Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3973629 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen |
| PRENOMES | Toni |
| SOBRENOME | Ronnow-Rasmussen |
| ASSINATURA | RØNNOW-RASMUSSEN T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Lund University |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 11 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 28 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 4 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2000 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2018 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Exploring Practical Philosophy
Selection of articles by leading international philosophers: Roger Crisp, Fred Feldman, Göran Hermerén, Derek Parfit, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Michael Smith, Paul Snowdon, Galen Strawson, Larry S. Temkin, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Michael J. Zimmerman. Published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.
Exploring Practical Philosophy
Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that wh…
For Kevin’s Sake
Motivation and Motivating Reason
Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to appear at the outset as incomprehensible. The next step is then to add some further details about the agent — typically some information about his or her beliefs and desires — providing some sort of explanation of the agent’s p…
Types of Value
This chapter introduces some contrasting notions of value, in particular final intrinsic and final extrinsic value. G. E. Moore's views on value, as well as his so‐called isolation test, are discussed. It is explained why this test might have done more bad than good to value theory. The chapter also examines the common claim that values are supervenient features. Supervenience is one of the key elements which this work employs in order to underst…
Personal Value
RÃ ̧nnow-Rasmussen examines the notion of 'good-for', and provides a new analysis of personal value that justifies its inclusion within our classical value taxonomy
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy)
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that al…
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of t…
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value
Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers
A Distinction in Value
The paper argues that the final value of an object—i.e., its value for its own sake—need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved…
Personal Value
RÃ ̧nnow-Rasmussen examines the notion of 'good-for', and provides a new analysis of personal value that justifies its inclusion within our classical value taxonomy
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of t…
A Distinction in Value
The paper argues that the final value of an object—i.e., its value for its own sake—need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved…
Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy)
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that al…
Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons
The 'buck-passing' account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of t…
Types of Value
This chapter introduces some contrasting notions of value, in particular final intrinsic and final extrinsic value. G. E. Moore's views on value, as well as his so‐called isolation test, are discussed. It is explained why this test might have done more bad than good to value theory. The chapter also examines the common claim that values are supervenient features. Supervenience is one of the key elements which this work employs in order to underst…
Personal Value
RÃ ̧nnow-Rasmussen examines the notion of 'good-for', and provides a new analysis of personal value that justifies its inclusion within our classical value taxonomy
Motivation and Motivating Reason
Philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to appear at the outset as incomprehensible. The next step is then to add some further details about the agent — typically some information about his or her beliefs and desires — providing some sort of explanation of the agent’s p…
For Kevin’s Sake
Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that wh…
Exploring Practical Philosophy
Selection of articles by leading international philosophers: Roger Crisp, Fred Feldman, Göran Hermerén, Derek Parfit, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Michael Smith, Paul Snowdon, Galen Strawson, Larry S. Temkin, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Michael J. Zimmerman. Published in honour of Ingmar Persson on his fiftieth birthday.
Exploring Practical Philosophy
Epistemology (10 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 obras) · Mathematics (6 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Psychology (4 obras) · Computer Science (3 obras) · Environmental ethics (3 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras)