Robert L Oldham
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4247808 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Robert L Oldham |
| PRENOMES | Robert L |
| SOBRENOME | Oldham |
| ASSINATURA | OLDHAM R L |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Princeton University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5761-3081 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
The Senate Sandbox
Political science educators must take innovative approaches to respond to twenty-first-century classroom challenges. Simulation-based pedagogy can foster deep student engagement while developing strong peer relationships, encouraging empathy, and improving professional skills. There are many ways, however, to conduct simulations in political science courses. We argue that open-ended, multi-week simulations in which students participate as relativ…
When Politics Is Not Pivotal
The 60‐vote end‐debate threshold is a key institution in the United States Senate. Most winning coalitions require 60 votes, effectively giving veto power to a minority of senators. But do supermajority debate rules necessarily translate into minority veto power? We examine this in state legislatures, where there is far more variation in whether chamber rules require a majority or a supermajority of legislators to cut off debate. Across multiple …
On the Congress Beat
Scholars have long criticized media coverage of Congress for its focus on conflict over policy substance. To uncover the drivers of this focus, we examine news coverage of the congressional response to COVID-19. We select the COVID-19 response as an extreme case of Congress coalescing quickly to address a major national crisis in an almost entirely bipartisan way. Our study confirms prior research documenting a media preference for conflict narra…
Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes
It is often argued that bipartisan lawmaking depends on minority legislative parties controlling institutional veto points through divided government and/or supermajority pivots. Using a new dataset of state legislative rollcall votes on tax increases—an issue where states vary in whether they require majority or supermajority votes—I assess (1) whether minority control of veto points is necessary for bipartisan policymaking and (2) whether there…
Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes
It is often argued that bipartisan lawmaking depends on minority legislative parties controlling institutional veto points through divided government and/or supermajority pivots. Using a new dataset of state legislative rollcall votes on tax increases—an issue where states vary in whether they require majority or supermajority votes—I assess (1) whether minority control of veto points is necessary for bipartisan policymaking and (2) whether there…
On the Congress Beat
Scholars have long criticized media coverage of Congress for its focus on conflict over policy substance. To uncover the drivers of this focus, we examine news coverage of the congressional response to COVID-19. We select the COVID-19 response as an extreme case of Congress coalescing quickly to address a major national crisis in an almost entirely bipartisan way. Our study confirms prior research documenting a media preference for conflict narra…
Partisan Governance and Minority Party Vetoes
It is often argued that bipartisan lawmaking depends on minority legislative parties controlling institutional veto points through divided government and/or supermajority pivots. Using a new dataset of state legislative rollcall votes on tax increases—an issue where states vary in whether they require majority or supermajority votes—I assess (1) whether minority control of veto points is necessary for bipartisan policymaking and (2) whether there…
When Politics Is Not Pivotal
The 60‐vote end‐debate threshold is a key institution in the United States Senate. Most winning coalitions require 60 votes, effectively giving veto power to a minority of senators. But do supermajority debate rules necessarily translate into minority veto power? We examine this in state legislatures, where there is far more variation in whether chamber rules require a majority or a supermajority of legislators to cut off debate. Across multiple …
On the Congress Beat
Scholars have long criticized media coverage of Congress for its focus on conflict over policy substance. To uncover the drivers of this focus, we examine news coverage of the congressional response to COVID-19. We select the COVID-19 response as an extreme case of Congress coalescing quickly to address a major national crisis in an almost entirely bipartisan way. Our study confirms prior research documenting a media preference for conflict narra…
The Senate Sandbox
Political science educators must take innovative approaches to respond to twenty-first-century classroom challenges. Simulation-based pedagogy can foster deep student engagement while developing strong peer relationships, encouraging empathy, and improving professional skills. There are many ways, however, to conduct simulations in political science courses. We argue that open-ended, multi-week simulations in which students participate as relativ…
Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 obras) · Legislature (3 obras) · Political science (3 obras) · Politics (3 obras) · Public Administration (3 obras) · Economics (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law (2 obras) · Law and economics (2 obras) · Political economy (2 obras)