Matthew J Barker
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3874263 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Matthew J Barker |
| PRENOMES | Matthew J |
| SOBRENOME | Barker |
| ASSINATURA | BARKER M J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Concordia University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 21 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1981 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
The chemical element category and classificatory norms
Eliminative Pluralism and Integrative Alternatives
Pluralisms of various sorts are popular in philosophy of science, including those that imply some scientific concept x should be eliminated from science in favour of a plurality of (typically more specific) concepts x1, x2, ... xn. This article focuses on influential and representative arguments for such eliminative pluralism about the concept species. The main conclusions are that these arguments fail, that all other extant arguments also fail, …
Environmentally Virtuous Agriculture
Biological explanations, realism, ontology, and categories (Reviewing J. Dupré, Processes of life
Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups
We reject a widespread objectivism about kinds of evolutionary groups in favor of a new conventionalism. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This novel pluralism underlies almost any single evolutionary group concept, unlike familiar pluralisms claiming that multiple concepts of certain sorts are legitimate. Consequently, we must help obje…
Specious Intrinsicalism
Over the last 2,300 years or so, many philosophers have believed that species are individuated by essences that are at least in part intrinsic. Psychologists tell us most folks also believe this view. But most philosophers of biology have abandoned the view, in light of evolutionary conceptions of species. In defiance, Michael Devitt has attempted in this journal to resurrect a version of the view, which he calls Intrinsic Biological Essentialism…
When Traditional Essentialism Fails
Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this vie…
The Empirical Inadequacy of Species Cohesion by Gene Flow
This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed
A Primary Prevention Programme for Migrant Children in a Queensland High School
Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups
We reject a widespread objectivism about kinds of evolutionary groups in favor of a new conventionalism. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This novel pluralism underlies almost any single evolutionary group concept, unlike familiar pluralisms claiming that multiple concepts of certain sorts are legitimate. Consequently, we must help obje…
Specious Intrinsicalism
Over the last 2,300 years or so, many philosophers have believed that species are individuated by essences that are at least in part intrinsic. Psychologists tell us most folks also believe this view. But most philosophers of biology have abandoned the view, in light of evolutionary conceptions of species. In defiance, Michael Devitt has attempted in this journal to resurrect a version of the view, which he calls Intrinsic Biological Essentialism…
The Empirical Inadequacy of Species Cohesion by Gene Flow
This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed
Eliminative Pluralism and Integrative Alternatives
Pluralisms of various sorts are popular in philosophy of science, including those that imply some scientific concept x should be eliminated from science in favour of a plurality of (typically more specific) concepts x1, x2, ... xn. This article focuses on influential and representative arguments for such eliminative pluralism about the concept species. The main conclusions are that these arguments fail, that all other extant arguments also fail, …
Biological explanations, realism, ontology, and categories (Reviewing J. Dupré, Processes of life
A Primary Prevention Programme for Migrant Children in a Queensland High School
When Traditional Essentialism Fails
Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this vie…
The Empirical Inadequacy of Species Cohesion by Gene Flow
This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed
Specious Intrinsicalism
Over the last 2,300 years or so, many philosophers have believed that species are individuated by essences that are at least in part intrinsic. Psychologists tell us most folks also believe this view. But most philosophers of biology have abandoned the view, in light of evolutionary conceptions of species. In defiance, Michael Devitt has attempted in this journal to resurrect a version of the view, which he calls Intrinsic Biological Essentialism…
Biological explanations, realism, ontology, and categories (Reviewing J. Dupré, Processes of life
Deep Conventionalism about Evolutionary Groups
We reject a widespread objectivism about kinds of evolutionary groups in favor of a new conventionalism. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This novel pluralism underlies almost any single evolutionary group concept, unlike familiar pluralisms claiming that multiple concepts of certain sorts are legitimate. Consequently, we must help obje…
Environmentally Virtuous Agriculture
Eliminative Pluralism and Integrative Alternatives
Pluralisms of various sorts are popular in philosophy of science, including those that imply some scientific concept x should be eliminated from science in favour of a plurality of (typically more specific) concepts x1, x2, ... xn. This article focuses on influential and representative arguments for such eliminative pluralism about the concept species. The main conclusions are that these arguments fail, that all other extant arguments also fail, …
The chemical element category and classificatory norms
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 obras) · Law (3 obras) · Political science (3 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 obras) · Biology (2 obras) · Essentialism (2 obras)