Camilla Mariotto
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4378343 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Camilla Mariotto |
| PRENOMES | Camilla |
| SOBRENOME | Mariotto |
| ASSINATURA | MARIOTTO C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Universität Innsbruck |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1116-2975 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 8 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 49 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2022 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
Should EU member states help each other? How the national context shapes individual preferences for European solidarity
With the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, the idea of providing cross-national financial transfers to countries in economic and financial difficulties has exacerbated the political divide between EU member states with strong macroeconomic performances, which were only weakly hit by the crisis, and the countries of the Eurozone periphery that struggled with a harsh economic downturn. This paper aims to explain which factors drive public support fo…
Negotiating and governing the economic and monetary union
The literature on the Economic and Monetary Union has expanded substantially in the last decade, especially in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. Important gaps remain, though. Three new books advance new insights both theoretically and empirically. Employing qualitative and quantitative methods, these books study aspects of decision-making during the negotiations of the latest reforms, their consequential institutional design and the oversigh…
The Implementation of Economic Rules
Country‐specific recommendations (CSRs) were introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact and offered guidance to countries in fiscal policies. Coordination was very limited and unsystematic in terms of policies and obligations. In the aftermath of the euro area financial crisis, the European Union reinforces the pre‐existing policy cycle with the European Semester. Why do countries implement CSRs? Are there explanatory differences in their implem…
Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms
We assess the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union (EU) that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations were characterized by high costs of failure. We confirm the accuracy and robustness of the compromise model, but a procedural model with a costly reference point performs well, indicating that misestimation of the no-agreement cost may b…
Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance
In the European Union, states can distribute enforcement prerogatives between a supranational agency, over which they exercise equal influence, and a Council of ministers, where power resources mostly vary by country size. What shapes attitudes towards different enforcement designs? States at greater risk of noncompliance should eschew deeper cooperation and prefer procedures over which they can exercise more influence. Employing an original data…
Politicisation and economic governance design
The functional pressures shaping policy design may be disrupted in salient policies and politicised contexts, according to recent postfunctionalist/new intergovernmentalist theories. We contrast these expectations with those derived from liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism by analysing the reforms of the European Union economic governance. Its Council-centred enforcement, which has been a dominant feature until the euro crisis, desp…
Negotiating implementation of EU fiscal governance
Since 1997 the Economic and Monetary Union has been centred on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which provides the framework for the coordination of economic policies and the surveillance of fiscal policies of member states. The country-specific recommendations, which address the member states macroeconomic programmes, are the policy instruments of the SGP preventive arm. At the same time, these recommendations are the object of intense negot…
Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee
The conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? We argue that its institutional setup is biased in favour of the Council of Ministers. Employing the Wordfish algorithm, we show that the joint text is more similar to the Council common position than to the parliamentary reading in almost 70 percent of the dossie…
The Implementation of Economic Rules
Country‐specific recommendations (CSRs) were introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact and offered guidance to countries in fiscal policies. Coordination was very limited and unsystematic in terms of policies and obligations. In the aftermath of the euro area financial crisis, the European Union reinforces the pre‐existing policy cycle with the European Semester. Why do countries implement CSRs? Are there explanatory differences in their implem…
Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee
The conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? We argue that its institutional setup is biased in favour of the Council of Ministers. Employing the Wordfish algorithm, we show that the joint text is more similar to the Council common position than to the parliamentary reading in almost 70 percent of the dossie…
Politicisation and economic governance design
The functional pressures shaping policy design may be disrupted in salient policies and politicised contexts, according to recent postfunctionalist/new intergovernmentalist theories. We contrast these expectations with those derived from liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism by analysing the reforms of the European Union economic governance. Its Council-centred enforcement, which has been a dominant feature until the euro crisis, desp…
Should EU member states help each other? How the national context shapes individual preferences for European solidarity
With the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, the idea of providing cross-national financial transfers to countries in economic and financial difficulties has exacerbated the political divide between EU member states with strong macroeconomic performances, which were only weakly hit by the crisis, and the countries of the Eurozone periphery that struggled with a harsh economic downturn. This paper aims to explain which factors drive public support fo…
Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance
In the European Union, states can distribute enforcement prerogatives between a supranational agency, over which they exercise equal influence, and a Council of ministers, where power resources mostly vary by country size. What shapes attitudes towards different enforcement designs? States at greater risk of noncompliance should eschew deeper cooperation and prefer procedures over which they can exercise more influence. Employing an original data…
Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms
We assess the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union (EU) that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations were characterized by high costs of failure. We confirm the accuracy and robustness of the compromise model, but a procedural model with a costly reference point performs well, indicating that misestimation of the no-agreement cost may b…
Negotiating implementation of EU fiscal governance
Since 1997 the Economic and Monetary Union has been centred on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which provides the framework for the coordination of economic policies and the surveillance of fiscal policies of member states. The country-specific recommendations, which address the member states macroeconomic programmes, are the policy instruments of the SGP preventive arm. At the same time, these recommendations are the object of intense negot…
Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee
The conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? We argue that its institutional setup is biased in favour of the Council of Ministers. Employing the Wordfish algorithm, we show that the joint text is more similar to the Council common position than to the parliamentary reading in almost 70 percent of the dossie…
Negotiating implementation of EU fiscal governance
Since 1997 the Economic and Monetary Union has been centred on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which provides the framework for the coordination of economic policies and the surveillance of fiscal policies of member states. The country-specific recommendations, which address the member states macroeconomic programmes, are the policy instruments of the SGP preventive arm. At the same time, these recommendations are the object of intense negot…
Politicisation and economic governance design
The functional pressures shaping policy design may be disrupted in salient policies and politicised contexts, according to recent postfunctionalist/new intergovernmentalist theories. We contrast these expectations with those derived from liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism by analysing the reforms of the European Union economic governance. Its Council-centred enforcement, which has been a dominant feature until the euro crisis, desp…
Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance
In the European Union, states can distribute enforcement prerogatives between a supranational agency, over which they exercise equal influence, and a Council of ministers, where power resources mostly vary by country size. What shapes attitudes towards different enforcement designs? States at greater risk of noncompliance should eschew deeper cooperation and prefer procedures over which they can exercise more influence. Employing an original data…
Should EU member states help each other? How the national context shapes individual preferences for European solidarity
With the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, the idea of providing cross-national financial transfers to countries in economic and financial difficulties has exacerbated the political divide between EU member states with strong macroeconomic performances, which were only weakly hit by the crisis, and the countries of the Eurozone periphery that struggled with a harsh economic downturn. This paper aims to explain which factors drive public support fo…
Negotiating and governing the economic and monetary union
The literature on the Economic and Monetary Union has expanded substantially in the last decade, especially in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. Important gaps remain, though. Three new books advance new insights both theoretically and empirically. Employing qualitative and quantitative methods, these books study aspects of decision-making during the negotiations of the latest reforms, their consequential institutional design and the oversigh…
The Implementation of Economic Rules
Country‐specific recommendations (CSRs) were introduced by the Stability and Growth Pact and offered guidance to countries in fiscal policies. Coordination was very limited and unsystematic in terms of policies and obligations. In the aftermath of the euro area financial crisis, the European Union reinforces the pre‐existing policy cycle with the European Semester. Why do countries implement CSRs? Are there explanatory differences in their implem…
Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms
We assess the accuracy of procedural and bargaining models in predicting the outcomes of the reforms of the economic governance of the European Union (EU) that took place between 1997 and 2013. These negotiations were characterized by high costs of failure. We confirm the accuracy and robustness of the compromise model, but a procedural model with a costly reference point performs well, indicating that misestimation of the no-agreement cost may b…
Economics (8 obras) · European union (8 obras) · Political science (8 obras) · European Union Policy and Governance (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Law (7 obras) · Negotiation (5 obras) · Politics (5 obras) · Corporate governance (4 obras) · International economics (4 obras)