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Barry O''Neill

Dados Biográficos

ID3789701
NOMEBarry O''Neill
PRENOMESBarry
SOBRENOMEO''Neill
ASSINATURANEILL B O
VERIFICADONão
TOTAL DE OBRAS8
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES101
TOTAL COMO AUTOR8
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1986
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2018
ÍNDICE H4
  • International Negotiation

    Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2018•Citada por: 4•Referências: 76

    Negotiation is a central activity in international affairs, but it tends to be studied indirectly through particular cases. Considering it as a subject in itself brings out some important principles. The general literature on negotiation falls into five categories: advice from practitioners, studies of particular cases or contexts, statistical tests of data, psychological theories with experiments, and game theory models. Each approach complement…

  • Policy Legends and Folklists

    Gary Alan Fine, Barry O''Neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of American Folklore•2010•Citada por: 3•Referências: 14

    Although folklorists have seldom concentrated on politics, folklore thrives among decision-making elites and the politically aware citizenry. One genre is the "policy legend," a traditional text that describes institutions or social conditions, often in a historical frame, to call for governmental or collective action. Even though policy legends are typically transmitted in written form, they change continually, adapting to their political contex…

  • Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory

    Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2001•Citada por: 22•Referências: 30

    When international relations writers use the idea of risk aversion, they either leave it undefined or cite the economics conception, that the decision-maker has a concave utility function for the goal. However, in the international context the goal is typically not money or any other objectively measurable quantity, and in this case the concept of concavity is meaningless. This article gives two definitions of risk aversion that are "non-metric" …

  • Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Citada por: 41•Referências: 18

    The United Nations is under pressure to make the Security Council more representative of the membership. The formal literature on voting power has discovered much that can clarify this debate, and the present analysis gives a version of the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power that considers likely alliances based on voting in the General Assembly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Veto members occupying outlying positions, like China, have e…

  • Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam

    Bruce Russett, Barry O''Neill et al.•ARTICLE•Global Governance A Review of…•1996•Citada por: 4

  • Weak Models, Nil Hypotheses, And Decorative Statistics

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1995•Citada por: 1•Referências: 32

    Donald Green and Ian Shapiro contend that rational choice models have made negligible contributions to the empirical study of politics. Published tests systematically violate some basic research principles, they say, and they ascribe the problem to modelers' universalist aim of explaining all human behavior. This review critiques some of the authors' principles, which seem to derive from an extreme form of Popperianism combined with norms around …

  • A Measure for Crisis Instability with an Application to Space-Based Antimissile Systems

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1987•Citada por: 7•Referências: 13

    Crisis instability is the danger of war due to each side's fear that the other is about to attack. An index is defined to measure the degree of instability in a situation and is justified by a set of persuasive criteria that any such measure should satisfy, and also by a set of axioms based in the theory of games. Some past measures are summarized and compared. In the second part, we give a simple quantitative model of a nuclear exchange and look…

  • International Escalation and the Dollar Auction

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1986•Citada por: 19•Referências: 4

    Two players bid for a dollar on the condition that both the loser and the winner must pay the bids, although only the winner will receive the dollar. Collusion or threats are excluded; bids must be in units of nickels; and a player does not bid in a situation in which bidding and not bidding would lead to the same payoff. We derive a formula for the players' rational strategies, which implies, for example, that when both have $2.50 available, the…

  • Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Citada por: 41•Referências: 18

    The United Nations is under pressure to make the Security Council more representative of the membership. The formal literature on voting power has discovered much that can clarify this debate, and the present analysis gives a version of the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power that considers likely alliances based on voting in the General Assembly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Veto members occupying outlying positions, like China, have e…

  • Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory

    Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2001•Citada por: 22•Referências: 30

    When international relations writers use the idea of risk aversion, they either leave it undefined or cite the economics conception, that the decision-maker has a concave utility function for the goal. However, in the international context the goal is typically not money or any other objectively measurable quantity, and in this case the concept of concavity is meaningless. This article gives two definitions of risk aversion that are "non-metric" …

  • International Escalation and the Dollar Auction

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1986•Citada por: 19•Referências: 4

    Two players bid for a dollar on the condition that both the loser and the winner must pay the bids, although only the winner will receive the dollar. Collusion or threats are excluded; bids must be in units of nickels; and a player does not bid in a situation in which bidding and not bidding would lead to the same payoff. We derive a formula for the players' rational strategies, which implies, for example, that when both have $2.50 available, the…

  • A Measure for Crisis Instability with an Application to Space-Based Antimissile Systems

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1987•Citada por: 7•Referências: 13

    Crisis instability is the danger of war due to each side's fear that the other is about to attack. An index is defined to measure the degree of instability in a situation and is justified by a set of persuasive criteria that any such measure should satisfy, and also by a set of axioms based in the theory of games. Some past measures are summarized and compared. In the second part, we give a simple quantitative model of a nuclear exchange and look…

  • International Negotiation

    Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2018•Citada por: 4•Referências: 76

    Negotiation is a central activity in international affairs, but it tends to be studied indirectly through particular cases. Considering it as a subject in itself brings out some important principles. The general literature on negotiation falls into five categories: advice from practitioners, studies of particular cases or contexts, statistical tests of data, psychological theories with experiments, and game theory models. Each approach complement…

  • Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam

    Bruce Russett, Barry O''Neill et al.•ARTICLE•Global Governance A Review of…•1996•Citada por: 4

  • Policy Legends and Folklists

    Gary Alan Fine, Barry O''Neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of American Folklore•2010•Citada por: 3•Referências: 14

    Although folklorists have seldom concentrated on politics, folklore thrives among decision-making elites and the politically aware citizenry. One genre is the "policy legend," a traditional text that describes institutions or social conditions, often in a historical frame, to call for governmental or collective action. Even though policy legends are typically transmitted in written form, they change continually, adapting to their political contex…

  • Weak Models, Nil Hypotheses, And Decorative Statistics

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1995•Citada por: 1•Referências: 32

    Donald Green and Ian Shapiro contend that rational choice models have made negligible contributions to the empirical study of politics. Published tests systematically violate some basic research principles, they say, and they ascribe the problem to modelers' universalist aim of explaining all human behavior. This review critiques some of the authors' principles, which seem to derive from an extreme form of Popperianism combined with norms around …

  • International Escalation and the Dollar Auction

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1986•Citada por: 19•Referências: 4

    Two players bid for a dollar on the condition that both the loser and the winner must pay the bids, although only the winner will receive the dollar. Collusion or threats are excluded; bids must be in units of nickels; and a player does not bid in a situation in which bidding and not bidding would lead to the same payoff. We derive a formula for the players' rational strategies, which implies, for example, that when both have $2.50 available, the…

  • A Measure for Crisis Instability with an Application to Space-Based Antimissile Systems

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1987•Citada por: 7•Referências: 13

    Crisis instability is the danger of war due to each side's fear that the other is about to attack. An index is defined to measure the degree of instability in a situation and is justified by a set of persuasive criteria that any such measure should satisfy, and also by a set of axioms based in the theory of games. Some past measures are summarized and compared. In the second part, we give a simple quantitative model of a nuclear exchange and look…

  • Weak Models, Nil Hypotheses, And Decorative Statistics

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1995•Citada por: 1•Referências: 32

    Donald Green and Ian Shapiro contend that rational choice models have made negligible contributions to the empirical study of politics. Published tests systematically violate some basic research principles, they say, and they ascribe the problem to modelers' universalist aim of explaining all human behavior. This review critiques some of the authors' principles, which seem to derive from an extreme form of Popperianism combined with norms around …

  • Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council

    Open Access•Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996•Citada por: 41•Referências: 18

    The United Nations is under pressure to make the Security Council more representative of the membership. The formal literature on voting power has discovered much that can clarify this debate, and the present analysis gives a version of the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power that considers likely alliances based on voting in the General Assembly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Veto members occupying outlying positions, like China, have e…

  • Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam

    Bruce Russett, Barry O''Neill et al.•ARTICLE•Global Governance A Review of…•1996•Citada por: 4

  • Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory

    Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•International Studies Quarterly•2001•Citada por: 22•Referências: 30

    When international relations writers use the idea of risk aversion, they either leave it undefined or cite the economics conception, that the decision-maker has a concave utility function for the goal. However, in the international context the goal is typically not money or any other objectively measurable quantity, and in this case the concept of concavity is meaningless. This article gives two definitions of risk aversion that are "non-metric" …

  • Policy Legends and Folklists

    Gary Alan Fine, Barry O''Neill et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of American Folklore•2010•Citada por: 3•Referências: 14

    Although folklorists have seldom concentrated on politics, folklore thrives among decision-making elites and the politically aware citizenry. One genre is the "policy legend," a traditional text that describes institutions or social conditions, often in a historical frame, to call for governmental or collective action. Even though policy legends are typically transmitted in written form, they change continually, adapting to their political contex…

  • International Negotiation

    Barry O''Neill, Barry O’neill et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2018•Citada por: 4•Referências: 76

    Negotiation is a central activity in international affairs, but it tends to be studied indirectly through particular cases. Considering it as a subject in itself brings out some important principles. The general literature on negotiation falls into five categories: advice from practitioners, studies of particular cases or contexts, statistical tests of data, psychological theories with experiments, and game theory models. Each approach complement…

Economics (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Political science (6 obras) · Politics (5 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Epistemology (3 obras) · Positive economics (3 obras) · Context (archaeology (2 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (2 obras)

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