Daniel Spiro
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4453611 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Daniel Spiro |
| PRENOMES | Daniel |
| SOBRENOME | Spiro |
| ASSINATURA | SPIRO D |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Uppsala University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6819-832X |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 2 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 1 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 2 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
The dynamics of revolutions
This paper answers two questions: 1) Why do revolutions sometimes start with moderate opponents of the regime, like in the Egyptian Arab Spring in 2011 and in the USSR in 1989-1991? 2) Why does the implementation of popular policies, such as Perestroika, sometimes trigger a revolution? Existing theories invariably predict that none of this should happen. We show that answers can be provided by extending Kuran’s (1989) dynamic model of mass protes…
Winners and losers of a Russian oil-export restriction
Russia has on several occasions threatened to limit its oil exports as part of its energy-economic warfare. Using a quantifiable short-run model of oil trade and detailed production and consumption data, this paper evaluates the winners and losers of potential Russian oil-export reductions and connects these to the potential interests of the Russian regime, including Russia’s oil producers and consumers and its international friends and foes. We …
Winners and losers of a Russian oil-export restriction
Russia has on several occasions threatened to limit its oil exports as part of its energy-economic warfare. Using a quantifiable short-run model of oil trade and detailed production and consumption data, this paper evaluates the winners and losers of potential Russian oil-export reductions and connects these to the potential interests of the Russian regime, including Russia’s oil producers and consumers and its international friends and foes. We …
The dynamics of revolutions
This paper answers two questions: 1) Why do revolutions sometimes start with moderate opponents of the regime, like in the Egyptian Arab Spring in 2011 and in the USSR in 1989-1991? 2) Why does the implementation of popular policies, such as Perestroika, sometimes trigger a revolution? Existing theories invariably predict that none of this should happen. We show that answers can be provided by extending Kuran’s (1989) dynamic model of mass protes…
Winners and losers of a Russian oil-export restriction
Russia has on several occasions threatened to limit its oil exports as part of its energy-economic warfare. Using a quantifiable short-run model of oil trade and detailed production and consumption data, this paper evaluates the winners and losers of potential Russian oil-export reductions and connects these to the potential interests of the Russian regime, including Russia’s oil producers and consumers and its international friends and foes. We …
Economics (2 obras) · Communism (1 obras) · Democracy (1 obras) · Development economics (1 obras) · Dissent (1 obras) · Economic history (1 obras) · Global Energy Security and Policy (1 obras) · History (1 obras) · International economics (1 obras) · International trade (1 obras)