Justin Weinberg
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4376291 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Justin Weinberg |
| PRENOMES | Justin |
| SOBRENOME | Weinberg |
| ASSINATURA | WEINBERG J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of South Carolina |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1997 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
The Practicality of Political Philosophy
Must principles of justice be practical? Some political philosophers, the “implementers,” say yes. Others, the “idealists,” say no. Despite this disagreement, the implementers and idealists agree on what “practical” means, subscribing to the “implementation-prediction” (IP) conception of practicality. They also seem to agree that principles of so-called “ideal theory” need not be (and often are not) IP-practical. The implementers take this as a r…
Non-Identity Matters, Sometimes
Suppose the only difference between the effects of two actions is to whom they apply: either to parties who would – or would not – exist if the actions were not performed. Is this a morally significant difference? This is one of the central questions raised by the Non-Identity Problem. Derek Parfit answers no, defending what he calls the ‘No-Difference View’. I argue that Parfit is mistaken and that sometimes this difference is morally significan…
Is Government Supererogation Possible?
Governments are subject to the requirements of justice, yet often seem to go above and beyond what justice requires in order to act in ways many people think are good. These kinds of acts – examples of which include putting on celebrations, providing grants to poets, and preserving historic architecture – appear to be acts of government supererogation. In this paper, I argue that a common view about the relationship between government, coercion, …
Norms and the Agency of Justice
In this paper I argue that when thinking about justice, political philosophers should pay more attention to social norms, not just the usual subjects of basic principles, rights, laws, and policies. I identify two widely-endorsed ideas about political philosophy that interfere with recognizing the importance of social norms-ideas I dub ‘compulsoriness’ and ‘institutionalism’-and argue for their rejection. I do this largely by focusing on question…
Self‐ and world‐ownership
G. A. Cohen's argument against the claim that respect for self‐ownership entails libertarianism features the imaginary example of "Able and Infirm." Richard Epstein, Tom Palmer, and Am Feallsanach criticize the example, but fail to rescue libertarianism from Cohen's attack. This is due to a misunderstanding of the role the example plays in Cohen's argument, and to a false belief that the initial ownership status of the world is important for reso…
Freedom, self‐ownership, and libertarian philosophical Diaspora
In Self‐Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that libertarianism does not follow from respect for freedom, and that libertarianism cannot be grounded on self‐ownership. Cohen's arguments are, for the most part, compelling. That leaves the libertarian philosopher the options of either moving leftwards—for example, along the lines of Philippe Van. Parijs's Real Freedom for All—or embracing some form of consequentialism. Either way, t…
Freedom, self‐ownership, and libertarian philosophical Diaspora
In Self‐Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that libertarianism does not follow from respect for freedom, and that libertarianism cannot be grounded on self‐ownership. Cohen's arguments are, for the most part, compelling. That leaves the libertarian philosopher the options of either moving leftwards—for example, along the lines of Philippe Van. Parijs's Real Freedom for All—or embracing some form of consequentialism. Either way, t…
Norms and the Agency of Justice
In this paper I argue that when thinking about justice, political philosophers should pay more attention to social norms, not just the usual subjects of basic principles, rights, laws, and policies. I identify two widely-endorsed ideas about political philosophy that interfere with recognizing the importance of social norms-ideas I dub ‘compulsoriness’ and ‘institutionalism’-and argue for their rejection. I do this largely by focusing on question…
Freedom, self‐ownership, and libertarian philosophical Diaspora
In Self‐Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that libertarianism does not follow from respect for freedom, and that libertarianism cannot be grounded on self‐ownership. Cohen's arguments are, for the most part, compelling. That leaves the libertarian philosopher the options of either moving leftwards—for example, along the lines of Philippe Van. Parijs's Real Freedom for All—or embracing some form of consequentialism. Either way, t…
Self‐ and world‐ownership
G. A. Cohen's argument against the claim that respect for self‐ownership entails libertarianism features the imaginary example of "Able and Infirm." Richard Epstein, Tom Palmer, and Am Feallsanach criticize the example, but fail to rescue libertarianism from Cohen's attack. This is due to a misunderstanding of the role the example plays in Cohen's argument, and to a false belief that the initial ownership status of the world is important for reso…
Norms and the Agency of Justice
In this paper I argue that when thinking about justice, political philosophers should pay more attention to social norms, not just the usual subjects of basic principles, rights, laws, and policies. I identify two widely-endorsed ideas about political philosophy that interfere with recognizing the importance of social norms-ideas I dub ‘compulsoriness’ and ‘institutionalism’-and argue for their rejection. I do this largely by focusing on question…
Is Government Supererogation Possible?
Governments are subject to the requirements of justice, yet often seem to go above and beyond what justice requires in order to act in ways many people think are good. These kinds of acts – examples of which include putting on celebrations, providing grants to poets, and preserving historic architecture – appear to be acts of government supererogation. In this paper, I argue that a common view about the relationship between government, coercion, …
The Practicality of Political Philosophy
Must principles of justice be practical? Some political philosophers, the “implementers,” say yes. Others, the “idealists,” say no. Despite this disagreement, the implementers and idealists agree on what “practical” means, subscribing to the “implementation-prediction” (IP) conception of practicality. They also seem to agree that principles of so-called “ideal theory” need not be (and often are not) IP-practical. The implementers take this as a r…
Non-Identity Matters, Sometimes
Suppose the only difference between the effects of two actions is to whom they apply: either to parties who would – or would not – exist if the actions were not performed. Is this a morally significant difference? This is one of the central questions raised by the Non-Identity Problem. Derek Parfit answers no, defending what he calls the ‘No-Difference View’. I argue that Parfit is mistaken and that sometimes this difference is morally significan…
Epistemology (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Sociology (6 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Law and economics (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (5 obras) · Political science (5 obras) · Philosophy (4 obras) · Political philosophy (4 obras)