Alberto Voltolini
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 461085 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Alberto Voltolini |
| PRENOMES | Alberto |
| SOBRENOME | Voltolini |
| ASSINATURA | VOLTOLINI A |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Turin |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0400-1978 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 24 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 24 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2005 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2025 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Did the Greeks believe in their myths
In this paper, against a new imagination-based account defended by Anna Ichino in some recent works, I defend the intuitive and traditional idea that so-called religious beliefs are indeed those doxastic attitudes that they are traditionally taken to be, i.e., bona fide beliefs. Yet I take that the objects of such beliefs amount to be different from what religious believers consciously take them to be; namely, they are mythological characters, a …
What Makes a Version of a Work a Version of That Work
In this paper, I want to defend the following claim. There is a good chance of keeping the Meinongian account of the individuation of fictional works and applying it to the individuation of versions of such a work, provided one properly takes into account some factors characterizing the make-believe games underlying the production of such versions, namely factors characterizing having to do with the remaking of such games, in order to explain why…
The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences
There are some complex experiences, such as the experiences that allow us to understand linguistic expressions and pictures respectively, which seem to be very similar. For they are stratified experiences in which, on top of grasping certain low-level properties, one also grasps some high-level semantic-like properties. Yet first of all, those similarities notwithstanding, a phenomenologically-based reflection shows that such experiences are diff…
The Strange Case of Dr. Moloch and Mr. Snazzo (or the Parmenides’ Riddle Once Again)
Once one draws a distinction between loyal non-existent items, which do not exist in a non-universal sense of the first-order existence predicate, and non-items, which fail to exist in a universal sense of that predicate, one may allow for the former but not for the latter in the overall ontological domain, so as to adopt a form of soft Parmenideanism. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for this distinction
Against mythical backward-looking creationism
I want to hold an original position as regards the metaphysics of mythical entities, a kind of fictional entities that, typically at least, are not recognised as such by their purported authors, for they entertain no relevant act of make-believe. This position is weak mythical creationism, which lies between straightforward mythical creationism, the position holding that all mythical entities are on a par by being created by their purported autho…
Perceiving Aesthetic Properties
In this paper, I want to claim that, in conformity with overall intuitions, there are some aesthetic properties that are perceivable. For they are high-level properties that are not only grasped immediately, but also attended to holistically—just like the grouping properties they depend on and that are responsible for the Gestalt effects or switches through which they are grasped. Yet, unlike such grouping properties, they are holistically attend…
Down But Not Out
If intentional objects are objects for a subject, how are they related
Tim Crane has put forward a theory of intentional objects (intentionalia), which has taken up again and expanded by Casey Woodling. Crane’s theory is articulated in three main theses: a) every intentional state, or thought, is about an intentional object; b) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a schematic object; c) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a phenomenological object. In this p…
Possibilia, Qualia, and Sensibilia
In this article I shall first and foremost attempt to show that the semantic requirements of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus intend the objects of the Tractatus to be conceived of as possibilia in the Russellian sense of 1903, i.e., as objects that may exist or may not exist; secondly, that the general ontology of the Tractatus suggests integrating this onto-semantic conception with a conception of these objects not properly as qual…
Down but Not Out
A contextualist treatment of negative existentials
In this paper, I want to vindicate the contextualist treatment that is typically applied by artefactualists on fictional entities ( ficta ) both to general and to singular negative existentials. According to this treatment, the truth value of a negative existential, whether general or singular, changes according to whether the existential quantifier or the first-order existence predicate is contextually used as respectively ranging over and apply…
Beliefs, make-beliefs, and making believe that beliefs are not make-beliefs
Fictional reference
In the old days of descriptivism, fictional reference and non-fictional reference with proper names were treated on a par. Descriptivism was not an intuitive theory, but it meritoriously provided a unitary semantic account of names, whether referentially full or empty. Then the revolution of the new theory of reference occurred. This new theory is definitely more intuitive than descriptivism, yet it comes with a drawback: the referentially full u…
Pleasure of Pictures
Against Phenomenal Externalism
We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up …
A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction
What is depiction? A new answer is given to this venerable question by providing a syncretistic theory of depiction that tries to combine the merits of the previous theories on the matter while droppi
From fictionalism to realism
Electronic transport through a graphene-based ferromagnetic/normal/ferromagnetic junction
Electronic transport in a graphene-based ferromagnetic/normal/ferromagnetic junction is investigated by means of the Landauer-Büttiker formalism and the nonequilibrium Green function technique. For the zigzag edge case, the results show that the conductance is always larger than e(2)/h for the parallel configuration of lead magnetizations, but for the antiparallel configuration the conductance becomes zero because of the band-selective rule. Ther…
L'irrimediabile dilemma del traduttore
This paper will try to show that there are not only de facto, but also de jure reasons as to why a translation cannot keep all the aspects of the original that it should, intuitively speaking, preserve in order for it to ideally be a good translation. For instance, if you preserve figurativity in translation you can hardly preserve the truthconditional meaning of the original; if you preserve self-reference in translation you can hardly preserve …
How pretence can really be metarepresentational
Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts
Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia
Journal Article Are there Non‐Existent Intentionalia? Get access Alberto Voltolini Alberto Voltolini Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 224, July 2006, Pages 436–441, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00451.x Published: 16 June 2006
Should Pride of Place be Given to the Norms? Intentionality and Normativity
Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this pape…
Pragmatica del linguaggio
Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts
A contextualist treatment of negative existentials
In this paper, I want to vindicate the contextualist treatment that is typically applied by artefactualists on fictional entities ( ficta ) both to general and to singular negative existentials. According to this treatment, the truth value of a negative existential, whether general or singular, changes according to whether the existential quantifier or the first-order existence predicate is contextually used as respectively ranging over and apply…
How pretence can really be metarepresentational
Pragmatica del linguaggio
Should Pride of Place be Given to the Norms? Intentionality and Normativity
Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this pape…
Pragmatica del linguaggio
Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts
Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia
Journal Article Are there Non‐Existent Intentionalia? Get access Alberto Voltolini Alberto Voltolini Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 56, Issue 224, July 2006, Pages 436–441, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00451.x Published: 16 June 2006
L'irrimediabile dilemma del traduttore
This paper will try to show that there are not only de facto, but also de jure reasons as to why a translation cannot keep all the aspects of the original that it should, intuitively speaking, preserve in order for it to ideally be a good translation. For instance, if you preserve figurativity in translation you can hardly preserve the truthconditional meaning of the original; if you preserve self-reference in translation you can hardly preserve …
How pretence can really be metarepresentational
Electronic transport through a graphene-based ferromagnetic/normal/ferromagnetic junction
Electronic transport in a graphene-based ferromagnetic/normal/ferromagnetic junction is investigated by means of the Landauer-Büttiker formalism and the nonequilibrium Green function technique. For the zigzag edge case, the results show that the conductance is always larger than e(2)/h for the parallel configuration of lead magnetizations, but for the antiparallel configuration the conductance becomes zero because of the band-selective rule. Ther…
From fictionalism to realism
A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction
What is depiction? A new answer is given to this venerable question by providing a syncretistic theory of depiction that tries to combine the merits of the previous theories on the matter while droppi
Against Phenomenal Externalism
We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up …
Pleasure of Pictures
A contextualist treatment of negative existentials
In this paper, I want to vindicate the contextualist treatment that is typically applied by artefactualists on fictional entities ( ficta ) both to general and to singular negative existentials. According to this treatment, the truth value of a negative existential, whether general or singular, changes according to whether the existential quantifier or the first-order existence predicate is contextually used as respectively ranging over and apply…
Beliefs, make-beliefs, and making believe that beliefs are not make-beliefs
Fictional reference
In the old days of descriptivism, fictional reference and non-fictional reference with proper names were treated on a par. Descriptivism was not an intuitive theory, but it meritoriously provided a unitary semantic account of names, whether referentially full or empty. Then the revolution of the new theory of reference occurred. This new theory is definitely more intuitive than descriptivism, yet it comes with a drawback: the referentially full u…
Down But Not Out
If intentional objects are objects for a subject, how are they related
Tim Crane has put forward a theory of intentional objects (intentionalia), which has taken up again and expanded by Casey Woodling. Crane’s theory is articulated in three main theses: a) every intentional state, or thought, is about an intentional object; b) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a schematic object; c) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a phenomenological object. In this p…
Possibilia, Qualia, and Sensibilia
In this article I shall first and foremost attempt to show that the semantic requirements of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus intend the objects of the Tractatus to be conceived of as possibilia in the Russellian sense of 1903, i.e., as objects that may exist or may not exist; secondly, that the general ontology of the Tractatus suggests integrating this onto-semantic conception with a conception of these objects not properly as qual…
Down but Not Out
The Strange Case of Dr. Moloch and Mr. Snazzo (or the Parmenides’ Riddle Once Again)
Once one draws a distinction between loyal non-existent items, which do not exist in a non-universal sense of the first-order existence predicate, and non-items, which fail to exist in a universal sense of that predicate, one may allow for the former but not for the latter in the overall ontological domain, so as to adopt a form of soft Parmenideanism. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for this distinction
Against mythical backward-looking creationism
I want to hold an original position as regards the metaphysics of mythical entities, a kind of fictional entities that, typically at least, are not recognised as such by their purported authors, for they entertain no relevant act of make-believe. This position is weak mythical creationism, which lies between straightforward mythical creationism, the position holding that all mythical entities are on a par by being created by their purported autho…
Perceiving Aesthetic Properties
In this paper, I want to claim that, in conformity with overall intuitions, there are some aesthetic properties that are perceivable. For they are high-level properties that are not only grasped immediately, but also attended to holistically—just like the grouping properties they depend on and that are responsible for the Gestalt effects or switches through which they are grasped. Yet, unlike such grouping properties, they are holistically attend…
The Different Bases of the Meaning and of the Seeing-in Experiences
There are some complex experiences, such as the experiences that allow us to understand linguistic expressions and pictures respectively, which seem to be very similar. For they are stratified experiences in which, on top of grasping certain low-level properties, one also grasps some high-level semantic-like properties. Yet first of all, those similarities notwithstanding, a phenomenologically-based reflection shows that such experiences are diff…
Did the Greeks believe in their myths
In this paper, against a new imagination-based account defended by Anna Ichino in some recent works, I defend the intuitive and traditional idea that so-called religious beliefs are indeed those doxastic attitudes that they are traditionally taken to be, i.e., bona fide beliefs. Yet I take that the objects of such beliefs amount to be different from what religious believers consciously take them to be; namely, they are mythological characters, a …
What Makes a Version of a Work a Version of That Work
In this paper, I want to defend the following claim. There is a good chance of keeping the Meinongian account of the individuation of fictional works and applying it to the individuation of versions of such a work, provided one properly takes into account some factors characterizing the make-believe games underlying the production of such versions, namely factors characterizing having to do with the remaking of such games, in order to explain why…
Philosophy (19 obras) · Epistemology (18 obras) · Computer Science (14 obras) · Psychology (10 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 obras) · Linguistics (7 obras) · Metaphysics (6 obras) · Philosophy (6 obras) · Social Psychology (5 obras) · Art (4 obras)