Kaisa Kärki
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 4589134 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Kaisa Kärki |
| PRENOMES | Kaisa |
| SOBRENOME | Kärki |
| ASSINATURA | KARKI K |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Helsinki |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3028-8063 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 6 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 7 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 6 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2018 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Evaluating action possibilities
How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action not done, the agent cannot further …
Digital Distraction, Attention Regulation, and Inequality
In the popular and academic literature on the problems of the so-called attention economy , the cost of attention grabbing, sustaining, and immersing digital medias has been addressed as if it touched all people equally. In this paper I ask whether everyone has the same resources to respond to the recent changes in their stimulus environments caused by the attention economy. I argue that there are not only differences but disparities between peop…
Does a Person Have a Right to Attention? Depends on What She is Doing
It has been debated whether the so-called attention economy , in which the attention of agents is measured and sold, jeopardizes something of value. One strand of this discussion has focused on so-called attention rights, asking: should attention be legally protected, either by introducing novel rights or by extending the scope of pre-existing rights? In this paper, however, in order to further this discussion, we ask: How is attention already pr…
Explaining with Intentional Omissions
Determining the human activity that social processes consist in is a central task for the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper asks: which conception of agency arising from contemporary action theory is the most suitable for social science explanation? It is argued that a movement‐centered, Davidsonian picture of agency is not suitable for explaining certain social processes such as strikes and boycotts because, instead of intentional bo…
Listening to vaccine refusers
In bioethics vaccine refusal is often discussed as an instance of free riding on the herd immunity of an infectious disease. However, the social science of vaccine refusal suggests that the reasoning behind refusal to vaccinate more often stems from previous negative experiences in healthcare practice as well as deeply felt distrust of healthcare institutions. Moreover, vaccine refusal often acts like an exit mechanism. Whilst free riding is ofte…
Not Doings as Resistance
What does it mean to intentionally not perform an action? Is it possible to not perform an action out of resistant intention? Is there sufficient language for talking about this kind of behavior in the social sciences? In this article, a nonnormative vocabulary of not doings including resistant intentional omissions is developed. Unlike concepts that describe official, overt, and public resistance, James Scott’s everyday resistance and Albert Hir…
Not Doings as Resistance
What does it mean to intentionally not perform an action? Is it possible to not perform an action out of resistant intention? Is there sufficient language for talking about this kind of behavior in the social sciences? In this article, a nonnormative vocabulary of not doings including resistant intentional omissions is developed. Unlike concepts that describe official, overt, and public resistance, James Scott’s everyday resistance and Albert Hir…
Explaining with Intentional Omissions
Determining the human activity that social processes consist in is a central task for the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper asks: which conception of agency arising from contemporary action theory is the most suitable for social science explanation? It is argued that a movement‐centered, Davidsonian picture of agency is not suitable for explaining certain social processes such as strikes and boycotts because, instead of intentional bo…
Not Doings as Resistance
What does it mean to intentionally not perform an action? Is it possible to not perform an action out of resistant intention? Is there sufficient language for talking about this kind of behavior in the social sciences? In this article, a nonnormative vocabulary of not doings including resistant intentional omissions is developed. Unlike concepts that describe official, overt, and public resistance, James Scott’s everyday resistance and Albert Hir…
Listening to vaccine refusers
In bioethics vaccine refusal is often discussed as an instance of free riding on the herd immunity of an infectious disease. However, the social science of vaccine refusal suggests that the reasoning behind refusal to vaccinate more often stems from previous negative experiences in healthcare practice as well as deeply felt distrust of healthcare institutions. Moreover, vaccine refusal often acts like an exit mechanism. Whilst free riding is ofte…
Does a Person Have a Right to Attention? Depends on What She is Doing
It has been debated whether the so-called attention economy , in which the attention of agents is measured and sold, jeopardizes something of value. One strand of this discussion has focused on so-called attention rights, asking: should attention be legally protected, either by introducing novel rights or by extending the scope of pre-existing rights? In this paper, however, in order to further this discussion, we ask: How is attention already pr…
Explaining with Intentional Omissions
Determining the human activity that social processes consist in is a central task for the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper asks: which conception of agency arising from contemporary action theory is the most suitable for social science explanation? It is argued that a movement‐centered, Davidsonian picture of agency is not suitable for explaining certain social processes such as strikes and boycotts because, instead of intentional bo…
Digital Distraction, Attention Regulation, and Inequality
In the popular and academic literature on the problems of the so-called attention economy , the cost of attention grabbing, sustaining, and immersing digital medias has been addressed as if it touched all people equally. In this paper I ask whether everyone has the same resources to respond to the recent changes in their stimulus environments caused by the attention economy. I argue that there are not only differences but disparities between peop…
Evaluating action possibilities
How do we control what we do not do? What are the relevant guiding mental states when an agent intentionally omits to perform an action? I argue that what happens when an agent intentionally omits is a two-part metacognitive process in which a representation of an action is brought to the agent’s mind for further processing and evaluated by her as something not to be done. Without a representation of the action not done, the agent cannot further …
Psychology (6 obras) · Epistemology (4 obras) · Social Psychology (4 obras) · Sociology (4 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras) · Philosophy (3 obras) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 obras) · Action (physics (2 obras) · Cognition (2 obras) · Cognitive science (2 obras)