Andrew Cheon
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4375271 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Andrew Cheon |
| PRENOMES | Andrew |
| SOBRENOME | Cheon |
| ASSINATURA | CHEON A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Columbia University, New York, NY, USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5567-6900 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 87 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Can you have it both ways? Attribution and plausible deniability in unclaimed coercion
States and non-state actors conduct unclaimed coercive attacks, inflicting costs on adversaries to signal resolve to prevail in a dispute while refraining from claiming or denying responsibility. Analysts argue that targets often know who is responsible, which enables coercive communication, and that the lack of claims of responsibility grants coercers plausible deniability in the eyes of third parties. The puzzle of different audiences holding d…
Does plausible deniability work? Assessing the effectiveness of unclaimed coercive acts in the Ukraine war
States conduct unclaimed coercive acts, imposing costs on adversaries to signal resolve but denying (or not claiming) responsibility. Some scholars posit that unclaimed acts have considerable potential to coerce targets, while containing escalation risks. Others suggest that unclaimed coercive efforts tend to fail and trigger escalation. We assess these competing perspectives about the effects of unclaimed attacks with a vignette experiment expos…
Determinants of Environmental Conflict
When do indigenous and other negatively affected populations mobilize against fossil fuel companies? We revisit social movement theory and environmental literature to identify three factors that may plausibly shape mobilization decisions of negatively affected populations—democratic institutions, community perceptions of government shaped by land tenure security, and firm attributes. Democratic institutions afford more opportunities for affected …
Activism and the Fossil Fuel Industry
Escaping Oil’s Stranglehold
Modern economies and militaries are fundamentally dependent on oil, but the study of energy security has fallen out of favor in the field of international relations. We develop and test a theory of when and how states invest in energy security. We argue that states implement policies to improve their energy security when they perceive a risk of a militarized dispute and international oil markets are dominated by a small number of Middle Eastern p…
Instruments of Political Control
Global petroleum subsidies peaked at US$520 billion in the summer of 2008 and reached US$212 billion in 2011, carrying high fiscal and environmental costs. Why do some countries spend so much money to subsidize petroleum consumption? Previous studies suggest that oil-rich autocracies lacking institutional capacity are the main culprits. However, they cannot explain why oil importers with capable bureaucracies, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Malay…
How do Competing Interest Groups Influence Environmental Policy? The Case of Renewable Electricity in Industrialized Democracies, 1989–2007
In this article, we examine the effect of competing interest groups on environmental policy. We argue that the supporters of environmental policy should be the most influential in the absence of opposition, while the opposition's importance is maximized when the supporter coalition is strong. This highlights an important asymmetry between competing interest groups: supporters are decisive in the absence of opposition, while the opposition is only…
Oil prices and energy technology innovation
How do Competing Interest Groups Influence Environmental Policy? The Case of Renewable Electricity in Industrialized Democracies, 1989–2007
In this article, we examine the effect of competing interest groups on environmental policy. We argue that the supporters of environmental policy should be the most influential in the absence of opposition, while the opposition's importance is maximized when the supporter coalition is strong. This highlights an important asymmetry between competing interest groups: supporters are decisive in the absence of opposition, while the opposition is only…
Instruments of Political Control
Global petroleum subsidies peaked at US$520 billion in the summer of 2008 and reached US$212 billion in 2011, carrying high fiscal and environmental costs. Why do some countries spend so much money to subsidize petroleum consumption? Previous studies suggest that oil-rich autocracies lacking institutional capacity are the main culprits. However, they cannot explain why oil importers with capable bureaucracies, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Malay…
Oil prices and energy technology innovation
Escaping Oil’s Stranglehold
Modern economies and militaries are fundamentally dependent on oil, but the study of energy security has fallen out of favor in the field of international relations. We develop and test a theory of when and how states invest in energy security. We argue that states implement policies to improve their energy security when they perceive a risk of a militarized dispute and international oil markets are dominated by a small number of Middle Eastern p…
Does plausible deniability work? Assessing the effectiveness of unclaimed coercive acts in the Ukraine war
States conduct unclaimed coercive acts, imposing costs on adversaries to signal resolve but denying (or not claiming) responsibility. Some scholars posit that unclaimed acts have considerable potential to coerce targets, while containing escalation risks. Others suggest that unclaimed coercive efforts tend to fail and trigger escalation. We assess these competing perspectives about the effects of unclaimed attacks with a vignette experiment expos…
Determinants of Environmental Conflict
When do indigenous and other negatively affected populations mobilize against fossil fuel companies? We revisit social movement theory and environmental literature to identify three factors that may plausibly shape mobilization decisions of negatively affected populations—democratic institutions, community perceptions of government shaped by land tenure security, and firm attributes. Democratic institutions afford more opportunities for affected …
Oil prices and energy technology innovation
How do Competing Interest Groups Influence Environmental Policy? The Case of Renewable Electricity in Industrialized Democracies, 1989–2007
In this article, we examine the effect of competing interest groups on environmental policy. We argue that the supporters of environmental policy should be the most influential in the absence of opposition, while the opposition's importance is maximized when the supporter coalition is strong. This highlights an important asymmetry between competing interest groups: supporters are decisive in the absence of opposition, while the opposition is only…
Escaping Oil’s Stranglehold
Modern economies and militaries are fundamentally dependent on oil, but the study of energy security has fallen out of favor in the field of international relations. We develop and test a theory of when and how states invest in energy security. We argue that states implement policies to improve their energy security when they perceive a risk of a militarized dispute and international oil markets are dominated by a small number of Middle Eastern p…
Instruments of Political Control
Global petroleum subsidies peaked at US$520 billion in the summer of 2008 and reached US$212 billion in 2011, carrying high fiscal and environmental costs. Why do some countries spend so much money to subsidize petroleum consumption? Previous studies suggest that oil-rich autocracies lacking institutional capacity are the main culprits. However, they cannot explain why oil importers with capable bureaucracies, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Malay…
Activism and the Fossil Fuel Industry
Determinants of Environmental Conflict
When do indigenous and other negatively affected populations mobilize against fossil fuel companies? We revisit social movement theory and environmental literature to identify three factors that may plausibly shape mobilization decisions of negatively affected populations—democratic institutions, community perceptions of government shaped by land tenure security, and firm attributes. Democratic institutions afford more opportunities for affected …
Does plausible deniability work? Assessing the effectiveness of unclaimed coercive acts in the Ukraine war
States conduct unclaimed coercive acts, imposing costs on adversaries to signal resolve but denying (or not claiming) responsibility. Some scholars posit that unclaimed acts have considerable potential to coerce targets, while containing escalation risks. Others suggest that unclaimed coercive efforts tend to fail and trigger escalation. We assess these competing perspectives about the effects of unclaimed attacks with a vignette experiment expos…
Can you have it both ways? Attribution and plausible deniability in unclaimed coercion
States and non-state actors conduct unclaimed coercive attacks, inflicting costs on adversaries to signal resolve to prevail in a dispute while refraining from claiming or denying responsibility. Analysts argue that targets often know who is responsible, which enables coercive communication, and that the lack of claims of responsibility grants coercers plausible deniability in the eyes of third parties. The puzzle of different audiences holding d…
Political science (6 obras) · Economics (5 obras) · Business (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Law (4 obras) · Politics (4 obras) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (3 obras) · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth (3 obras) · Engineering (3 obras) · Computer Science (2 obras)