Tim Schnelle
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4418924 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Tim Schnelle |
| PRENOMES | Tim |
| SOBRENOME | Schnelle |
| ASSINATURA | SCHNELLE T |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Universität Hamburg |
| ORCID | 0009-0002-4469-8837 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 3 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 3 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2024 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Introducing the Dataset of Constituent Actors (DCA)
This paper introduces the Dataset of Constituent Actors (DCA). For 868 national constitutions adopted between 1789 and 2024, it identifies whether the executive, a constituent legislature, a constituent assembly, or a combination thereof was nominally involved in the constitution-making process. Additionally, it reports whether a constitutional referendum was held, allowing researchers to study the effects of both constituent actors and citizen p…
Crafting Compliance The Role of Inclusion and Participation in Constitution-Making
Over the past decade, a concerning global trend has emerged in which governments increasingly ignore constitutional constraints. One theoretically promising strategy to address this widening implementation gap is constitutional reform. Replacing ineffective constitutions with more robust institutions should bind the hands of politicians and close the gap between constitutional promises and reality. However, the success of these reforms hinges on …
Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study
It has often been claimed that if constitutions are not complied with, they will be changed. Because an ineffective constitutional contract is a bad contract, a lack of enforcement should induce constitutional reform. This paper empirically tests this conjecture based on a dataset of 170 countries from 1950 to 2018. The results indicate that the size of the de jure/de facto gap has no effect on the likelihood of constitutional change as such. How…
Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study
It has often been claimed that if constitutions are not complied with, they will be changed. Because an ineffective constitutional contract is a bad contract, a lack of enforcement should induce constitutional reform. This paper empirically tests this conjecture based on a dataset of 170 countries from 1950 to 2018. The results indicate that the size of the de jure/de facto gap has no effect on the likelihood of constitutional change as such. How…
Non-compliance as a determinant of constitutional change? A comparative study
It has often been claimed that if constitutions are not complied with, they will be changed. Because an ineffective constitutional contract is a bad contract, a lack of enforcement should induce constitutional reform. This paper empirically tests this conjecture based on a dataset of 170 countries from 1950 to 2018. The results indicate that the size of the de jure/de facto gap has no effect on the likelihood of constitutional change as such. How…
Introducing the Dataset of Constituent Actors (DCA)
This paper introduces the Dataset of Constituent Actors (DCA). For 868 national constitutions adopted between 1789 and 2024, it identifies whether the executive, a constituent legislature, a constituent assembly, or a combination thereof was nominally involved in the constitution-making process. Additionally, it reports whether a constitutional referendum was held, allowing researchers to study the effects of both constituent actors and citizen p…
Crafting Compliance The Role of Inclusion and Participation in Constitution-Making
Over the past decade, a concerning global trend has emerged in which governments increasingly ignore constitutional constraints. One theoretically promising strategy to address this widening implementation gap is constitutional reform. Replacing ineffective constitutions with more robust institutions should bind the hands of politicians and close the gap between constitutional promises and reality. However, the success of these reforms hinges on …
Constitution (3 obras) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (3 obras) · Constitutional right (2 obras) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 obras) · Enforcement (2 obras) · Political Systems and Governance (2 obras) · Civil rights (1 obras) · Compliance (psychology (1 obras) · Constitutional law (1 obras) · Corruption and Economic Development (1 obras)