Carsten Helm
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4382783 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Carsten Helm |
| PRENOMES | Carsten |
| SOBRENOME | Helm |
| ASSINATURA | HELM C |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Technische Universität Darmstadt |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4884-163X |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 3 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 83 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1999 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information
With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. This provides a rationale why coalition governmen…
Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes
Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the meas…
The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes
The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriv…
Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes
Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the meas…
The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes
The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriv…
The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes
The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriv…
Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes
Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the meas…
Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information
With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. This provides a rationale why coalition governmen…
Economics (3 obras) · Political science (3 obras) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (2 obras) · Counterfactual thinking (2 obras) · Politics (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Public economics (2 obras) · Business (1 obras) · Computer Science (1 obras) · Corporate governance (1 obras)