Jonathan Y Tsou
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 460668 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jonathan Y Tsou |
| PRENOMES | Jonathan Y |
| SOBRENOME | Tsou |
| ASSINATURA | TSOU J Y |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Iowa State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3939-1518 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 16 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 15 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 2 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2001 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
Technology Ethics
In this chapter, the author explains the post-phenomenological approach to ethics of technology. He introduces post-phenomenology itself, as a specific way to analyze technology and its role in society and discusses the various dimensions of the moral significance of technology that become visible from the post-phenomenological approach. The author explains how technologies mediate moral actions and decisions, how they help to shape value framewo…
Biological Essentialism, Projectable Human Kinds, and Psychiatric Classification
A minimal essentialism (“intrinsic biological essentialism”) about natural kinds is required to explain the projectability of human science terms. Human classifications that yield robust and ampliative projectable inferences refer to biological kinds. I articulate this argument with reference to an intrinsic essentialist account of homeostatic property cluster kinds. This account implies that human sciences (e.g., medicine, psychiatry) that aim t…
Social Construction, HPC Kinds, and the Projectability of Human Categories
This paper addresses the question of how human science categories yield projectable inferences by critically examining Ron Mallon’s “social role” account of human kinds. Mallon contends that human categories are projectable when a social role produces a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kind. On this account, human categories are projectable when various social mechanisms stabilize and entrench those categories. Mallon’s analysis obscures a dist…
Natural kinds, psychiatric classification and the history of the DSM
This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e.g. schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a method for classifying natu…
Objectivity in Science
Objectivity in Science
Objectivity in Science
This highly multidisciplinary collection discusses an increasingly important topic among scholars in science and technology studies: objectivity in science. It features eleven essays on scientific objectivity from a variety of perspectives, including philosophy of science, history of science, and feminist philosophy. Topics addressed in the book include the nature and value of scientific objectivity, the history of objectivity, and objectivity in…
Intervention, causal reasoning, and the neurobiology of mental disorders
The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry
Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks to demonstrate that a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can provide a rich and informative philosophical perspective for critically examining the issue of psychiatric classification. This case is inten…
Putnam’s account of apriority and scientific change
Rachel Cooper Classifying Madness
Defining Mental Disorder
Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science
This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) t…
The Justification of Concepts in Carnap's Aufbau
This paper concerns the recent debate on the nature and motivations of the epistemological project advanced in Rudolf Carnap's (1891–1970) Aufbau. Much of this debate has been initiated by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson who argue (against the received view of the Aufbau as a foundationalist defense of empiricism) that Carnap's epistemological project is located in the tradition of neo-Kantian epistemology. On this revisionist reading of the…
A Role for Reason in Science
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Prospects for Stimulant Maintenance in Vancouver, Canada
Medical provision of orally-administered stimulants is a harm reduction technique that could reduce suffering and slow the spread of AIDS among cocaine misusers in Vancouver, B.C., Canada. However, experimentation with stimulant maintenance will be difficult to carry out until the public's exaggerated fears of cocaine and other stimulants, engendered by a prolonged “War on Drugs”, have subsided. This article explores the prospects for stimulant m…
Intervention, causal reasoning, and the neurobiology of mental disorders
The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry
Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks to demonstrate that a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can provide a rich and informative philosophical perspective for critically examining the issue of psychiatric classification. This case is inten…
Social Construction, HPC Kinds, and the Projectability of Human Categories
This paper addresses the question of how human science categories yield projectable inferences by critically examining Ron Mallon’s “social role” account of human kinds. Mallon contends that human categories are projectable when a social role produces a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kind. On this account, human categories are projectable when various social mechanisms stabilize and entrench those categories. Mallon’s analysis obscures a dist…
Biological Essentialism, Projectable Human Kinds, and Psychiatric Classification
A minimal essentialism (“intrinsic biological essentialism”) about natural kinds is required to explain the projectability of human science terms. Human classifications that yield robust and ampliative projectable inferences refer to biological kinds. I articulate this argument with reference to an intrinsic essentialist account of homeostatic property cluster kinds. This account implies that human sciences (e.g., medicine, psychiatry) that aim t…
Putnam’s account of apriority and scientific change
The Justification of Concepts in Carnap's Aufbau
This paper concerns the recent debate on the nature and motivations of the epistemological project advanced in Rudolf Carnap's (1891–1970) Aufbau. Much of this debate has been initiated by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson who argue (against the received view of the Aufbau as a foundationalist defense of empiricism) that Carnap's epistemological project is located in the tradition of neo-Kantian epistemology. On this revisionist reading of the…
A Role for Reason in Science
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Prospects for Stimulant Maintenance in Vancouver, Canada
Medical provision of orally-administered stimulants is a harm reduction technique that could reduce suffering and slow the spread of AIDS among cocaine misusers in Vancouver, B.C., Canada. However, experimentation with stimulant maintenance will be difficult to carry out until the public's exaggerated fears of cocaine and other stimulants, engendered by a prolonged “War on Drugs”, have subsided. This article explores the prospects for stimulant m…
The Justification of Concepts in Carnap's Aufbau
This paper concerns the recent debate on the nature and motivations of the epistemological project advanced in Rudolf Carnap's (1891–1970) Aufbau. Much of this debate has been initiated by Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson who argue (against the received view of the Aufbau as a foundationalist defense of empiricism) that Carnap's epistemological project is located in the tradition of neo-Kantian epistemology. On this revisionist reading of the…
A Role for Reason in Science
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science
This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) t…
Defining Mental Disorder
Putnam’s account of apriority and scientific change
Rachel Cooper Classifying Madness
The Importance of History for Philosophy of Psychiatry
Recently, some philosophers of psychiatry (viz., Rachel Cooper and Dominic Murphy) have analyzed the issue of psychiatric classification. This paper expands upon these analyses and seeks to demonstrate that a consideration of the history of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can provide a rich and informative philosophical perspective for critically examining the issue of psychiatric classification. This case is inten…
Intervention, causal reasoning, and the neurobiology of mental disorders
Objectivity in Science
Objectivity in Science
Objectivity in Science
This highly multidisciplinary collection discusses an increasingly important topic among scholars in science and technology studies: objectivity in science. It features eleven essays on scientific objectivity from a variety of perspectives, including philosophy of science, history of science, and feminist philosophy. Topics addressed in the book include the nature and value of scientific objectivity, the history of objectivity, and objectivity in…
Natural kinds, psychiatric classification and the history of the DSM
This paper addresses philosophical issues concerning whether mental disorders are natural kinds and how the DSM should classify mental disorders. I argue that some mental disorders (e.g. schizophrenia, depression) are natural kinds in the sense that they are natural classes constituted by a set of stable biological mechanisms. I subsequently argue that a theoretical and causal approach to classification would provide a method for classifying natu…
Social Construction, HPC Kinds, and the Projectability of Human Categories
This paper addresses the question of how human science categories yield projectable inferences by critically examining Ron Mallon’s “social role” account of human kinds. Mallon contends that human categories are projectable when a social role produces a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kind. On this account, human categories are projectable when various social mechanisms stabilize and entrench those categories. Mallon’s analysis obscures a dist…
Biological Essentialism, Projectable Human Kinds, and Psychiatric Classification
A minimal essentialism (“intrinsic biological essentialism”) about natural kinds is required to explain the projectability of human science terms. Human classifications that yield robust and ampliative projectable inferences refer to biological kinds. I articulate this argument with reference to an intrinsic essentialist account of homeostatic property cluster kinds. This account implies that human sciences (e.g., medicine, psychiatry) that aim t…
Technology Ethics
In this chapter, the author explains the post-phenomenological approach to ethics of technology. He introduces post-phenomenology itself, as a specific way to analyze technology and its role in society and discusses the various dimensions of the moral significance of technology that become visible from the post-phenomenological approach. The author explains how technologies mediate moral actions and decisions, how they help to shape value framewo…
Epistemology (12 obras) · Philosophy (12 obras) · Psychology (8 obras) · Mental Health and Psychiatry (7 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (7 obras) · Philosophy of science (6 obras) · Computer Science (5 obras) · Psychiatry (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · Medicine (4 obras)