Pular para o conteúdo principal

ETHNOS_APP

Início • Busca • Periódicos • Lista 0

Per Baltzer Overgaard

Dados Biográficos

ID4382536
NOMEPer Baltzer Overgaard
PRENOMESPer Baltzer
SOBRENOMEOvergaard
ASSINATURAOVERGAARD P B
AFILIAÇÕESAarhus University
ORCID0000-0002-1967-3614
VERIFICADOSim
TOTAL DE OBRAS1
TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES38
TOTAL COMO AUTOR1
TOTAL COMO EDITOR0
PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO1994
ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO1994
ÍNDICE H1
  • The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources

    Open Access•Per Baltzer Overgaard•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1994•Citada por: 38•Referências: 9

    This article studies conflicts between terrorists and governments in a setting of asymmetric information. The government is initially uncertain about the level of resources available to a terrorist group for use in violent attacks. The conflict is modeled as a signaling game where the magnitude of terrorist attacks serves as a signal of terrorist resources. With complete information, optimal government retaliation depends nontrivially on terroris…

  • The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources

    Open Access•Per Baltzer Overgaard•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1994•Citada por: 38•Referências: 9

    This article studies conflicts between terrorists and governments in a setting of asymmetric information. The government is initially uncertain about the level of resources available to a terrorist group for use in violent attacks. The conflict is modeled as a signaling game where the magnitude of terrorist attacks serves as a signal of terrorist resources. With complete information, optimal government retaliation depends nontrivially on terroris…

  • The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources

    Open Access•Per Baltzer Overgaard•ARTICLE•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1994•Citada por: 38•Referências: 9

    This article studies conflicts between terrorists and governments in a setting of asymmetric information. The government is initially uncertain about the level of resources available to a terrorist group for use in violent attacks. The conflict is modeled as a signaling game where the magnitude of terrorist attacks serves as a signal of terrorist resources. With complete information, optimal government retaliation depends nontrivially on terroris…

Business (1 obras) · Computer Science (1 obras) · Computer security (1 obras) · Economics (1 obras) · Flexibility (engineering (1 obras) · Game Theory and Applications (1 obras) · Government (linguistics (1 obras) · Incentive (1 obras) · Information asymmetry (1 obras) · Law (1 obras)

Ethnos_APP • Projeto Open Source • Licença MIT • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacidade e Cookies • Documentação da API: api.ethnos.app/docs • Código da API: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Código do Frontend: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae