David Plunkett
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3873281 |
|---|---|
| NOME | David Plunkett |
| PRENOMES | David |
| SOBRENOME | Plunkett |
| ASSINATURA | PLUNKETT D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Dartmouth College |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 26 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 106 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 5 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Metalinguistic negotiation and matters of language
In previous work, we have developed the idea that, in some disputes, speakers appear to use (rather than mention) a term in order to put forward views about how that term should be used. We call such disputes “metalinguistic negotiations”. Herman Cappelen objects that our model of metalinguistic negotiation makes implausible predictions about what speakers really care about, and what kinds of issues they would take to settle their disputes. We hi…
Conceptual ethics, metaepistemology, and normative epistemology
This paper advertises the importance of distinguishing three different foundational projects about epistemic thought and talk, which we call “systematic normative epistemology”, “metaepistemology”, and “the conceptual ethics of epistemology”. We argue that these projects can be distinguished by their contrasting constitutive success conditions. This paper is motivated by the idea that the distinctions between these three projects matter for epist…
Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond
One important activity in conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering involves proposing to associate a new semantics with an existing word. Many philosophers think that one important way to evaluate such a proposal concerns whether it preserves the "topic" picked out by the existing word, and several have offered competing proposals concerning what is required to preserve topic. Our paper is focused on the conceptual ethics question of how conc…
Technology, Dwelling, and Nature as “Resource”
In his later work, such as “The Question Concerning Technology”, Martin Heidegger puts forward a critique of modern technology. Alongside this critique, Heidegger presents a kind of positive alternative through his discussion of “dwelling”. I put forward a reading of Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and his embrace of “dwelling”. On my reading, Heidegger’s thinking centers on the idea that modern technology’s form of “world-disclosure” p…
The varieties of idealization and the politics of economic growth
Are societies required to pursue continual economic growth as a matter of justice? In “The Value of Economic Growth”, Julie Rose considers three arguments in favor of the need for continual economic growth, each of which revolves around the instrumental value of economic growth for promoting an important good that is needed for a just society. In each case, Rose argues that there are mechanisms other than economic growth that could allow a societ…
Normative standards and the epistemology of conceptual ethics
This paper addresses an important but relatively unexplored question about the relationship between conceptual ethics and other philosophical inquiry: how does the epistemology of conceptual ethics relate to the epistemology of other, more “traditional” forms of philosophical inquiry? This paper takes as its foil the optimistic thought that the epistemology of conceptual ethics will be easier and less mysterious than relevant “traditional” philos…
Counterfactual genealogy and metaethics in Pettit’s The Birth of Ethics
One of the primary goals of Pettit’s The Birth of Ethics is to offer a novel defense of a form of naturalistic realism in metaethics, drawing on a kind of “counterfactual genealogy” for ethical thought and talk, in a community he dubs “Erewhon”. We argue that Pettit’s argument faces a deep dilemma. The dilemma begins by noting the reasonable controversy about which metaethical view is true of our ethical thought and talk. We then ask: is the thou…
The Ravens Paradox and negative existential judgments about evidence
In this paper, I provide a new argument in support of a concessive response to the Ravens Paradox. The argument I offer stems from Mark Schroeder's Gricean explanation for why existential judgments about normative reasons for action are unreliable. In short, I argue that Schroeder's work suggests that, in the case of the Ravens Paradox, people are running together the issue of what's assertible (in an ordinary context) about evidence with what's …
Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity
This paper argues for the value of distinguishing two projects concerning our normative and evaluative thought and talk, which we dub "metanormative inquiry" and "the conceptual ethics of normativity" respectively. The first half of the paper offers a substantive account of each project and of the relationship between them. Roughly, metanormative inquiry aims to understand actual normative and evaluative thought and talk, and what (if anything) i…
Philosophy and Climate Change
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with assessing representational devices such as concepts and words. Conceptual engineers looks for the problems with such devices and attempt to come up with ways of improving flawed concepts: they attempt to say how those concepts should be. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the possibility, benefits, problems, and applications of conceptual engineering and conceptual …
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
Debate
Dimensions of Normativity
Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity
In Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund considers a “variance thesis” about our most fundamental (and seemingly most “authoritative”) normative concepts. This thesis raises the threat of an alarming symmetry between different sets of normative concepts. If this symmetry holds, it would be incompatible with “ardent realism” about normativity. Eklund argues that the ardent realist should appeal to the idea of “referential normativity” in response to…
The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics
Routledge Handbook of Metaethics
Reasons Internalism
This chapter provides an overview of some key arguments on behalf of internalism and externalism, respectively. It looks at how the debate over internalism interacts with the debate over moral rationalism. Moral rationalism, is the view that morality necessarily provides normative reasons. The chapter also provides the discussion of moral rationalism as a general frame to discuss some of the major versions of internalism. Much of the critical dis…
Law, Morality, and Everything Else
In this article, we propose a novel account of general jurisprudence by situating it within the broader project of metanormative inquiry. We begin by showing how general jurisprudence is parallel to another well-known part of that project, namely, metaethics. We then argue that these projects all center on the same task: explaining how a certain part of thought, talk, and reality fits into reality overall. Metalegal inquiry aims to explain how le…
Negotiating the Meaning of “Law
One of the central debates in legal philosophy is the debate over legal positivism. Roughly, positivists say that law is ultimately grounded in social facts alone, whereas antipositivists say it is ultimately grounded in both social facts and moral facts. In this paper, I argue that philosophers involved in the dispute over legal positivism sometimes employ distinct concepts when they use the term “law” and pick out different things in the world …
Justice, Non-Human Animals, and the Methodology of Political Philosophy
One important trend in political philosophy is to hold that non-human animals don't directly place demands of justice on us. Another important trend is to give considerations of justice normative priority in our general normative theorising about social/political institutions. This situation is problematic, given the actual ethical standing of non-human animals. Either we need a theory of justice that gives facts about non-human animals a non-der…
Which Concepts Should We Use?
This paper is about philosophical disputes where the literal content of what speakers communicate concerns such object-level issues as ground, supervenience, or real definition. It is tempting to think that such disputes straightforwardly express disagreements about these topics. In contrast to this, I suggest that, in many such cases, the disagreement that is expressed is actually one about which concepts should be employed. I make this case as …
Conceptual Ethics I
Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call 'conceptual ethics'. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as funda…
The Planning Theory of Law I
This paper and its companion ("The Planning Theory of Law II: The Nature of Legal Norms") provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro's Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. This first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. The second concerns the account of legal norms
The Planning Theory of Law II
This paper and its companion ("The Planning Theory of Law I: The Nature of Legal Institutions") provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro's Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. The first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. This paper concerns the account of legal norms
Conceptual Ethics I
Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call 'conceptual ethics'. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as funda…
Conceptual Ethics II
Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call 'conceptual ethics'. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fund…
Law, Morality, and Everything Else
In this article, we propose a novel account of general jurisprudence by situating it within the broader project of metanormative inquiry. We begin by showing how general jurisprudence is parallel to another well-known part of that project, namely, metaethics. We then argue that these projects all center on the same task: explaining how a certain part of thought, talk, and reality fits into reality overall. Metalegal inquiry aims to explain how le…
Justice, Non-Human Animals, and the Methodology of Political Philosophy
One important trend in political philosophy is to hold that non-human animals don't directly place demands of justice on us. Another important trend is to give considerations of justice normative priority in our general normative theorising about social/political institutions. This situation is problematic, given the actual ethical standing of non-human animals. Either we need a theory of justice that gives facts about non-human animals a non-der…
Negotiating the Meaning of “Law
One of the central debates in legal philosophy is the debate over legal positivism. Roughly, positivists say that law is ultimately grounded in social facts alone, whereas antipositivists say it is ultimately grounded in both social facts and moral facts. In this paper, I argue that philosophers involved in the dispute over legal positivism sometimes employ distinct concepts when they use the term “law” and pick out different things in the world …
Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity
This paper argues for the value of distinguishing two projects concerning our normative and evaluative thought and talk, which we dub "metanormative inquiry" and "the conceptual ethics of normativity" respectively. The first half of the paper offers a substantive account of each project and of the relationship between them. Roughly, metanormative inquiry aims to understand actual normative and evaluative thought and talk, and what (if anything) i…
Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity
In Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund considers a “variance thesis” about our most fundamental (and seemingly most “authoritative”) normative concepts. This thesis raises the threat of an alarming symmetry between different sets of normative concepts. If this symmetry holds, it would be incompatible with “ardent realism” about normativity. Eklund argues that the ardent realist should appeal to the idea of “referential normativity” in response to…
Debate
Conceptual Ethics I
Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call 'conceptual ethics'. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as funda…
The Planning Theory of Law I
This paper and its companion ("The Planning Theory of Law II: The Nature of Legal Norms") provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro's Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. This first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. The second concerns the account of legal norms
The Planning Theory of Law II
This paper and its companion ("The Planning Theory of Law I: The Nature of Legal Institutions") provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro's Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. The first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. This paper concerns the account of legal norms
Conceptual Ethics II
Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call 'conceptual ethics'. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fund…
Which Concepts Should We Use?
This paper is about philosophical disputes where the literal content of what speakers communicate concerns such object-level issues as ground, supervenience, or real definition. It is tempting to think that such disputes straightforwardly express disagreements about these topics. In contrast to this, I suggest that, in many such cases, the disagreement that is expressed is actually one about which concepts should be employed. I make this case as …
Negotiating the Meaning of “Law
One of the central debates in legal philosophy is the debate over legal positivism. Roughly, positivists say that law is ultimately grounded in social facts alone, whereas antipositivists say it is ultimately grounded in both social facts and moral facts. In this paper, I argue that philosophers involved in the dispute over legal positivism sometimes employ distinct concepts when they use the term “law” and pick out different things in the world …
Justice, Non-Human Animals, and the Methodology of Political Philosophy
One important trend in political philosophy is to hold that non-human animals don't directly place demands of justice on us. Another important trend is to give considerations of justice normative priority in our general normative theorising about social/political institutions. This situation is problematic, given the actual ethical standing of non-human animals. Either we need a theory of justice that gives facts about non-human animals a non-der…
The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics
Routledge Handbook of Metaethics
Reasons Internalism
This chapter provides an overview of some key arguments on behalf of internalism and externalism, respectively. It looks at how the debate over internalism interacts with the debate over moral rationalism. Moral rationalism, is the view that morality necessarily provides normative reasons. The chapter also provides the discussion of moral rationalism as a general frame to discuss some of the major versions of internalism. Much of the critical dis…
Law, Morality, and Everything Else
In this article, we propose a novel account of general jurisprudence by situating it within the broader project of metanormative inquiry. We begin by showing how general jurisprudence is parallel to another well-known part of that project, namely, metaethics. We then argue that these projects all center on the same task: explaining how a certain part of thought, talk, and reality fits into reality overall. Metalegal inquiry aims to explain how le…
Dimensions of Normativity
Normative roles, conceptual variance, and ardent realism about normativity
In Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund considers a “variance thesis” about our most fundamental (and seemingly most “authoritative”) normative concepts. This thesis raises the threat of an alarming symmetry between different sets of normative concepts. If this symmetry holds, it would be incompatible with “ardent realism” about normativity. Eklund argues that the ardent realist should appeal to the idea of “referential normativity” in response to…
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
Conceptual engineering is a branch of philosophy that is concerned with assessing representational devices such as concepts and words. Conceptual engineers looks for the problems with such devices and attempt to come up with ways of improving flawed concepts: they attempt to say how those concepts should be. This is the first volume devoted entirely to the possibility, benefits, problems, and applications of conceptual engineering and conceptual …
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
Debate
Metaethics and the conceptual ethics of normativity
This paper argues for the value of distinguishing two projects concerning our normative and evaluative thought and talk, which we dub "metanormative inquiry" and "the conceptual ethics of normativity" respectively. The first half of the paper offers a substantive account of each project and of the relationship between them. Roughly, metanormative inquiry aims to understand actual normative and evaluative thought and talk, and what (if anything) i…
Philosophy and Climate Change
The Ravens Paradox and negative existential judgments about evidence
In this paper, I provide a new argument in support of a concessive response to the Ravens Paradox. The argument I offer stems from Mark Schroeder's Gricean explanation for why existential judgments about normative reasons for action are unreliable. In short, I argue that Schroeder's work suggests that, in the case of the Ravens Paradox, people are running together the issue of what's assertible (in an ordinary context) about evidence with what's …
Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond
One important activity in conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering involves proposing to associate a new semantics with an existing word. Many philosophers think that one important way to evaluate such a proposal concerns whether it preserves the "topic" picked out by the existing word, and several have offered competing proposals concerning what is required to preserve topic. Our paper is focused on the conceptual ethics question of how conc…
Technology, Dwelling, and Nature as “Resource”
In his later work, such as “The Question Concerning Technology”, Martin Heidegger puts forward a critique of modern technology. Alongside this critique, Heidegger presents a kind of positive alternative through his discussion of “dwelling”. I put forward a reading of Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and his embrace of “dwelling”. On my reading, Heidegger’s thinking centers on the idea that modern technology’s form of “world-disclosure” p…
The varieties of idealization and the politics of economic growth
Are societies required to pursue continual economic growth as a matter of justice? In “The Value of Economic Growth”, Julie Rose considers three arguments in favor of the need for continual economic growth, each of which revolves around the instrumental value of economic growth for promoting an important good that is needed for a just society. In each case, Rose argues that there are mechanisms other than economic growth that could allow a societ…
Normative standards and the epistemology of conceptual ethics
This paper addresses an important but relatively unexplored question about the relationship between conceptual ethics and other philosophical inquiry: how does the epistemology of conceptual ethics relate to the epistemology of other, more “traditional” forms of philosophical inquiry? This paper takes as its foil the optimistic thought that the epistemology of conceptual ethics will be easier and less mysterious than relevant “traditional” philos…
Counterfactual genealogy and metaethics in Pettit’s The Birth of Ethics
One of the primary goals of Pettit’s The Birth of Ethics is to offer a novel defense of a form of naturalistic realism in metaethics, drawing on a kind of “counterfactual genealogy” for ethical thought and talk, in a community he dubs “Erewhon”. We argue that Pettit’s argument faces a deep dilemma. The dilemma begins by noting the reasonable controversy about which metaethical view is true of our ethical thought and talk. We then ask: is the thou…
Metalinguistic negotiation and matters of language
In previous work, we have developed the idea that, in some disputes, speakers appear to use (rather than mention) a term in order to put forward views about how that term should be used. We call such disputes “metalinguistic negotiations”. Herman Cappelen objects that our model of metalinguistic negotiation makes implausible predictions about what speakers really care about, and what kinds of issues they would take to settle their disputes. We hi…
Epistemology (21 obras) · Sociology (19 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (14 obras) · Philosophy (14 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (13 obras) · Political science (12 obras) · Normative (10 obras) · Ethics in medical practice (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras)