Jennifer Nagel
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3873315 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jennifer Nagel |
| PRENOMES | Jennifer |
| SOBRENOME | Nagel |
| ASSINATURA | NAGEL J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Toronto |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0960-0497 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 73 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2006 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2021 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Mindreading in conversation
How is human social intelligence engaged in the course of ordinary conversation? Standard models of conversation hold that language production and comprehension are guided by constant, rapid inferences about what other agents have in mind. However, the idea that mindreading is a pervasive feature of conversation is challenged by a large body of evidence suggesting that mental state attribution is slow and taxing, at least when it deals with propo…
The Meanings of Metacognition
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions
Intuitions and Experiments
The Attitude of Knowledge
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism
Do we apply higher epistemic standards to subjects with high stakes? This paper argues that we expect different outward behavior from high-stakes subjects—for example, we expect them to collect more evidence than their low-stakes counterparts—but not because of any change in epistemic standards. Rather, we naturally expect subjects in any condition to think in a roughly adaptive manner, balancing the expected costs of additional evidence collecti…
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error
Epistemologists generally agree that the stringency of intuitive ascriptions of knowledge is increased when unrealized possibilities of error are mentioned. Non‐sceptical invariantists (Williamson, Hawthorne) think it a mistake to yield in such cases to the temptation to be more stringent, but they do not deny that we feel it. They contend that the temptation is best explained as the product of a psychological bias known as the availability heuri…
Epistemic Intuitions
We naturally evaluate the beliefs of others, sometimes by deliberate calculation, and sometimes in a more immediate fashion. Epistemic intuitions are immediate assessments arising when someone's condition appears to fall on one side or the other of some significant divide in epistemology. After giving a rough sketch of several major features of epistemic intuitions, this article reviews the history of the current philosophical debate about them a…
A Priori Justification
Book Review| April 01 2006 A Priori Justification Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. xiii + 249 pp. Jennifer Nagel Jennifer Nagel Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 251–255. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2005-018 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Jennifer Nagel; A Priori Justification. The Philos…
A Priori Justification
REVIEWS sciences but are multidisciplinary, and at least some of them are nevertheless legitimate questions.I have given only a selective indication of the book's contents and mer its; there is much more here of note than I have mentioned.Kornblith's discus sion is consistently clear, stimulating, witty, and well worthy of close study-the book is a pleasure to read.Kornblith successfully outlines a consistent natu ralistic position on knowledge, …
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism
Do we apply higher epistemic standards to subjects with high stakes? This paper argues that we expect different outward behavior from high-stakes subjects—for example, we expect them to collect more evidence than their low-stakes counterparts—but not because of any change in epistemic standards. Rather, we naturally expect subjects in any condition to think in a roughly adaptive manner, balancing the expected costs of additional evidence collecti…
Intuitions and Experiments
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error
Epistemologists generally agree that the stringency of intuitive ascriptions of knowledge is increased when unrealized possibilities of error are mentioned. Non‐sceptical invariantists (Williamson, Hawthorne) think it a mistake to yield in such cases to the temptation to be more stringent, but they do not deny that we feel it. They contend that the temptation is best explained as the product of a psychological bias known as the availability heuri…
Epistemic Intuitions
We naturally evaluate the beliefs of others, sometimes by deliberate calculation, and sometimes in a more immediate fashion. Epistemic intuitions are immediate assessments arising when someone's condition appears to fall on one side or the other of some significant divide in epistemology. After giving a rough sketch of several major features of epistemic intuitions, this article reviews the history of the current philosophical debate about them a…
The Meanings of Metacognition
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions
The Attitude of Knowledge
A Priori Justification
Book Review| April 01 2006 A Priori Justification Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. xiii + 249 pp. Jennifer Nagel Jennifer Nagel Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (2): 251–255. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2005-018 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Jennifer Nagel; A Priori Justification. The Philos…
A Priori Justification
REVIEWS sciences but are multidisciplinary, and at least some of them are nevertheless legitimate questions.I have given only a selective indication of the book's contents and mer its; there is much more here of note than I have mentioned.Kornblith's discus sion is consistently clear, stimulating, witty, and well worthy of close study-the book is a pleasure to read.Kornblith successfully outlines a consistent natu ralistic position on knowledge, …
Epistemic Intuitions
We naturally evaluate the beliefs of others, sometimes by deliberate calculation, and sometimes in a more immediate fashion. Epistemic intuitions are immediate assessments arising when someone's condition appears to fall on one side or the other of some significant divide in epistemology. After giving a rough sketch of several major features of epistemic intuitions, this article reviews the history of the current philosophical debate about them a…
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism
Do we apply higher epistemic standards to subjects with high stakes? This paper argues that we expect different outward behavior from high-stakes subjects—for example, we expect them to collect more evidence than their low-stakes counterparts—but not because of any change in epistemic standards. Rather, we naturally expect subjects in any condition to think in a roughly adaptive manner, balancing the expected costs of additional evidence collecti…
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error
Epistemologists generally agree that the stringency of intuitive ascriptions of knowledge is increased when unrealized possibilities of error are mentioned. Non‐sceptical invariantists (Williamson, Hawthorne) think it a mistake to yield in such cases to the temptation to be more stringent, but they do not deny that we feel it. They contend that the temptation is best explained as the product of a psychological bias known as the availability heuri…
Intuitions and Experiments
The Attitude of Knowledge
Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions
The Meanings of Metacognition
Mindreading in conversation
How is human social intelligence engaged in the course of ordinary conversation? Standard models of conversation hold that language production and comprehension are guided by constant, rapid inferences about what other agents have in mind. However, the idea that mindreading is a pervasive feature of conversation is challenged by a large body of evidence suggesting that mental state attribution is slow and taxing, at least when it deals with propo…
Epistemology (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 obras) · Computer Science (6 obras) · Citation (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Library science (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 obras)