Nicholas Unwin
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3873407 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Nicholas Unwin |
| PRENOMES | Nicholas |
| SOBRENOME | Unwin |
| ASSINATURA | UNWIN N |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Lancaster University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8245-3171 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 7 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 17 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1981 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2020 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Continuants, identity and essentialism
The question of whether it is permissible to quantify into a modal context is re-examined from an empiricist perspective. Following Wiggins, it is argued that an ontology of continuants implies essentialism, but it is also argued, against Wiggins, that the only conception of necessity that we need to start out with is that of analyticity. Essentialism, of a limited kind, can then be actually generated from this. An exceptionally fine-grained iden…
Transitivity and the ontology of causation
It is argued that it is very hard to analyse causation in such a way that prevents everything from causing everything else. This is particularly true if we assume that the causal relation is transitive, for it all too often happens that causal chains that we wish to keep separate pass through common intermediate events. It is also argued that treating causes as aspects of events, rather than the events themselves, will not solve this problem. Thi…
Divine Hoorays
Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God’s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on God’s. Ostensibly, such views are incompatible. However, we shall argue that a rapprochement is possible and beneficial to both sides. Expressivists need to explain the difference between reporting and expres…
Norms and Negation
All expressivist theories, including Gibbard's norm‐expressivism, require a solution to the ‘Frege–Geach problem’, or ‘embedding problem’. This is the problem of accounting for the fact that normative predicates can enter into indefinitely many complex contexts without changing their meanings. I argue that Gibbard's well known solution fails. The chief difficulty is with negated contexts, specifically the distinction between refusing to accept a …
Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem
Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I sh…
Sonata No.2
Objects and Identity
Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem
Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I sh…
Norms and Negation
All expressivist theories, including Gibbard's norm‐expressivism, require a solution to the ‘Frege–Geach problem’, or ‘embedding problem’. This is the problem of accounting for the fact that normative predicates can enter into indefinitely many complex contexts without changing their meanings. I argue that Gibbard's well known solution fails. The chief difficulty is with negated contexts, specifically the distinction between refusing to accept a …
Objects and Identity
Sonata No.2
Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem
Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I sh…
Norms and Negation
All expressivist theories, including Gibbard's norm‐expressivism, require a solution to the ‘Frege–Geach problem’, or ‘embedding problem’. This is the problem of accounting for the fact that normative predicates can enter into indefinitely many complex contexts without changing their meanings. I argue that Gibbard's well known solution fails. The chief difficulty is with negated contexts, specifically the distinction between refusing to accept a …
Divine Hoorays
Divine law theories of metaethics claim that moral rightness is grounded in God’s commands, wishes and so forth. Expressivist theories, by contrast, claim that to call something morally right is to express our own attitudes, not to report on God’s. Ostensibly, such views are incompatible. However, we shall argue that a rapprochement is possible and beneficial to both sides. Expressivists need to explain the difference between reporting and expres…
Transitivity and the ontology of causation
It is argued that it is very hard to analyse causation in such a way that prevents everything from causing everything else. This is particularly true if we assume that the causal relation is transitive, for it all too often happens that causal chains that we wish to keep separate pass through common intermediate events. It is also argued that treating causes as aspects of events, rather than the events themselves, will not solve this problem. Thi…
Continuants, identity and essentialism
The question of whether it is permissible to quantify into a modal context is re-examined from an empiricist perspective. Following Wiggins, it is argued that an ontology of continuants implies essentialism, but it is also argued, against Wiggins, that the only conception of necessity that we need to start out with is that of analyticity. Essentialism, of a limited kind, can then be actually generated from this. An exceptionally fine-grained iden…
Epistemology (5 obras) · Philosophy (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 obras) · Expressivism (2 obras) · Linguistics (2 obras) · Negation (2 obras) · Ontology (2 obras)