Wen‐hsuan Tsai
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4448558 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Wen‐hsuan Tsai |
| PRENOMES | Wen‐hsuan |
| SOBRENOME | Tsai |
| ASSINATURA | TSAI W H |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 35 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 177 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 35 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2012 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 8 |
Archaeological Nationalism in Contemporary China and the Official Construction of Ancient Chinese History
This paper examines the archaeological nationalism of the Chinese state. The existence of the Xia dynasty, long regarded by Chinese scholars to be China's first dynasty, has become a contentious issue in both Chinese and Western academic circles. During Jiang Zemin's tenure, the Chinese government began to leverage state power to support archaeological efforts aimed at substantiating the historical reality of the Xia dynasty. The Project to Trace…
Centralizing Rules
How does the Chinese Communist Party ensure that its officials remain loyal to the top leader, and what mechanisms does the leader use to get cadres to comply with his policies and intentions? We argue that Party regulations play a very important role in ensuring loyalty. These regulations, both written and unwritten, constitute a system of authoritarian legality through which Xi Jinping ensures that cadres practice the “two safeguards,” thus enh…
Urban Management in Authoritarian China
Comprehensive law enforcement' is an important part of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) thinking on urban management. It involves all government departments and units related to law enforcement working together to improve their administrative efficiency. Since 2009, the CCP has absorbed some elements of the Western concept of the 'smart city', including the use of big data analysis and technology in implementing and enforcing the law. At the…
The Recruitment Process for Grassroots Cadres in a Chinese County
Through field research conducted within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) County S Organization Department, this article finds that, under the CCP’s 2012 Eighteenth Party Congress policies of strengthening local governance and “whoever recommends a cadre is responsible for their performance,” the powers of the county organization departments have been enhanced. The main task of an organization department is the selection of cadres for posting…
Fast Track Promotion for Grassroots Cadres
Although the “selected graduate” (xuandiaosheng) system is not new, Xi Jinping has changed it substantially since he came to power. This paper introduces the concept of the “promotion ladder” to describe how low-ranking cadres must wait longer for promotion than do mid- and high-ranking cadres. This promotion ladder often leads to low-ranking cadres hitting a ceiling in their careers. For this reason, section-level cadres need a fast track that w…
Contemporary Chinese martial arts and the manipulation of cultural positioning
Traditional Chinese martial arts have a long history. In terms of cultural positioning, traditional martial arts have two main functions, namely, to promote patriotism and to provide opportunities for commercial exploitation. These are primarily reflected in the combat style and the expressive nature of traditional martial arts. In addition, martial arts can be useful in the governance of contemporary Chinese society, as they have the potential t…
Beautiful Countryside Construction,” Policy Inspection Teams, and Grassroots Political Participation in China
This article seeks to demonstrate that there is a certain degree of political participation in contemporary China. We argue that the qunzhong, or ‘masses’, in China can be divided into three categories: members of autonomous grassroots organizations, local elites (xin xiangxian), and victims of rights violations, and we illustrate our discussion of the impact of these three groups on policy through the example of the ‘Beautiful Countryside Constr…
The Role of China’s County-level Research Offices in Policy Adaptation
The policy implementation strategies of county cadres
Using the concept of 'hedging', we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated task…
Dual Elite Recruitment Logic and Political Manipulation under Xi Jinping
Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of “dual elite recruitment logic” as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in t…
Hobbling Big Brother
This article argues that policy implementation in China has moved toward a system under which the center formulates a blueprint or “top-level design” from which local officials devise detailed regulations through a process of “crossing the river by feeling for stones.” This applies to the development of China’s new social credit system. To minimize political risk, when implementing it local officials have selected easier goals from the “top-level…
A Mechanism of Coded Communication
Studies of the official media of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long focused on interpretations of political propaganda. In this article, we propose another model—the “secret code communication” model. We find that the main audience for some of the official media consists not of members of the public but rather cadres. The China Central Television (CCTV) program Xinwen Lianbo is a typical example. The program operates according to a very …
Ideological Education and Practical Training at a County Party School
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is concentrating efforts on the cultivation of outstanding local cadres in order to improve local governance. For this purpose, it is strengthening the functions of local Party schools that offer students both political and administrative education to create a cohort of cadres who are both “red and expert.” We discuss how this is done in terms of curriculum planning, types of classes, and the student …
Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level
On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC…
Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation
This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of 'institutionalized mobilization', we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and …
Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics
How are bureaucrats controlled by their superiors in the Chinese political system? “Leading small groups” (领导小组) are among the most important mechanisms for integrating the interests and opinions of various government and Party departments so that superiors can ensure that their policies are implemented. This article analyzes the roles of the three main actors in the leading small groups: group leaders, the heads of the lead departments, and the …
Penetrating the Grassroots
Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical…
Social Constructionism and the Significance of Political Rumors in Contemporary China
Rumors are a set of collective discussions used by cadres or the masses to attain specific goals. Both political elites and the general public reveal their dissatisfaction or concern with the Chinese Communist Party regime through the dissemination of politically charged rumors, fueled by the party-state system’s habit of withholding information and amplified by traditional Chinese superstition
The Impending Rise of the “Tsinghua Clique
The Tsinghua clique is highly influential in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics. But in the past, alumni from other elite universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, also occupied positions as senior cadres, so Tsinghua did not have any more influence than they did. However, since 2002, Tsinghua University has developed a ‘cultivation/transfer’ system whereby the school, in a purposeful, calculating, and organi…
Managing Irregular Petitions in China
This paper uses Province A and City T as case studies to explore the strategies used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for managing citizens’ “irregular letters and visits” (irregular petitions) and the logic behind them. We believe that the local officials use both “hard” and “soft” measures to exercise control over these activities. The soft measures include persuasion and negotiation aimed at getting petitioners to abandon their irregular p…
The Authority, Functions, and Political Intrigues of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party
The General Office of the Party Central Committee is the core staff organization through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises power internally. This article discusses the attributes of the General Office’s directors and its important constituent departments, which include the Secretarial Bureau, Letters and Visits Bureau, Research Office, Security Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Confidential Communication Bureau, and Departmental Affairs Mana…
Medical Politics and the CCP’s Healthcare System for State Leaders
The health of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders is a sensitive and closely guarded secret, and academic literature on the topic has been sorely lacking as a consequence. Using the most up-to-date information, the author of this article will lift the cloak of mystery surrounding official CCP healthcare, detailing the operation of a confidential healthcare system established to provide state leaders with comprehensive medical treatment. The mai…
The ccp’s Learning System
A Model of Adaptive Mobilization
Diaoyan (investigation and research) occupies a special place in the politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The concept can be broken down into two distinct types: symbolic diaoyan, and standard diaoyan. The former refers to the phenomenon of top leaders promoting and initiating the coordinated implementation of a particular political line. Leaders first promote their ideas through symbolic trips and speeches, and observe the extent of su…
Delicacies for a Privileged Class in a Risk Society
This paper discusses the history and operation of the tegong (special supplies) system for foodstuffs operated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The system has been in existence since the Yan’an period and is still being practiced today. It was originally introduced to deal with China’s shortage economy during the era of Mao Zedong. Nowadays, the issue of food safety has made China a risk society, making it necessary for the CCP to provide it…
Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion
Within the operational procedures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadre appointment system, age restrictions hinder cadre promotion. As a result, three different methods have emerged to bypass these restrictions, allowing officials to attain faster promotion. These three methods are the Communist Youth League route, temporary transferred duty and non-regulation promotion. This article will explain the age restriction system, and then outline…
Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation
This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of 'institutionalized mobilization', we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and …
How ‘Networked Authoritarianism’ was Operationalized in China
Does network technology weaken the ability of authoritarian regimes to govern their citizens? Arguments and discussion regarding this proposition can be found in existing studies. Scholars who support this point of view believe that certain developments in network technology led to the outbreak of the Jasmine Revolution in Arab countries in 2011. This chain of rebellions provides an obvious and affirmative example of this theory. However, as far …
The Impending Rise of the “Tsinghua Clique
The Tsinghua clique is highly influential in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics. But in the past, alumni from other elite universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, also occupied positions as senior cadres, so Tsinghua did not have any more influence than they did. However, since 2002, Tsinghua University has developed a ‘cultivation/transfer’ system whereby the school, in a purposeful, calculating, and organi…
The CCP's Learning System
In an attempt to mold itself into a “learning Party”, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has recently borrowed the theory of the “learning organization”, a concept derived from Western management. This article argues that, in the process of molding the CCP into a “learning Party”, President Hu Jintao has employed two functions of learning inherited from Party history—thought unification and regime adaptation—to reinforce his own political legitima…
Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics
How are bureaucrats controlled by their superiors in the Chinese political system? “Leading small groups” (领导小组) are among the most important mechanisms for integrating the interests and opinions of various government and Party departments so that superiors can ensure that their policies are implemented. This article analyzes the roles of the three main actors in the leading small groups: group leaders, the heads of the lead departments, and the …
Managing Irregular Petitions in China
This paper uses Province A and City T as case studies to explore the strategies used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for managing citizens’ “irregular letters and visits” (irregular petitions) and the logic behind them. We believe that the local officials use both “hard” and “soft” measures to exercise control over these activities. The soft measures include persuasion and negotiation aimed at getting petitioners to abandon their irregular p…
Enabling China’s Voice to Be Heard by the World
As China becomes a more prominent international player, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has stepped up its external propaganda in a bid to promote its image as a superpower. The operations of the CCP’s external propaganda system are no longer guided by dogma; rather, these incorporate many Western theories related to “public diplomacy,” which emphasizes the role played by non-governmental actors and the use of a softer approach. However, the CC…
Concentrating Power to Accomplish Big Things
This article discusses the operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pishi system from the perspective of decision making. As an authoritarian regime, the CCP ‘concentrates power to accomplish big things’, demonstrating the extent of the CCP’s state capacity. This article argues that, through a wide range of documentation, the CCP provides leaders with a channel for resource accumulation, to issue pishi (written directives). Next, mishu (se…
Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level
On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC…
The policy implementation strategies of county cadres
Using the concept of 'hedging', we explore how local cadres in China deviate from central policies in order to serve local interests and, while doing so, avoid being called to account by their superiors. Political signals enable cadres to decide when to invest more resources into the implementation of certain policies. In this way, they optimize their performance and avoid the political risks involved in failing to carry out their designated task…
A Model of Adaptive Mobilization
Diaoyan (investigation and research) occupies a special place in the politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The concept can be broken down into two distinct types: symbolic diaoyan, and standard diaoyan. The former refers to the phenomenon of top leaders promoting and initiating the coordinated implementation of a particular political line. Leaders first promote their ideas through symbolic trips and speeches, and observe the extent of su…
Penetrating the Grassroots
Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical…
A Unique Pattern of Policymaking in China’s Authoritarian Regime
This article aims to deepen academic discussion of the Chinese Communist Party’s official media by presenting the neican/pishi (internal reference/written directive) model. The model represents an amalgamated system of internal watchdog journalism and political decision-making practices, reflecting the unique pattern of the CCP’s “documentary politics.”
Hobbling Big Brother
This article argues that policy implementation in China has moved toward a system under which the center formulates a blueprint or “top-level design” from which local officials devise detailed regulations through a process of “crossing the river by feeling for stones.” This applies to the development of China’s new social credit system. To minimize political risk, when implementing it local officials have selected easier goals from the “top-level…
The Authority, Functions, and Political Intrigues of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party
The General Office of the Party Central Committee is the core staff organization through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises power internally. This article discusses the attributes of the General Office’s directors and its important constituent departments, which include the Secretarial Bureau, Letters and Visits Bureau, Research Office, Security Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Confidential Communication Bureau, and Departmental Affairs Mana…
Framing the Funeral
Influenced by Confucian culture and Soviet traditions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gives special attention to the arrangements for officials’ funerals. The format of these funerals is framed according to the officials’ rank and political performance. This article primarily discusses the funerals of national leaders and identifies five different roles: great leader, eminent leader, deposed leader, political offender, and political traitor. T…
Urban Management in Authoritarian China
Comprehensive law enforcement' is an important part of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) thinking on urban management. It involves all government departments and units related to law enforcement working together to improve their administrative efficiency. Since 2009, the CCP has absorbed some elements of the Western concept of the 'smart city', including the use of big data analysis and technology in implementing and enforcing the law. At the…
The Recruitment Process for Grassroots Cadres in a Chinese County
Through field research conducted within the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) County S Organization Department, this article finds that, under the CCP’s 2012 Eighteenth Party Congress policies of strengthening local governance and “whoever recommends a cadre is responsible for their performance,” the powers of the county organization departments have been enhanced. The main task of an organization department is the selection of cadres for posting…
Ideological Education and Practical Training at a County Party School
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is concentrating efforts on the cultivation of outstanding local cadres in order to improve local governance. For this purpose, it is strengthening the functions of local Party schools that offer students both political and administrative education to create a cohort of cadres who are both “red and expert.” We discuss how this is done in terms of curriculum planning, types of classes, and the student …
Centralizing Rules
How does the Chinese Communist Party ensure that its officials remain loyal to the top leader, and what mechanisms does the leader use to get cadres to comply with his policies and intentions? We argue that Party regulations play a very important role in ensuring loyalty. These regulations, both written and unwritten, constitute a system of authoritarian legality through which Xi Jinping ensures that cadres practice the “two safeguards,” thus enh…
Contemporary Chinese martial arts and the manipulation of cultural positioning
Traditional Chinese martial arts have a long history. In terms of cultural positioning, traditional martial arts have two main functions, namely, to promote patriotism and to provide opportunities for commercial exploitation. These are primarily reflected in the combat style and the expressive nature of traditional martial arts. In addition, martial arts can be useful in the governance of contemporary Chinese society, as they have the potential t…
Beautiful Countryside Construction,” Policy Inspection Teams, and Grassroots Political Participation in China
This article seeks to demonstrate that there is a certain degree of political participation in contemporary China. We argue that the qunzhong, or ‘masses’, in China can be divided into three categories: members of autonomous grassroots organizations, local elites (xin xiangxian), and victims of rights violations, and we illustrate our discussion of the impact of these three groups on policy through the example of the ‘Beautiful Countryside Constr…
The Role of China’s County-level Research Offices in Policy Adaptation
Dual Elite Recruitment Logic and Political Manipulation under Xi Jinping
Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of “dual elite recruitment logic” as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in t…
Public Nomination and Direct Election in China
This research takes the case of Public Nomination and Direct Election, currently being rolled out in the People's Republic of China, to explain the function of elections in China. We believe that the goal of implementing this election system is to increase the governing ability of the Chinese Communist Party, thus sustaining the survival of the party-state system
Secret Codes of Political Propaganda
Within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), some Party units have established a largely unknown network of writing teams which propagate the policies or perspectives of a particular unit by publishing feature articles in Party journals. These writing teams often make use of a pseudonym in the form of a person's name, leading outsiders to believe that the work is written by a journalist. In fact, the pseudonyms of the Party unit writing teams functi…
The CCP's Learning System
In an attempt to mold itself into a “learning Party”, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has recently borrowed the theory of the “learning organization”, a concept derived from Western management. This article argues that, in the process of molding the CCP into a “learning Party”, President Hu Jintao has employed two functions of learning inherited from Party history—thought unification and regime adaptation—to reinforce his own political legitima…
Lifting the Veil of the CCP’s Mishu System
This article analyzes the Chinese Communist Party’s opaque mishu (secretary) system. It consists of two branches: institutional mishu and personal mishu. The former are mainly employed in Party Committee general offices, to assist the Committee leadership and liaise between departments to push Committee policies and to administer and compile relevant documents to support the policy-making process. Personal mishu work instead in the individual lea…
Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion
Within the operational procedures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadre appointment system, age restrictions hinder cadre promotion. As a result, three different methods have emerged to bypass these restrictions, allowing officials to attain faster promotion. These three methods are the Communist Youth League route, temporary transferred duty and non-regulation promotion. This article will explain the age restriction system, and then outline…
A Unique Pattern of Policymaking in China’s Authoritarian Regime
This article aims to deepen academic discussion of the Chinese Communist Party’s official media by presenting the neican/pishi (internal reference/written directive) model. The model represents an amalgamated system of internal watchdog journalism and political decision-making practices, reflecting the unique pattern of the CCP’s “documentary politics.”
Delicacies for a Privileged Class in a Risk Society
This paper discusses the history and operation of the tegong (special supplies) system for foodstuffs operated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The system has been in existence since the Yan’an period and is still being practiced today. It was originally introduced to deal with China’s shortage economy during the era of Mao Zedong. Nowadays, the issue of food safety has made China a risk society, making it necessary for the CCP to provide it…
Framing the Funeral
Influenced by Confucian culture and Soviet traditions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gives special attention to the arrangements for officials’ funerals. The format of these funerals is framed according to the officials’ rank and political performance. This article primarily discusses the funerals of national leaders and identifies five different roles: great leader, eminent leader, deposed leader, political offender, and political traitor. T…
Enabling China’s Voice to Be Heard by the World
As China becomes a more prominent international player, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has stepped up its external propaganda in a bid to promote its image as a superpower. The operations of the CCP’s external propaganda system are no longer guided by dogma; rather, these incorporate many Western theories related to “public diplomacy,” which emphasizes the role played by non-governmental actors and the use of a softer approach. However, the CC…
Concentrating Power to Accomplish Big Things
This article discusses the operations of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pishi system from the perspective of decision making. As an authoritarian regime, the CCP ‘concentrates power to accomplish big things’, demonstrating the extent of the CCP’s state capacity. This article argues that, through a wide range of documentation, the CCP provides leaders with a channel for resource accumulation, to issue pishi (written directives). Next, mishu (se…
How ‘Networked Authoritarianism’ was Operationalized in China
Does network technology weaken the ability of authoritarian regimes to govern their citizens? Arguments and discussion regarding this proposition can be found in existing studies. Scholars who support this point of view believe that certain developments in network technology led to the outbreak of the Jasmine Revolution in Arab countries in 2011. This chain of rebellions provides an obvious and affirmative example of this theory. However, as far …
The ccp’s Learning System
A Model of Adaptive Mobilization
Diaoyan (investigation and research) occupies a special place in the politics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The concept can be broken down into two distinct types: symbolic diaoyan, and standard diaoyan. The former refers to the phenomenon of top leaders promoting and initiating the coordinated implementation of a particular political line. Leaders first promote their ideas through symbolic trips and speeches, and observe the extent of su…
Managing Irregular Petitions in China
This paper uses Province A and City T as case studies to explore the strategies used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for managing citizens’ “irregular letters and visits” (irregular petitions) and the logic behind them. We believe that the local officials use both “hard” and “soft” measures to exercise control over these activities. The soft measures include persuasion and negotiation aimed at getting petitioners to abandon their irregular p…
The Authority, Functions, and Political Intrigues of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party
The General Office of the Party Central Committee is the core staff organization through which the Chinese Communist Party exercises power internally. This article discusses the attributes of the General Office’s directors and its important constituent departments, which include the Secretarial Bureau, Letters and Visits Bureau, Research Office, Security Bureau, Confidential Bureau, Confidential Communication Bureau, and Departmental Affairs Mana…
Medical Politics and the CCP’s Healthcare System for State Leaders
The health of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders is a sensitive and closely guarded secret, and academic literature on the topic has been sorely lacking as a consequence. Using the most up-to-date information, the author of this article will lift the cloak of mystery surrounding official CCP healthcare, detailing the operation of a confidential healthcare system established to provide state leaders with comprehensive medical treatment. The mai…
Integrated Fragmentation and the Role of Leading Small Groups in Chinese Politics
How are bureaucrats controlled by their superiors in the Chinese political system? “Leading small groups” (领导小组) are among the most important mechanisms for integrating the interests and opinions of various government and Party departments so that superiors can ensure that their policies are implemented. This article analyzes the roles of the three main actors in the leading small groups: group leaders, the heads of the lead departments, and the …
Penetrating the Grassroots
Since Xi Jinping placed poverty alleviation on the main agenda of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), various means have been adopted to promote a more rational distribution of income in difficult-to-manage regions. One method used by the CCP is the posting of first secretaries to rural areas, which allows the higher levels of government to penetrate the grassroots and facilitates effective poverty alleviation. This paper is a systematic empirical…
Social Constructionism and the Significance of Political Rumors in Contemporary China
Rumors are a set of collective discussions used by cadres or the masses to attain specific goals. Both political elites and the general public reveal their dissatisfaction or concern with the Chinese Communist Party regime through the dissemination of politically charged rumors, fueled by the party-state system’s habit of withholding information and amplified by traditional Chinese superstition
The Impending Rise of the “Tsinghua Clique
The Tsinghua clique is highly influential in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics. But in the past, alumni from other elite universities, such as Peking University and Renmin University of China, also occupied positions as senior cadres, so Tsinghua did not have any more influence than they did. However, since 2002, Tsinghua University has developed a ‘cultivation/transfer’ system whereby the school, in a purposeful, calculating, and organi…
Ideological Education and Practical Training at a County Party School
Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party is concentrating efforts on the cultivation of outstanding local cadres in order to improve local governance. For this purpose, it is strengthening the functions of local Party schools that offer students both political and administrative education to create a cohort of cadres who are both “red and expert.” We discuss how this is done in terms of curriculum planning, types of classes, and the student …
Strengthening China’s Powerful Commission for Discipline Inspection under Xi Jinping, with a Case Study at the County Level
On becoming paramount leader, Xi Jinping, with the assistance of Wang Qishan, augmented the powers of the Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI), the body charged with investigating wrongdoing by government and Party employees. To consolidate his power, Xi merged a number of different departments into a “great system of supervision and investigation,” known as the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). The CDI acts as the core body of the NSC…
Mobilizing cadre incentives in policy implementation
This article discusses the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mobilizes local governments to implement policies set by higher-level governments. Using the concept of 'institutionalized mobilization', we discuss poverty alleviation in H county. We identify three key mechanisms: the cross-system leading group, cross-level personnel/financial management, and pairing-up. These mechanisms involve both the adjustment of tiao tiao (条条) and …
Dual Elite Recruitment Logic and Political Manipulation under Xi Jinping
Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of “dual elite recruitment logic” as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in t…
Hobbling Big Brother
This article argues that policy implementation in China has moved toward a system under which the center formulates a blueprint or “top-level design” from which local officials devise detailed regulations through a process of “crossing the river by feeling for stones.” This applies to the development of China’s new social credit system. To minimize political risk, when implementing it local officials have selected easier goals from the “top-level…
Political science (34 obras) · Law (32 obras) · Law (31 obras) · Politics (31 obras) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (29 obras) · China (26 obras) · Communism (24 obras) · Public Administration (20 obras) · Public Administration (19 obras) · Sociology (17 obras)