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Seok‐ju Cho

Dados Biográficos

ID4372007
NOMESeok‐ju Cho
PRENOMESSeok‐ju
SOBRENOMECho
ASSINATURACHO S J
VERIFICADONão
TOTAL DE OBRAS1
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES2
OBRAS COMO AUTOR1
OBRAS COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO2009
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO2009
ÍNDICE H1
  • Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

    Open Access•Seok‐ju Cho, Seokju Cho•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2009•Citada por: 2•Referências: 15

    This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…

  • Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

    Open Access•Seok‐ju Cho, Seokju Cho•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2009•Citada por: 2•Referências: 15

    This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…

  • Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

    Open Access•Seok‐ju Cho, Seokju Cho•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•2009•Citada por: 2•Referências: 15

    This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single‐member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well‐behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll‐call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representati…

Economics (1 obra) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 obra) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (1 obra) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (1 obra) · Law (1 obra) · Law (1 obra) · Legislation (1 obra) · Legislator (1 obra) · Legislature (1 obra) · Majority rule (1 obra)

Ethnos_APP • Projeto Open Source • Licença MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidade e Cookies • Documentação da API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código da API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código do Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae