionality and Intentionality Holism
A number of philosophers, ourselves included, advocate the Phenomenal Intentionality thesis, which asserts that the fundamental kind of intentionality or aboutness is the intentionality of occurrent conscious states or processes. We take this to imply that phenomenal intentionality is both intrinsic and basic. We ourselves also maintain that phenomenal intentionality of the kind instantiated in humans can only occur within the context of a wider …
Naturally Free Action
Epistemology (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Psychology (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 obras) · Cognitive psychology (3 obras) · Cognitive science (3 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras)