Vladimir Krstić
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3985161 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Vladimir Krstić |
| PRENOMES | Vladimir |
| SOBRENOME | Krstić |
| ASSINATURA | KRSTIC V |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Nazarbayev University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1953-2675 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 15 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 0 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2019 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 0 |
In Defence of Oblique Intention
Recent work on lying has revived an old action‐theoretic category: oblique, or indirect, intention. I argue that some liars intend deception obliquely. Sneddon objects that this category is drastic and unjustified: it counts all foreseen side‐effects as intended. My response is that oblique intention is not mere foresight. It applies only where an agent foresees an unwanted effect, could avoid it by abandoning or altering the relevant course of a…
In Defence of a Functional Analysis of Deception
A Functional Analysis of Self-Deception
Our received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act (sub-)intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally and unknowingly. Some non-traditionalists even say that self-deception involves a mer…
We Should Move on from Signalling-Based Analyses of Biological Deception
On the connection between lying, asserting, and intending to cause beliefs
A Functional Analysis of Human Deception
A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are no…
Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True
Bald-Faced Lies, Blushing, and Noses that Grow
Bald-faced lying to institutions
Lying to others, lying to yourself, and literal self-deception
This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confident…
Sworn Virgins of the Balkan Highlands
Once widely spread in the Dinaric Mountains part of the Balkan Peninsula swearing to virginity was a social and cultural custom recorded among all groups inhabiting the area. In the absence of a capable adult man in the household, a daughter would take over his social role by ‘becoming’ a man. The standard explanation is that the function of this practice is enabling the continuation of the household’s economic, social, and religious activities. …
On the function of self‐deception
Self‐deception makes best sense as a self‐defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self‐deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self‐deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal be…
Lying, Tell-Tale Signs, and Intending to Deceive
Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e., knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g., blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies…
On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann
In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not…
Lost in Machine Translation
The article considers the issues related to the semantic, grammatical, stylistic and technical difficulties currently present in machine translation and compares its four main approaches: Rule-based (RBMT), Corpora-based (CBMT), Neural (NMT), and Hybrid (HMT). It also examines some "open systems", which allow the correction or augmentation of content by the users themselves ("crowdsourced translation"). The authors of the article, native speakers…
Sem obras proeminentes nesta página.
Lost in Machine Translation
The article considers the issues related to the semantic, grammatical, stylistic and technical difficulties currently present in machine translation and compares its four main approaches: Rule-based (RBMT), Corpora-based (CBMT), Neural (NMT), and Hybrid (HMT). It also examines some "open systems", which allow the correction or augmentation of content by the users themselves ("crowdsourced translation"). The authors of the article, native speakers…
On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann
In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not…
On the function of self‐deception
Self‐deception makes best sense as a self‐defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self‐deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self‐deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal be…
Lying, Tell-Tale Signs, and Intending to Deceive
Arguably, the existence of bald-faced (i.e., knowingly undisguised) lies entails that not all lies are intended to deceive. Two kinds of bald-faced lies exist in the literature: those based on some common knowledge that implies that you are lying and those that involve tell-tale signs (e.g., blushing) that show that you are lying. I designed the tell-tale sign bald-faced lies to avoid objections raised against the common knowledge bald-faced lies…
Sworn Virgins of the Balkan Highlands
Once widely spread in the Dinaric Mountains part of the Balkan Peninsula swearing to virginity was a social and cultural custom recorded among all groups inhabiting the area. In the absence of a capable adult man in the household, a daughter would take over his social role by ‘becoming’ a man. The standard explanation is that the function of this practice is enabling the continuation of the household’s economic, social, and religious activities. …
Lying to others, lying to yourself, and literal self-deception
This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confident…
A Functional Analysis of Human Deception
A satisfactory analysis of human deception must rule out cases where it is a mistake or an accident that person B was misled by person A's behavior. Therefore, most scholars think that deceivers must intend to deceive. This article argues that there is a better solution: rather than appealing to the deceiver's intentions, we should appeal to the function of their behavior. After all, animals and plants engage in deception, and most of them are no…
Lying by Asserting What You Believe is True
Bald-Faced Lies, Blushing, and Noses that Grow
Bald-faced lying to institutions
A Functional Analysis of Self-Deception
Our received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act (sub-)intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally and unknowingly. Some non-traditionalists even say that self-deception involves a mer…
We Should Move on from Signalling-Based Analyses of Biological Deception
On the connection between lying, asserting, and intending to cause beliefs
In Defence of Oblique Intention
Recent work on lying has revived an old action‐theoretic category: oblique, or indirect, intention. I argue that some liars intend deception obliquely. Sneddon objects that this category is drastic and unjustified: it counts all foreseen side‐effects as intended. My response is that oblique intention is not mere foresight. It applies only where an agent foresees an unwanted effect, could avoid it by abandoning or altering the relevant course of a…
In Defence of a Functional Analysis of Deception
Deception (10 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Epistemology (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (9 obras) · Lying (8 obras) · Social Psychology (8 obras) · Deception detection and forensic psychology (5 obras) · Misinformation and Its Impacts (4 obras)