Christel Koop
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4265128 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Christel Koop |
| PRENOMES | Christel |
| SOBRENOME | Koop |
| ASSINATURA | KOOP C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7125-6439 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 33 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 770 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 33 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1983 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 17 |
In the shadow of the European Council
The European Council regularly intervenes in everyday law-making by expressing legislative priorities in summit conclusions. We theorise and analyse the impact of these priorities on the duration of the EU’s co-decision (or ordinary legislative) procedure. Theoretically, we argue that the European Council increases speed through leadership. Leadership translates, via political authority, into limited hierarchical relations between the national he…
Technocrats, Reputation, and Responsiveness in Policy Explanation
In contemporary democracies, independent technocratic bodies take many key policy decisions. The organizations are meant to avoid traditional policy responsiveness, but still have processes in place to take into account societal views. Our study analyzes how pressure on technocratic bodies affects the audience orientation of their policy explanations. Taking a reputational perspective, we argue that the policy explanations provided by technocrats…
Digital practices for consumer e-participation in economic regulation and the role of organisational capacity
How do national regulatory agencies (NRAs) use digital practices to empower consumers for e-participation in regulatory processes? To address this question, we designed a novel framework to comprehensively capture digital practices adopted by NRAs across the key regulatory procedures, including consumer information provision, communication, education, and rule-making, which we conceptualise as two-way relational mechanisms. To measure the scope o…
Exploring the potential and limits of digital tools for inclusive regulatory engagement with citizens
Over the past decade, independent regulatory agencies like competition authorities, water and energy regulators have increasingly turned to citizen engagement, including via digital channels. In this study, we seek to shed light on the potential and limits of economic regulators' digital engagement with citizens, compared to traditional, non-digital equivalents. More specifically, we analyse the costs and benefits of four prominent (digital) enga…
Non‐majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability
As non‐majoritarian institutions are deliberately insulated from electoral pressure and ministerial hierarchy, they face an accountability deficit. This deficit can be reduced by embedding the organizations in a wider accountability landscape with multiple forums. Of particular relevance in this landscape are the news media, who may not only serve as account‐holders, but can also reinforce other forms of accountability. Yet, we know little about …
How do the media scrutinise central banking? Evidence from the Bank of England
Central bank independence has raised questions of accountability ever since its global diffusion in the 1990s, and especially since the financial crisis. Yet, whilst the literature on central banks’ legislative oversight has expanded, the role of the media as account holders has been left largely unexplored. We assess media scrutiny by using an original dataset of news articles about the Bank of England published between 1997 and 2020, and by ana…
Agenda‐setting under pressure
The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's ‘electorally connected’ institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non‐majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda‐setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation o…
Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies
Regulatory independence has become an international norm over the past decades. Yet, governments in some emerging and developing economies have eschewed the model. We argue that this outcome is shaped by the domestic institutional context; in particular, authoritarianism and traditions of state control over the economy. Analyzing new data on the adoption and operation of independent competition authorities between 1990 and 2017, we find that auth…
EU Actors under pressure
This contribution conceptualises bottom-up politicisation in Europe's multi-level system. EU-level actors, we argue, respond strategically to the functional and political pressures 'travelling up' from the member states. Perceiving domestic dissensus as either constraining or enabling, actors display both self-restraint and assertiveness in their responses. Motivated by the survival of the EU as a system 'under attack', and by the preservation of…
Responsive withdrawal? The politics of EU agenda-setting
This contribution asks whether and why the newly political environment of EU law-making impacts on the European Commission's choice (not) to announce the withdrawal of legislative proposals. We argue that the Commission uses ‘responsive withdrawal’ in response to bottom-up pressure, so as to signal self-restraint or policy-determination to different audiences. Bottom-up pressures are driven by (1) the national contestation of ‘Europe’; (2) visibl…
British economic regulators in an age of politicisation
The regulatory state that developed in Britain and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by independent agencies, efficiency-based objectives, ‘econocratic’ analysis, and an emphasis on output- and outcome-based legitimacy. Yet, with economic regulation becoming increasingly politicised, the ‘responsible’ regulatory state has come under pressure. How have British regulators adapted to these changes? Building primarily on interviews w…
Losing out on substance but winning procedurally? The European Parliament and accountability in crisis legislation
Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union’s response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, usi…
When politics prevails
In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations’ ‘collective disloyalty’ with…
Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making
Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 Organisation for Econom…
What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis
The concept of regulation is believed to suffer from a lack of shared understanding. Yet the maturation of the field raises the question whether this conclusion is still valid. By taking a new methodological approach toward this question of conceptual consolidation, this study assesses how regulation is conceived in the most cited articles in six social science disciplines. Four main conclusions are drawn. First, there is a remarkable absence of …
The impact of informalisation
European Union legislative decision-making is increasingly shifted into informal secluded arenas. Scholars have explained this trend and analysed its consequences for bargaining success and democratic legitimacy. Yet, we know little about how informalisation affects legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. This article contributes to closing the gap, by theorising and analysing the impact of ‘early agreements’ on cohesion. Given the repu…
Coping with Power Dispersion
Theorizing and Explaining Voluntary Accountability
Public organizations are not only subject to statutory obligations to give account, but they also commit themselves voluntarily to additional accountability practices. What motivates the organizations to do so? After all, such practices are costly to the organizations in a number of ways. This study argues that public organizations opt for voluntary accountability for two main reasons: they regard it as an appropriate practice and they respond to…
Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation
The literature on power dispersion in the regulatory state emphasizes the interdependence of regulatory agencies. However, this may conflict with their independence and specialization. Given this potential conflict, what provisions exist to facilitate co-ordination? And do these reflect national administrative traditions? This study explores these questions in the context of the formalization of co-ordination in economic regulation. First, we dev…
Coping with power dispersion? Autonomy, co-ordination and control in multilevel systems
The last decades have witnessed a significant shift in policy competences away from central governments in Europe. The reallocation of competences spans over three dimensions: upwards; sideways; and downwards. This collection takes the dispersion of powers as a starting point and seeks to assess how the actors involved cope with the new configurations. In this introduction, we discuss the conceptualization of power dispersion and highlight the wa…
Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies
Regulation by independent agencies, rather than ministries, is believed to result in better policy outcomes. Yet this belief requires one to accept a complex causal chain leading from formal independence to actual independence from politics, to policy decisions, and, ultimately, to policy outcomes. In this study, we analyze the link between the formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies in Western Europe. New data on the appointment of…
The Informal Politics of Legislation
This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as “early agreements.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive…
Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies
While the literature on delegation has discussed at length the benefits of creating independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), not much attention has been paid to the conceptualization and operationalization of agency independence. In this study, we argue that existing attempts to operationalize the formal political independence of IRAs suffer from a number of conceptual and methodological flaws. To address these, we define what we understand by ind…
Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies
Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hierarchy. To compensate for this, politicians incorporate all kinds of information and reporting requirements into the statutes of the organizations. However, the degree to which this occurs varies considerably, which raises the question: Why are some agencies are made more accountable than others? This study examines the impact of political salience…
Political Distrust and Social Capital in Europe and the USA
The Informal Politics of Legislation
This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as “early agreements.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive…
EU Actors under pressure
This contribution conceptualises bottom-up politicisation in Europe's multi-level system. EU-level actors, we argue, respond strategically to the functional and political pressures 'travelling up' from the member states. Perceiving domestic dissensus as either constraining or enabling, actors display both self-restraint and assertiveness in their responses. Motivated by the survival of the EU as a system 'under attack', and by the preservation of…
Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies
Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hierarchy. To compensate for this, politicians incorporate all kinds of information and reporting requirements into the statutes of the organizations. However, the degree to which this occurs varies considerably, which raises the question: Why are some agencies are made more accountable than others? This study examines the impact of political salience…
Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies
While the literature on delegation has discussed at length the benefits of creating independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), not much attention has been paid to the conceptualization and operationalization of agency independence. In this study, we argue that existing attempts to operationalize the formal political independence of IRAs suffer from a number of conceptual and methodological flaws. To address these, we define what we understand by ind…
What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis
The concept of regulation is believed to suffer from a lack of shared understanding. Yet the maturation of the field raises the question whether this conclusion is still valid. By taking a new methodological approach toward this question of conceptual consolidation, this study assesses how regulation is conceived in the most cited articles in six social science disciplines. Four main conclusions are drawn. First, there is a remarkable absence of …
Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies
Regulation by independent agencies, rather than ministries, is believed to result in better policy outcomes. Yet this belief requires one to accept a complex causal chain leading from formal independence to actual independence from politics, to policy decisions, and, ultimately, to policy outcomes. In this study, we analyze the link between the formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies in Western Europe. New data on the appointment of…
Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation
The literature on power dispersion in the regulatory state emphasizes the interdependence of regulatory agencies. However, this may conflict with their independence and specialization. Given this potential conflict, what provisions exist to facilitate co-ordination? And do these reflect national administrative traditions? This study explores these questions in the context of the formalization of co-ordination in economic regulation. First, we dev…
Theorizing and Explaining Voluntary Accountability
Public organizations are not only subject to statutory obligations to give account, but they also commit themselves voluntarily to additional accountability practices. What motivates the organizations to do so? After all, such practices are costly to the organizations in a number of ways. This study argues that public organizations opt for voluntary accountability for two main reasons: they regard it as an appropriate practice and they respond to…
Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making
Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 Organisation for Econom…
British economic regulators in an age of politicisation
The regulatory state that developed in Britain and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by independent agencies, efficiency-based objectives, ‘econocratic’ analysis, and an emphasis on output- and outcome-based legitimacy. Yet, with economic regulation becoming increasingly politicised, the ‘responsible’ regulatory state has come under pressure. How have British regulators adapted to these changes? Building primarily on interviews w…
Political Distrust and Social Capital in Europe and the USA
Responsive withdrawal? The politics of EU agenda-setting
This contribution asks whether and why the newly political environment of EU law-making impacts on the European Commission's choice (not) to announce the withdrawal of legislative proposals. We argue that the Commission uses ‘responsive withdrawal’ in response to bottom-up pressure, so as to signal self-restraint or policy-determination to different audiences. Bottom-up pressures are driven by (1) the national contestation of ‘Europe’; (2) visibl…
When politics prevails
In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations’ ‘collective disloyalty’ with…
Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist Parties in Western Europe
The impact of informalisation
European Union legislative decision-making is increasingly shifted into informal secluded arenas. Scholars have explained this trend and analysed its consequences for bargaining success and democratic legitimacy. Yet, we know little about how informalisation affects legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. This article contributes to closing the gap, by theorising and analysing the impact of ‘early agreements’ on cohesion. Given the repu…
Agenda‐setting under pressure
The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's ‘electorally connected’ institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non‐majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda‐setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation o…
Coping with power dispersion? Autonomy, co-ordination and control in multilevel systems
The last decades have witnessed a significant shift in policy competences away from central governments in Europe. The reallocation of competences spans over three dimensions: upwards; sideways; and downwards. This collection takes the dispersion of powers as a starting point and seeks to assess how the actors involved cope with the new configurations. In this introduction, we discuss the conceptualization of power dispersion and highlight the wa…
Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies
Regulatory independence has become an international norm over the past decades. Yet, governments in some emerging and developing economies have eschewed the model. We argue that this outcome is shaped by the domestic institutional context; in particular, authoritarianism and traditions of state control over the economy. Analyzing new data on the adoption and operation of independent competition authorities between 1990 and 2017, we find that auth…
Losing out on substance but winning procedurally? The European Parliament and accountability in crisis legislation
Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union’s response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, usi…
Non‐majoritarian institutions, media coverage, and “reinforced accountability
As non‐majoritarian institutions are deliberately insulated from electoral pressure and ministerial hierarchy, they face an accountability deficit. This deficit can be reduced by embedding the organizations in a wider accountability landscape with multiple forums. Of particular relevance in this landscape are the news media, who may not only serve as account‐holders, but can also reinforce other forms of accountability. Yet, we know little about …
Exploring the potential and limits of digital tools for inclusive regulatory engagement with citizens
Over the past decade, independent regulatory agencies like competition authorities, water and energy regulators have increasingly turned to citizen engagement, including via digital channels. In this study, we seek to shed light on the potential and limits of economic regulators' digital engagement with citizens, compared to traditional, non-digital equivalents. More specifically, we analyse the costs and benefits of four prominent (digital) enga…
Surgeon General Urges Adoption of Fluoridation
Dental Sealants
Report of the Surgeon General's Workshop on Pornography and Public Health
Report of the Surgeon General's Workshop on Pornography and Public Health
The Challenge of Definition
Koop, Surgeon General of the United States, argues that the term\n"euthanasia," meaning "happy death," challenges the life-centered values of\nWestern culture and heritage which hold each individual personally responsible\nfor being a life-centered member of the human community. To reverse these\nvalues within the arena of medicine is to unleash the terror of a "euthanasian\nethic" reminiscent of the state-sponsored euthanasia of Nazi Germany, wh…
Final report of the Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public Health
The tobacco scandal
On 8 September 1998, former United States Surgeon General C Everett Koop delivered the speech reproduced below to the National Press Club in Washington, DC. This text is based on a transcript prepared by the Federal News Service, a private firm located in Washington, DC. Dr Koop kindly consented to publication of his speech in “Tobacco Control”.—ED I was invited to speak here today, and when I heard that Dr Kessler was also going to be present, I…
Consensus Democracy and Support for Populist Parties in Western Europe
Political Distrust and Social Capital in Europe and the USA
Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies
Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hierarchy. To compensate for this, politicians incorporate all kinds of information and reporting requirements into the statutes of the organizations. However, the degree to which this occurs varies considerably, which raises the question: Why are some agencies are made more accountable than others? This study examines the impact of political salience…
Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies
While the literature on delegation has discussed at length the benefits of creating independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), not much attention has been paid to the conceptualization and operationalization of agency independence. In this study, we argue that existing attempts to operationalize the formal political independence of IRAs suffer from a number of conceptual and methodological flaws. To address these, we define what we understand by ind…
Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies
Regulation by independent agencies, rather than ministries, is believed to result in better policy outcomes. Yet this belief requires one to accept a complex causal chain leading from formal independence to actual independence from politics, to policy decisions, and, ultimately, to policy outcomes. In this study, we analyze the link between the formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies in Western Europe. New data on the appointment of…
The Informal Politics of Legislation
This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as “early agreements.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive…
Theorizing and Explaining Voluntary Accountability
Public organizations are not only subject to statutory obligations to give account, but they also commit themselves voluntarily to additional accountability practices. What motivates the organizations to do so? After all, such practices are costly to the organizations in a number of ways. This study argues that public organizations opt for voluntary accountability for two main reasons: they regard it as an appropriate practice and they respond to…
Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation
The literature on power dispersion in the regulatory state emphasizes the interdependence of regulatory agencies. However, this may conflict with their independence and specialization. Given this potential conflict, what provisions exist to facilitate co-ordination? And do these reflect national administrative traditions? This study explores these questions in the context of the formalization of co-ordination in economic regulation. First, we dev…
Coping with power dispersion? Autonomy, co-ordination and control in multilevel systems
The last decades have witnessed a significant shift in policy competences away from central governments in Europe. The reallocation of competences spans over three dimensions: upwards; sideways; and downwards. This collection takes the dispersion of powers as a starting point and seeks to assess how the actors involved cope with the new configurations. In this introduction, we discuss the conceptualization of power dispersion and highlight the wa…
Coping with Power Dispersion
The impact of informalisation
European Union legislative decision-making is increasingly shifted into informal secluded arenas. Scholars have explained this trend and analysed its consequences for bargaining success and democratic legitimacy. Yet, we know little about how informalisation affects legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. This article contributes to closing the gap, by theorising and analysing the impact of ‘early agreements’ on cohesion. Given the repu…
What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept analysis
The concept of regulation is believed to suffer from a lack of shared understanding. Yet the maturation of the field raises the question whether this conclusion is still valid. By taking a new methodological approach toward this question of conceptual consolidation, this study assesses how regulation is conceived in the most cited articles in six social science disciplines. Four main conclusions are drawn. First, there is a remarkable absence of …
When politics prevails
In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations’ ‘collective disloyalty’ with…
Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making
Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 Organisation for Econom…
Losing out on substance but winning procedurally? The European Parliament and accountability in crisis legislation
Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union’s response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, usi…
EU Actors under pressure
This contribution conceptualises bottom-up politicisation in Europe's multi-level system. EU-level actors, we argue, respond strategically to the functional and political pressures 'travelling up' from the member states. Perceiving domestic dissensus as either constraining or enabling, actors display both self-restraint and assertiveness in their responses. Motivated by the survival of the EU as a system 'under attack', and by the preservation of…
Responsive withdrawal? The politics of EU agenda-setting
This contribution asks whether and why the newly political environment of EU law-making impacts on the European Commission's choice (not) to announce the withdrawal of legislative proposals. We argue that the Commission uses ‘responsive withdrawal’ in response to bottom-up pressure, so as to signal self-restraint or policy-determination to different audiences. Bottom-up pressures are driven by (1) the national contestation of ‘Europe’; (2) visibl…
British economic regulators in an age of politicisation
The regulatory state that developed in Britain and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by independent agencies, efficiency-based objectives, ‘econocratic’ analysis, and an emphasis on output- and outcome-based legitimacy. Yet, with economic regulation becoming increasingly politicised, the ‘responsible’ regulatory state has come under pressure. How have British regulators adapted to these changes? Building primarily on interviews w…
Political science (27 obras) · Law (24 obras) · Law (22 obras) · Politics (19 obras) · Economics (18 obras) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (17 obras) · Public Administration (15 obras) · Public Administration (15 obras) · Sociology (14 obras) · Political economy (13 obras)