Gerald Marschke
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4398904 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Gerald Marschke |
| PRENOMES | Gerald |
| SOBRENOME | Marschke |
| ASSINATURA | MARSCHKE G |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Albany State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8231-5625 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 4 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 60 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 4 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2007 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Task Mismatch and Salary Penalties
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems
We use the principal‐agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time, drawi…
A General Test for Distortions in Performance Measures
Results from the incentive literature suggest that performance measures are often distorted, eliciting dysfunctional and unintended responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behavior is typically hidden from the researcher. We present a simple model showing that one can test for the existence of distortions by estimating the change in the association between a performance measure an…
Making Government Accountable
This article describes the evolution of a performance measurement system in a government job training program. In this program, a federal agency establishes performance measures and standards for substate agencies. The performance measurement system’s evolution is at least partly explained as a process of trial and error characterized by a feedback loop: The federal agency establishes performance measures, the local managers learn how to game the…
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems
We use the principal‐agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time, drawi…
Making Government Accountable
This article describes the evolution of a performance measurement system in a government job training program. In this program, a federal agency establishes performance measures and standards for substate agencies. The performance measurement system’s evolution is at least partly explained as a process of trial and error characterized by a feedback loop: The federal agency establishes performance measures, the local managers learn how to game the…
A General Test for Distortions in Performance Measures
Results from the incentive literature suggest that performance measures are often distorted, eliciting dysfunctional and unintended responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behavior is typically hidden from the researcher. We present a simple model showing that one can test for the existence of distortions by estimating the change in the association between a performance measure an…
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems
We use the principal‐agent model as a focal theoretical frame for synthesizing what we know, both theoretically and empirically, about the design and dynamics of the implementation of performance management systems in the public sector. In this context, we review the growing body of evidence about how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time, drawi…
Task Mismatch and Salary Penalties
Computer Science (3 obras) · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance (2 obras) · Business (2 obras) · Marketing (2 obras) · Performance measurement (2 obras) · Political science (2 obras) · Psychology (2 obras) · Public Policy and Administration Research (2 obras) · Accountability (1 obras) · Accounting and Organizational Management (1 obras)