Christopher D Carothers
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4425880 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Christopher D Carothers |
| PRENOMES | Christopher D |
| SOBRENOME | Carothers |
| ASSINATURA | CAROTHERS C D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | California University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 9 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 68 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 9 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2018 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
One Team, Two Nameplates
Since administrative reforms in 2018, many of China's top governing institutions have begun to operate under dual identities – often as a Chinese Communist Party body and a government organisation with different names but the same leadership team. This low-profile but far-reaching phenomenon, which we term “institutional doubling,” has received little scholarly attention. Why has Xi Jinping encouraged institutional doubling, and what are the impl…
The Autocrat's Corruption Dilemma
A large body of scholarship shows that autocrats can use corruption strategically to strengthen their political hold, such as by distributing rents to their supporters. However, this scholarship often overlooks how corruption may also politically damage autocrats. I argue that corruption often brings substantial political costs alongside its advantages, resulting in a ‘corruption dilemma’ for autocrats. I show that in recent years, public anger o…
When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes
Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the 'old guard'-retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadersh…
Does External Threat Unify? Chinese Pressure and Domestic Politics in Taiwan and South Korea
Since 2009, China's growing geopolitical assertiveness has triggered or exacerbated conflicts with many of its neighbors. External threat is often believed to produce domestic cohesion, such as bipartisanship or a rally-‘round-the-flag effect. However, this study uses the cases of Taiwan and South Korea to show that political parties have sometimes united around a response to Chinese pressure but at other times have been sharply divided. Despite …
The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea
North Korea is widely seen as having among the most corrupt governments in the world. However, the Kim family regime has not always been so accepting of government wrongdoing. Drawing on archival evidence, this study shows that Kim Il-sung saw corruption as a threat to economic development and launched campaigns to curb it throughout the 1950s. I find that these campaigns were at least somewhat successful, and they contributed to post-Korean War …
Huang Chin-Hao and David C. Kang, State Formation through Emulation
From Corruption Control to Everything Control
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has dramatically expanded its use of inspections (巡视). Existing scholarship largely portrays inspections as an anti-corruption mechanism. However, based on an examination of hundreds of post-inspection reports from party organs, provincial and municipal governments, central state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, this article argues that while inspections initially focused on curbing corrupti…
Taking Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Reform Seriously
Scholars generally assume that authoritarian regimes will not curb corruption because autocrats benefit from it politically, use anti-corruption campaigns as excuses to purge rivals, and reject democratic institutions widely thought to reduce corruption, such as judicial independence. However, I argue that authoritarian regimes curb corruption more frequently—and sometimes more effectively—than scholars realize. Using a novel scoring system for a…
The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism
After many countries that had embarked upon transitions in the 1980s and 1990s failed to become consolidated democracies, political scientists highlighted the widespread emergence of hybrid regimes, which combine authoritarian and democratic features. Scholars argued such regimes were stable, with some positing that quasi-democratic institutions actually strengthened authoritarianism. But an examination of competitive authoritarianism (CA)—the mo…
The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism
After many countries that had embarked upon transitions in the 1980s and 1990s failed to become consolidated democracies, political scientists highlighted the widespread emergence of hybrid regimes, which combine authoritarian and democratic features. Scholars argued such regimes were stable, with some positing that quasi-democratic institutions actually strengthened authoritarianism. But an examination of competitive authoritarianism (CA)—the mo…
Taking Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Reform Seriously
Scholars generally assume that authoritarian regimes will not curb corruption because autocrats benefit from it politically, use anti-corruption campaigns as excuses to purge rivals, and reject democratic institutions widely thought to reduce corruption, such as judicial independence. However, I argue that authoritarian regimes curb corruption more frequently—and sometimes more effectively—than scholars realize. Using a novel scoring system for a…
When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes
Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the 'old guard'-retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadersh…
The Autocrat's Corruption Dilemma
A large body of scholarship shows that autocrats can use corruption strategically to strengthen their political hold, such as by distributing rents to their supporters. However, this scholarship often overlooks how corruption may also politically damage autocrats. I argue that corruption often brings substantial political costs alongside its advantages, resulting in a ‘corruption dilemma’ for autocrats. I show that in recent years, public anger o…
Does External Threat Unify? Chinese Pressure and Domestic Politics in Taiwan and South Korea
Since 2009, China's growing geopolitical assertiveness has triggered or exacerbated conflicts with many of its neighbors. External threat is often believed to produce domestic cohesion, such as bipartisanship or a rally-‘round-the-flag effect. However, this study uses the cases of Taiwan and South Korea to show that political parties have sometimes united around a response to Chinese pressure but at other times have been sharply divided. Despite …
The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea
North Korea is widely seen as having among the most corrupt governments in the world. However, the Kim family regime has not always been so accepting of government wrongdoing. Drawing on archival evidence, this study shows that Kim Il-sung saw corruption as a threat to economic development and launched campaigns to curb it throughout the 1950s. I find that these campaigns were at least somewhat successful, and they contributed to post-Korean War …
From Corruption Control to Everything Control
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has dramatically expanded its use of inspections (巡视). Existing scholarship largely portrays inspections as an anti-corruption mechanism. However, based on an examination of hundreds of post-inspection reports from party organs, provincial and municipal governments, central state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, this article argues that while inspections initially focused on curbing corrupti…
One Team, Two Nameplates
Since administrative reforms in 2018, many of China's top governing institutions have begun to operate under dual identities – often as a Chinese Communist Party body and a government organisation with different names but the same leadership team. This low-profile but far-reaching phenomenon, which we term “institutional doubling,” has received little scholarly attention. Why has Xi Jinping encouraged institutional doubling, and what are the impl…
The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism
After many countries that had embarked upon transitions in the 1980s and 1990s failed to become consolidated democracies, political scientists highlighted the widespread emergence of hybrid regimes, which combine authoritarian and democratic features. Scholars argued such regimes were stable, with some positing that quasi-democratic institutions actually strengthened authoritarianism. But an examination of competitive authoritarianism (CA)—the mo…
Does External Threat Unify? Chinese Pressure and Domestic Politics in Taiwan and South Korea
Since 2009, China's growing geopolitical assertiveness has triggered or exacerbated conflicts with many of its neighbors. External threat is often believed to produce domestic cohesion, such as bipartisanship or a rally-‘round-the-flag effect. However, this study uses the cases of Taiwan and South Korea to show that political parties have sometimes united around a response to Chinese pressure but at other times have been sharply divided. Despite …
The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea
North Korea is widely seen as having among the most corrupt governments in the world. However, the Kim family regime has not always been so accepting of government wrongdoing. Drawing on archival evidence, this study shows that Kim Il-sung saw corruption as a threat to economic development and launched campaigns to curb it throughout the 1950s. I find that these campaigns were at least somewhat successful, and they contributed to post-Korean War …
Huang Chin-Hao and David C. Kang, State Formation through Emulation
From Corruption Control to Everything Control
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has dramatically expanded its use of inspections (巡视). Existing scholarship largely portrays inspections as an anti-corruption mechanism. However, based on an examination of hundreds of post-inspection reports from party organs, provincial and municipal governments, central state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, this article argues that while inspections initially focused on curbing corrupti…
Taking Authoritarian Anti-Corruption Reform Seriously
Scholars generally assume that authoritarian regimes will not curb corruption because autocrats benefit from it politically, use anti-corruption campaigns as excuses to purge rivals, and reject democratic institutions widely thought to reduce corruption, such as judicial independence. However, I argue that authoritarian regimes curb corruption more frequently—and sometimes more effectively—than scholars realize. Using a novel scoring system for a…
The Autocrat's Corruption Dilemma
A large body of scholarship shows that autocrats can use corruption strategically to strengthen their political hold, such as by distributing rents to their supporters. However, this scholarship often overlooks how corruption may also politically damage autocrats. I argue that corruption often brings substantial political costs alongside its advantages, resulting in a ‘corruption dilemma’ for autocrats. I show that in recent years, public anger o…
When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes
Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the 'old guard'-retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadersh…
One Team, Two Nameplates
Since administrative reforms in 2018, many of China's top governing institutions have begun to operate under dual identities – often as a Chinese Communist Party body and a government organisation with different names but the same leadership team. This low-profile but far-reaching phenomenon, which we term “institutional doubling,” has received little scholarly attention. Why has Xi Jinping encouraged institutional doubling, and what are the impl…
Law (9 obras) · Political science (9 obras) · Law (8 obras) · Economics (7 obras) · Politics (7 obras) · Democracy (6 obras) · Political economy (6 obras) · Authoritarianism (5 obras) · China (5 obras) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (4 obras)