Rosa Cao
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3874117 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Rosa Cao |
| PRENOMES | Rosa |
| SOBRENOME | Cao |
| ASSINATURA | CAO R |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Stanford University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1726-477X |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 20 |
| OBRAS COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| OBRAS COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2014 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Mental representation, “standing-in-for”, and internal models
Talk of ”mental representations” is ubiquitous in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science. A slogan common to many different approaches says that representations ”stand in for” the things they represent. We argue that this slogan is either false or uninformative. We then offer a new slogan that aims to do better. The new slogan ties the role of representations to the cognitive role played by the deliverances of perception. After…
Assessing the landscape of representational concepts
On the basis of a series of surveys targeting neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, Favela and Machery raise concerns about the conceptual messiness around what counts as a representation . I propose some alternative explanations for the pattern of responses elicited by the surveys, arguing that the way “representation” is used in the wild may turn out to be more disciplined than it initially appears—and then offer a brief catalog of …
Neural decoding, the Atlantis machine, and zombies
Neural decoding studies seem to show that the “private” experiences of others are more accessible than philosophers have traditionally believed. While these studies have many limitations, they do demonstrate that by capturing patterns in brain activity, we can discover a great deal about what a subject is experiencing. We present a thought experiment about a super‐decoder — the Atlantis machine — and argue that given plausible assumptions, an Atl…
Putting representations to use
Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism
New Labels for Old Ideas
Crowding out Memetic Explanation
Memes have been proposed to explain wide swathes of human culture and language use. I argue that what is really doing the explanatory work in many of these cases is a basic mechanism of information transmission, which is distinct from memetic evolution by natural selection in significant ways. Perhaps the most significant of these is that information transmission depends primarily on the interests of the users of information, rather than the repr…
Content in Simple Signalling Systems
Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of…
Signaling in the Brain
What are the functional units of the brain? If the function of the brain is to process information-carrying signals, then the functional units will be the senders and receivers of those signals. Neurons have been the default candidate, with action potentials as the signals. But there are alternatives: synapses fit the action potential picture more cleanly, and glial activities (e.g., in astrocytes) might also be characterized as signaling. Are sy…
Content in Simple Signalling Systems
Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of…
Putting representations to use
Signaling in the Brain
What are the functional units of the brain? If the function of the brain is to process information-carrying signals, then the functional units will be the senders and receivers of those signals. Neurons have been the default candidate, with action potentials as the signals. But there are alternatives: synapses fit the action potential picture more cleanly, and glial activities (e.g., in astrocytes) might also be characterized as signaling. Are sy…
Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism
Signaling in the Brain
What are the functional units of the brain? If the function of the brain is to process information-carrying signals, then the functional units will be the senders and receivers of those signals. Neurons have been the default candidate, with action potentials as the signals. But there are alternatives: synapses fit the action potential picture more cleanly, and glial activities (e.g., in astrocytes) might also be characterized as signaling. Are sy…
Content in Simple Signalling Systems
Our understanding of communication and its evolution has advanced significantly through the study of simple models involving interacting senders and receivers of signals. Many theorists have thought that the resources of mathematical information theory are all that are needed to capture the meaning or content that is being communicated in these systems. However, the way theorists routinely talk about the models implicitly draws on a conception of…
New Labels for Old Ideas
Crowding out Memetic Explanation
Memes have been proposed to explain wide swathes of human culture and language use. I argue that what is really doing the explanatory work in many of these cases is a basic mechanism of information transmission, which is distinct from memetic evolution by natural selection in significant ways. Perhaps the most significant of these is that information transmission depends primarily on the interests of the users of information, rather than the repr…
Putting representations to use
Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism
Neural decoding, the Atlantis machine, and zombies
Neural decoding studies seem to show that the “private” experiences of others are more accessible than philosophers have traditionally believed. While these studies have many limitations, they do demonstrate that by capturing patterns in brain activity, we can discover a great deal about what a subject is experiencing. We present a thought experiment about a super‐decoder — the Atlantis machine — and argue that given plausible assumptions, an Atl…
Mental representation, “standing-in-for”, and internal models
Talk of ”mental representations” is ubiquitous in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science. A slogan common to many different approaches says that representations ”stand in for” the things they represent. We argue that this slogan is either false or uninformative. We then offer a new slogan that aims to do better. The new slogan ties the role of representations to the cognitive role played by the deliverances of perception. After…
Assessing the landscape of representational concepts
On the basis of a series of surveys targeting neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, Favela and Machery raise concerns about the conceptual messiness around what counts as a representation . I propose some alternative explanations for the pattern of responses elicited by the surveys, arguing that the way “representation” is used in the wild may turn out to be more disciplined than it initially appears—and then offer a brief catalog of …
Psychology (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Epistemology (8 obras) · Cognitive science (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (5 obras) · Cognition (4 obras) · Cognitive psychology (4 obras) · Neural dynamics and brain function (4 obras) · Neuroscience (4 obras)